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Abstract 
 
Landshypotek is today Sweden’s largest lending institution for land and forest owners with 
loan assets around 50 billion SEK. “Landshypotek AB” is owned by an economic association 
consisting of 52 000 members and has 19 offices all over Sweden. Its market share of first 
mortgage loans to land and forest owners is 38 percent. To be a member in Landshypotek 
ownership of land or forest are compulsory and the members have to place their mortgage in 
Landshypotek. 
 
Landshypotek’s equity for 2010 was barely 3,4 billion SEK which has been built up through 
patronage refunds on the borrowers (members) interest payments. The members’ contributed 
capital constitutes just over 1 billion of the equity and the rest (2,4 billion) is Landshypotek’s 
unallocated equity. The equity is enough to balance today’s lending but since the market is 
expanding a demand for capital and Landshypotek’s future growth strategy more equity is 
needed. Landshypotek is therefore considering introducing a change in the financial model at 
the beginning of the year 2012. 
 
In comparison with investor-owned firms, cooperatives are at a disadvantage in raising equity 
capital. The cooperative equity is not marketable because the distribution of earnings in 
cooperatives is based on patronage and not investment. As a result there are no incentives for 
non patrons to invest in a cooperative and cooperatives are therefore restricted to its members 
to raise equity. But members may be reluctant to increase their illiquid stake in a cooperative 
because of the non marketability of the equity. The possibility to raise equity through retained 
earnings may also be met with resistance from the cooperative’s members because it 
translates into higher costs and lower revenues for the patrons. 
 
The aim of the study is to answer the following questions, hence the issue is if 
Landshypotek’s members be negative towards increasing their illiquid stake? Is the intended 
change of contributed capital likely to reduce the risk of free-rider problems? Are members 
with a long time left in Landshypotek likely to be more positive towards the intended change 
of contributed capital than those with a short time left? Will members terminate their business 
relationship with Landshypotek due to the intended change of contributed capital? How will 
the intended change of contributed capital affect a member’s cost of capital?  
 
The thesis is conducted as a qualitative case study. The empirical material consists of 
qualitative research interviews with twelve members in Landshypotek and a study of four 
scenarios regarding the members’ cost of capital. 
 
The conclusion is that Landshypotek’s members will not be negative towards increasing their 
illiquid stake. The members, regardless of their expected time horizon, are also positive 
towards the intended change of contributed capital and the members with long time left in 
Landshypotek are more positive towards the possibility to actively contribute with capital. 
The intended change of contributed capital is likely to reduce the risk of free-rider problem. It 
is also revealed that the members will not terminate their business activities with 
Landshypotek due to the intended change of contributed capital as long as Landshypotek is 
meeting the objective of ten percent dividend on contributed capital. Finally, the intended 
change of contributed capital tends to increase the cost of capital for non investing members 
and decrease it for investing members. 
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Sammanfattning  
 
Landshypotek är idag Sveriges största kreditgivare för jord- och skogsägare med en utlåning 
omkring 50 miljarder kronor. Landshypotek AB ägs av en ekonomisk förening bestående av 
52 000 medlemmar och har 19 kontor i Sverige. Landshypoteks marknadsandel av bottenlån 
till jord- och skogsägare är 38 procent. Det är ett krav att äga jord eller skog för att erhålla ett 
bottenlån hos Landshypotek. 
 
2010 var Landshypoteks egna kapital knappt 3,4 miljarder svenska kronor som har byggts upp 
genom återbäring från låntagarnas (medlemmarnas) räntebetalningar. Medlemmarnas 
insatskapital uppgår till drygt 1 miljard av det egna kapitaler och de resterande (2,4 miljarder) 
utgör Landshypoteks fria egna kapital. Det finns tillräckligt eget kapital för att klara dagens 
utlåning, men pga. marknadens ökande krav på kapital och Landshypoteks framtida tillväxt 
strategi behövs mer eget kapital. Därför överväger Landshypotek att introducera en förändring 
i den finansiella modellen med start år 2012.    
 
I jämförelse med aktiebolag, har kooperativa företag en nackdel när det gäller att anskaffa 
eget kapital. Det egna kapitalet är låst i kooperativet pga. att fördelningen av överskottet är 
baserad på handeln med kooperativet och inte investeringar. Detta leder till en brist på 
incitament till att investera i kooperativet för icke medlemmar varför kooperativet är 
begränsat till medlemmarna för att anskaffa eget kapital. Å andra sidan kan medlemmarna 
kanske vara motvilliga till att öka sin kapitalandel i kooperativet pga. kapitalet är låst i 
föreningen. Möjligheten att anskaffa eget kapital genom att ökade marginaler kommer också 
troligtvis att ogillas av medlemmarna eftersom det innebär högre kostnader och lägre intäkter 
för medlemmarna.  
 
Målet med denna studie är därför att besvara följande frågor, Är Landshypoteks medlemmar 
att vara negativa till att öka deras kapitalandelar? Kommer den planerade förändringen av 
insatskapitalet minska risken med ”free-rider” problemen? Är det troligt att medlemmar med 
lång tid kvar i Landshypotek vara mer positiva till förändringen av insatskapitalet än 
medlemmar med kort tid kvar? Kommer medlemmar avsluta sina affärer med Landshypotek 
pga. den planerade förändringen av insatskapitalet? Hur förväntas förändringen av 
insatskapitalet påverka en medlems kapitalkostnad? 
 
Uppsatsen är genomförd som en kvalitativ fallstudie. Det empiriska materialet består av 
kvalitativa forskningsintervjuer med tolv medlemmar i Landshypotek och en studie av fyra 
scenarier angående medlemmarnas kapitalkostnad.  
 
Slutsatsen är att medlemmarna i Landshypotek inte förväntas vara negativa till att öka deras 
respektive kapitalandelar. Medlemmarna, oavsett deras förväntade tidshorisont, är också 
positiva till den planerade förändringen av insatskapitalet. Medlemmar med lång tid kvar i 
Landshypotek är mer positiva till möjligheten att aktivt bidra med kapital. Den planerade 
förändringen förväntas minska risken med ”free-rider” problemen. Det framgår dessutom att 
medlemmarna inte avser att avsluta sina affärer med Landshypotek pga. den planerade 
förändringen av insatskapitalet så länge Landshypotek lyckas nå målet med tio procents 
utdelning på insatskapitalet. Slutligen leder den planerade förändringen av insatskapitalet till 
en ökning av kapitalkostnaden för medlemmar som inte väljer att investera medan 
kapitalkostnaden sjunker för de medlemmar som investerar.   
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1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of the introduction chapter is to provide the reader with an overview of the 
study’s aim, problem, delimitations and a background of Landshypotek.    
 
1.1 Background 
 
Landshypotek’s first regional association was established in 1836 in Scania, Sweden (www, 
Landshypotek, 2011, 1). Its purpose was to provide farmers with credits and to use their 
agricultural land as security. During the 1840s and 50s, an additional six regional associations 
were established. All the regional associations had been established as privately organized 
cooperatives without government support. The cooperative idea meant that the regional 
associations were not aspiring for profit and as a result they could provide credits at low 
interest rates, basically at the same rate as the associations borrowing rates. This was made 
possible through specific subsidies that were not reflected in the interest rate and that covered 
the cost of management.  
 
During 1856-1857 the conditions on the international debt market worsened. This led to 
higher interest rates and borrowing problems (www, Landshypotek, 2011, 1). As a result the 
lending of regional associations declined dramatically while the need for capital after a poor 
harvest was large. During the 1850s there had also been an increased lack of trust in the 
regional associations amongst farmers. This led to the conclusion that it was necessary to 
reorganize the organization. Hence, in 1860 the idea of centralization of funding for a joint 
mortgage bank was presented (www, Landshypotek, 2011, 2). 
 
The regional associations' position to the proposal was not necessarily positive (www, 
Landshypotek, 2011, 2). A few of the regional associations claimed that they had succeeded 
as independent entities and therefore did not need any central control from Stockholm, while 
other regional associations welcomed the proposal because they felt that the lending 
conditions became too onerous and that they would receive more favorable terms if the 
borrowing was managed centrally. Although the attitudes differed amongst the regional 
associations, the proposal of centralization of funding for a joint mortgage bank was accepted 
in 1861 and got the name “Sveriges Allmänna Hypotetsbank”.  
 
Because of the deregulation of the Swedish credit market in 1983 and the adaption of 
international capital adequacy rules, it was necessary for Landshypotek to strengthen its 
capital (www, Landshypotek, 2011, 3). Once again it was necessary to reorganize the 
organization. In 1995 the decision was made for Landshypotek to be reorganized as a joint-
stock-company, which got the name “Landshypotek AB”. The joint-stock-company was to be 
owned by a new economic association formed by the ten existing regional associations. By 
forming this organization Landshypotek had created a cooperative organization that basically 
made it impossible for takeovers by outside stakeholders and at the same time guaranteed the 
borrowers continued influence. 
 
Landshypotek is today Sweden’s largest credit institution for land and forest owners with loan 
assets around 50 billion SEK (www, Landshypotek, 2011, 4). As shown in figure 1 
Landshypotek’s market share of first mortgage loans to land and forest owners is 38 percent 
(pers. com Ordell, 2011). “Landshypotek AB” is owned by the economic association 
consisting of 52 000 members and has 19 offices all over Sweden. The organizational 
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structure is shown in figure 2. Membership in Landshypotek requires ownership of land or 
forest, and the members have to place their mortgage in Landshypotek (www, Landshypotek, 
2011, 5).  
 
 
Figure 1. Landshypotek’s market share of first mortgage loans to land and forest owners 2010. Source own 
arrangement 
 
All clients in “Landshypotek AB” automatically become members of the Landshypotek 
economic association. The economic association is a cooperative where “one member one 
vote” is applied at the annual meeting (Landshypotek, 2010). Members use their vote at the 
annual meeting to select “elected representatives” that will serve as appraisers, ambassadors 
and board of directors (www, Landshypotek, 2011, 10). Of the 52 000 members there are a 
couple of hundred “elected representatives”. Today Landshypotek can provide almost all the 
same services as a common bank but the main business idea is the same as it was 175 years 
ago, namely to provide land and forest owners with credits and to use their agricultural land 
as security (www, Landshypotek, 2011, 6) (Landshypotek, 2011, 1).  
 
“Landshypotek AB” is the parent company where 90 percent of the group business is 
conducted (Landshypotek, 2010). The parent company provides land and forest owners with 
first mortgage loans up to 75 percent of the assessed market value, secured by real property. 
Within the group there are also two subsidiary companies, “Landshypotek Jordbrukskredit 
AB” and “Lantbrukskredit AB”. “Landshypotek Jordbrukskredit AB” provides other credits 
for land and forest owners not covered by “Landshypotek AB”. “Lantbrukskredit AB” finance 
farm related activities. However, since July 2003 there are no new credits provided by 
“Lantbrukskredit AB”.  
 
Landshypotek group is financed through borrowing on the capital market and the members’ 
contributed capital (Landshypotek, 2010). Borrowing on the capital market is distributed in a 
number of funding programs tailored to different types of investors, and thereby achieving the 
desired flexibility. All borrowing on the capital market was managed by “Sveriges Allmänna 
Hypotetsbank” up until 1997. But “Sveriges Allmänna Hypotetsbank” is currently being 
discontinued and today all borrowing is managed by “Landshypotek AB”.   
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Figure 2. Organizational chart for Landshypotek group. Source own arrangement according to Landshypotek 
2011, 11  
 
Figure 2 shows Landshypotek groups organizational structure with “Landshypotek ekonomisk 
förening” (Landshypotek economic association) as the controlling entity over “Landshypotek 
AB” and its subsidiary companies “Landshypotek Jordbrukskredit AB” and “Lantbrukskredit 
AB”. The figure also shows “Sveriges Allmänna Hypotetsbank” that is currently being 
discontinued.  
 
Landshypotek’s governance is structured as in figure 3. Landshypotek’s members are divided 
into ten different regions (www, Landshypotek, 2011, 11). All members are welcome to their 
regional meeting to vote for representatives to the regional board. The members are entitled 
one vote each. If members have an idea or an issue, they contact their local representative, 
who discuss the subject on the regional board. The matter is also passed on to the board of the 
economic association and the board of “Landshypotek AB” (pers. com Ordell, 2011). The 
board of the economic association consists of one member from each regional board, the chief 
executive officer and two union representatives (www, Landshypotek, 2011, 11). The board 
of “Landshypotek AB” is chosen at the Annual General Meeting by a proposal from the 
nominating committee (pers. com Ordell, 2011). The nominating committee consists of 
members from the economic association board. 
 
 
Figure 3. Organizational chart for governance in Landshypotek. Source own arrangement 
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Figure 3 describes how the members in Landshypotek are able to influence the management 
of the company. Every member has one vote that they can use at the regional meeting to elect 
representatives for the regional board. It is then up to the “elected representatives” to 
represent the members and influence how “Landshypotek AB” is managed.  
 
Landshypotek’s lending to its members was barely 52 billion SEK in 2010, which is a lending 
growth of 11,4 percent compared to 2009 (Landshypotek, 2011, 2). During 2009 
Landshypotek’s net lending increased by 5,2 billion which corresponds to a lending growth of 
12,5 percent (Landshypotek, 2010). This is an 8,5 percentage units larger increase compared 
to 2008 when the net lending only increased by four percent. The large lending growth in 
2009 compared to 2008 is explained by increased activity on the market with strong interests 
in both land purchases and investment in buildings and machinery. During 2009 the lending 
to the public (members) amounted to 46 billion SEK and as shown in figure 4 the lending has 
increased continuously since 2006.  
 
Landshypotek’s equity for 2010 was barely 3,4 billion SEK which has been built up through 
patronage refund on the borrowers (members) interest payments (Landshypotek, 2011, 2) 
(Landshypotek, 2011, 1). The members’ contributed capital constitutes just over 1 billion of 
the equity and the rest (2,4 billion) is Landshypotek’s unallocated equity. The equity is 
enough to balance today’s lending but because of the increasing demand for capital and 
Landshypotek’s future growth strategy more equity is needed. Landshypotek is therefore 
considering introducing a change in the financial model at the start of year 2012.  
 
 
Figure 4. Landshypotek’s lending to the public(members) 2006-2010. Source Landshypotek 2011, 2 
 
A figure 4 show that Landshypotek’s lending to the public (members) has increased 
continuously from 2006 to 2010. Landshypotek’s lending to the public amounted to barely 
52 billion during 2010 which is an 11,4 % increase compared to 2009. 
 
1.1.1 Old model 
 
One of Landshypotek’s objectives is that only its members should profit from the low interest 
rates (Landshypotek, 2011, 1). This means that Landshypotek can offer competitive lending 
conditions and at the same time let members receive a share of the economic surplus through 
patronage refund and interest on contributed capital. Landshypotek’s profits are today 
distributed to borrowers (members) through patronage refund on interest that the borrowers 
paid during the year and interest on contributed capital (www, Landshypotek, 2011, 7).  
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How large the patronage refund will be is determined each year on Landshypotek’s annual 
meeting. In 2009 the patronage refund was 4,5 percent, which meant the members received a 
refund that amounted to 4,5 percent of their individual paid interests. Of the received 
patronage refund, 70 percent is deposited into an equity account until it reaches eight percent 
(input limit) of the borrowed capital (www, Landshypotek, 2011, 8). The remaining 30 
percent and any excess of the input limit are deposited into a member account.  
 
The proceeds on the equity account serve as the members’ contributed capital and are paid out 
first three years after the members exit from Landshypotek. The contributed capital is fixed 
for the whole lending period but the proceeds on the member account offers three choices 
(www, Landshypotek, 2011, 9). Keep the money in the member account and receive interest, 
receive deduction of interest payments or request cash payout (minimum withdrawal is 5000 
SEK). Both the equity account and member account are interest bearing and for the last ten 
years the interest rate has averaged around five percent (www, Landshypotek, 2011, 7). 
 
 
Figure 5. Distribution of Landshypotek’s profit in the old model. Source own arrangement 
 
Figure 5 describes how Landshypotek’s profit is distributed in the old model. The members 
receive patronage refund based on Landshypotek’s business surplus and the members’ paid 
interests.  
 
1.1.2 Distribution of contributed capital  
 
The old model implies an illogical distribution of the contributed capital between different 
member categories (Landshypotek, 2011, 1). The member categories consist of members with 
different amounts of contributed capital in relation to their borrowed capital. As shown in 
figure 6 nearly half of the members each have a contributed capital that is larger than eight 
percent of their borrowed capital but the rest of the members’ contributed capital ranges from 
zero to eight percent. The total contributed capital in Landshypotek was just over 1 billion in 
2010 (Landshypotek, 2011, 1). Table 1 shows that members with a contributed capital in 
excess of eight percent of their borrowed capital accounted for 29 percent of the total 
contributed capital in Landshypotek in 2010. The second largest group of contributors are 
members with 1,0 % – 1,5 % and 1,5 % - 2,0 % in contributed capital, that each accounts for 
seven percent of total contributed capital in Landshypotek. This makes the members with a 
contributed capital exceeding eight percent of their borrowed capital the single largest group 
of capital contributors in Landshypotek.  
 
The data in appendix 7 shows that 27 percent of the members each have less than two percent 
contributed capital. Their contributed capital equals 22 percent of the total contributed capital 
but their debt equals 68 percent of Landshypotek’s total lending. The reason for this is 
probably that members with little contributed capital have been members for fewer years and 
have not been able to amortize much of their debt. In contrast, members with large 
contributed capital have been members for many years and therefore amortized most of the 
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original debt. The conclusion is that many members with large loans have contributed little 
capital. This could constitute a problem because members with little contributed capital can 
take part of profits from the cooperative without contributing too much. The intended change 
of contributed capital is a proposal that might solve this problem. 
 
 
Figure 6. Members with different amount contributed capital in relation to their borrowed capital. Source own 
arrangement according to Landshypotek 
 
Figure 6 illustrates in intervals how much capital Landshypotek’s members have contributed 
with. Approximately 7 000 members each have a contributed capital that ranges from 0,0 % - 
0,5 % of their borrowed capital. The interval groups between 0,5 % - 1,0 % and 7,5 % - 8 % 
all consists of around 2000 members each. The largest interval group consists of roughly 
23 000 members who all have a contributed capital in excess of eight percent of their 
borrowed capital. 
 
Table 1. Distribution of members’ contributed capital in Landshypotek. Source own arrangement 
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Table 1 illustrates how the contributed capital is distributed among the different member 
categories in relation to Landshypotek’s total contributed capital. The table shows that 
members with contributed capital over eight percent of their borrowed capital contribute with 
29 percent of Landshypotek’s total contributed capital, making them the single largest group 
of capital contributors.  
 
 
Figure 7: Total debt versus contributed capital in relation to debt Source own arrangement according to 
Landshypotek 
 
Figure 7 shows that members with a contributed capital between 0 and 2,5 percent holds the 
largest share of borrowed capital in Landshypotek. This means that members with a small 
percentage contributed capital in relation to their borrowed capital are those members who 
have the majority of the members’ total debt. 
 
1.1.3 New Model 
 
The change in the financial model that Landshypotek is considering implies that the member 
account is removed and that the input limit on the equity account is reduced from eight 
percent of the borrowed capital to four percent (Landshypotek, 2011, 1). Instead of interest on 
contributed capital the members will be entitled to a dividend that is proportional to the 
volume of their contributed capital. Patronage refunds and dividends on contributed capital 
are capitalized on the equity account until it reaches four percent of the borrowed capital. The 
change in the financial model also allows the members to deposit the full amount of 
contributed capital right away, either through a “member loan” or the use of own assets (pers. 
com Ordell, 2011). By doing so, the member will receive direct payout of both patronage 
refund and dividend. The intended change will also give the board of directors the opportunity 
to each year change the input limit if needed. 
 
Following the intended change in the financial model, Landshypotek’s profits will be 
distributed among the members through dividends on contributed capital and patronage 
refunds on paid interests as shown in figures 8 and 9 (Landshypotek, 2011, 1). Because 
dividends and patronage refunds are based on the business surplus, it is impossible to predict 
how large they will be, but the goal is to give ten percent dividend on contributed capital, and 
one percent patronage refund on paid interests. Given this intended change Landshypotek 
hopes to attain the funds needed to expand the business and to reward the members who 
contribute capital. 
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Figure 8. Distribution of Landshypotek’s profit in the new model without an active contribution of capital. 
Source  own arrangement 
 
Figure 8 shows the cash flow in the new model for a member that does not choose to invest 
capital in Landshypotek. The member’s contributed capital has not reached four percent of the 
borrowed capital in this scenario. Landshypotek’s profit will provide the member with 
patronage refunds (one percent of paid interest) and dividend (ten percent) of the contributed 
capital, but this will be capitalized as contributed capital until the capital amounts to four 
percent of the borrowed capital. When four percent of the borrowed capital is reached all 
dividends and patronage refunds are directly paid out to the member (Landshypotek, 2011, 1). 
 
 
Figure 9. Distribution of Landshypotek’s profit in the new model with an active contribution of capital. Source 
own arrangement 
 
Figure 9 presents how the cash flow changes if the member invests in Landshypotek to 
immediately reach four percent of the borrowed capital. Another method to reach the 
maximum of four percent could be that the member has collected sufficient contributed 
capital through capitalization of patronage refunds and dividends of contributed capital. When 
the limit of four percent is reached the patronage refunds and dividends on contributed capital 
are disbursed as capital income in the member’s business operations (Landshypotek, 2011, 1).   
 
1.2 Problem  
 
In comparison with investor-owned firms, cooperatives are at a disadvantage in raising equity 
capital (Royer, 1995). This is many analysts conclusion due to cooperatives unique financing 
features. The ownership structure in cooperatives is different from investor-owned firms 
because the owners/members of the cooperative also are its clients (Lerman & Parliament, 
1993). In investor-owned firms the clients are separated from the investors who own the firm. 
The investor-owned firms therefore seek to maximize earnings adjusted for risk so that 
investors can receive a return proportional to their investment. Rather than earning a return on 
invested capital, members in cooperatives seek to benefit directly through their dealings with 
the cooperative. Because of this, there is an incentive for members to underfinance the 
cooperative so that their patronage relative to their investments increases (Royer, 1995).  
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The difference in ownership structure requires different financial and business strategies 
(Lerman & Parliament, 1993). According to Lerman & Parliament (1993) one of the main 
differences is that in comparison with investor-owned firms stock, cooperative equity is not 
marketable. This is because the distribution of earnings in cooperatives is based on patronage 
and not investment. As a result there are no incentives for non patrons to invest in a 
cooperative and cooperatives are therefore restricted to its members to raise equity. But 
members may be reluctant to increase their illiquid stake in a cooperative because of the non 
marketability of the equity. Landshypotek’s members experience the same problem of the non 
marketability of their equity. It is only Landshypotek’s members who are able to contribute 
with capital. The possibility to raise equity through retained earnings may also be met with 
resistance from the cooperatives members because it translates into higher costs and lower 
revenues for the patrons. This may result in an unbalanced capital structure for expanding 
cooperatives because it is easier to finance the growth with loans than raise equity through 
retained earnings (Royer, 1995). 
  
Potential obstacles for cooperative growth are ill-defined property rights and agency problems 
(Fahlbeck, 2007). Free-rider problem, horizon problem, portfolio problem and are all 
problems within the property rights theory (Cook, 1995). These problems exist because of the 
nonexistent secondary market for cooperative equity.  
 
As mentioned, capital acquisition can be a problem for cooperatives. This is explained in 
property rights theory through “free-rider problem” and “horizon problem” (Harris et al, 
1996). According to Vitaliano (1983) and the horizon problem members can only benefit 
from investments over the time horizons of their expected membership in the cooperative. 
This creates differences in investment preferences among the members based on diverse time 
horizons. The general tendency is leaning towards investment with short payoff periods. To 
encourage Landshypotek’s members to invest in long term might be a problem if some 
members are considering ending their membership in a few years. Members prefer 
investments which generate payoffs during expected patronage time rather than after (Harris 
et al, 1996). This implies that the intended change of contributed capital will be more 
interesting for members with long time left in Landshypotek than members with short time 
left (Nilsson, 2001).  
 
According to Harris et al, (1996) the free-rider problem usually emerges in cooperatives 
because ownership does not provide any additional benefit. The members will only obtain 
benefits through their economic activities with the cooperative. This could result in lack of 
incentives for members to invest in the cooperative, even though the members’ investments 
are critical for the cooperative’s success. Due to lack of incentives for investments, non 
investing members could become free-riders. This is because they can harvest benefits that 
they have not fully contributed to. The free-rider problem also occurs in Landshypotek 
because new members get access to equity contributed by the older members. In the old 
model the interest on contributed capital is small compared to the patronage refund, which 
implies that the members in Landshypotek mostly profit through their dealings with the 
cooperative. This implies that there is a risk that members with little contributed capital will 
become “free-riders” (Harris et al, 1996).    
 
The portfolio problem occurs when members hold suboptimal portfolios and are unable to 
match their cooperative assets to their personal risk preferences (Cook, 1995). The portfolio 
problem is an effect of the non marketability of cooperative equity that implies lack of 
transferability and liquidity. Due to the portfolio problem members are more reluctant to 
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invest in new cooperative equity (Royer, 1995). This implies reduced opportunities for 
Landshypotek’s members to diversify their investments and spread the risk over different 
assets.   
 
1.3 Aim  
 
Landshypotek has today enough capital to manage the core operation but with the future 
growth strategy more capital is needed. To meet the need for more capital Landshypotek is 
considering a change of the contributed capital in order to acquire capital from its members. 
Landshypotek believes that this will strengthen the equity and increase the members’ benefits. 
Because Landshypotek is owned by its members it is interesting to examine their attitudes 
towards the new financial model. The aim of the study is to answer the following questions: 
 
 Will Landshypotek’s members be negative towards increasing their illiquid stake?  
 Will the intended change of contributed capital reduce the risk of free-rider problem?  
 Will members with a long time left in Landshypotek be more positive towards the 
intended change of contributed capital than those with a short time left?  
 Will members terminate their business relationship with Landshypotek due to the 
intended change of contributed capital? 
 How will the intended change of contributed capital affect a member’s cost of capital?  
 
1.4 Delimitations  
 
The study is delimited to twelve members in Landshypotek who all but one are situated in the 
region around “Mälardalen”. The reason for this is that the study contains qualitative research 
interviews that demand quite some time. It is therefore not reasonable to conduct more 
interviews given the study’s time constraint. The region around “Mälardalen” is chosen 
because it makes it possible for us to visit the interviewees, which mean that more members 
are interested in participating in the study. But because of the criteria used to select members 
for the interviews, it was not possible to obtain all interviewed members within the same 
geographical area and one member is therefore not situated in the region around 
“Mälardalen”. The study is also delimited to the Landshypotek’s intended change of 
contributed capital and does therefore not consider tax effects or the impact of the opportunity 
cost of capital.  
 
1.5 Outline   
 
The outline of the thesis, illustrated in figure 10, is intended to provide the reader a picture of 
the structure of the study. Chapter one will give the reader an introduction to Landshypotek, 
illustrate how the financial model is structured today and present the change of contributed 
capital that Landshypotek is currently considering. The chapter will also provide the reader 
with the study’s aim and delimitations and present problems that can occur when a 
cooperative needs to acquire capital. Chapter 2 contains a review of some earlier studies and a 
presentation of how the contributed capital works in the cooperatives “Lantmännen” and 
“Södra”. Chapter 2 also contains the theories chosen to analyze the empirical material and a 
presentation of the created hypotheses. Chapter 3 provides the reader with a presentation of 
the method chosen to achieve the study’s aim and a description of the course of action, 
followed by chapter 4 that contains the results from the qualitative interviews and the 
calculations of a member’s cost of capital. In chapter 5 the empirical material presented in 
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1. Introduction 
2. Theoretical 
perspective and 
litterature review 
3. Method 
4. The empirical 
study 
5. Analysis 6. Conclusions 7. Discussion 
chapter 4 is analyzed according to the theories in chapter 2 in order to confirm or reject the 
hypotheses. The conclusions are presented in chapter 6 and provide answers to the questions 
stated in the study’s aim. Finally, parts of the result that are not covered in the analysis are 
discussed in chapter 7. The chapter also provides suggestions for further studies and 
recommendations for Landshypotek. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
Figure 10. Illustration of the outline of the study. Source own arrangement 
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2 Theoretical perspective and literature review 
 
Chapter 2 provides a literature review of other cooperatives such as “Lantmännen” and 
”Södra”. A theoretical perspective of the used theories and the hypothesis are also presented.  
 
2.1 Literature review 
 
Since 1998 it is possible for cooperatives to transfer non-restricted equity to restricted equity 
(Nilsson, 2002). The non-restricted equity is the cooperative’s unallocated capital, which is 
owned by all members, but no member has clear property rights to the unallocated capital. 
This implies that a member has no right to receive any share of the unallocated capital when 
he/she terminates the membership. The restricted equity is the members’ individual owned 
capital in the cooperative. This capital has clear property rights and if a member leaves the 
cooperative he/she receives his/her share of the restricted equity. Cooperatives as 
“Lantmännen” and “Södra” use this opportunity to transfer non-restricted equity to restricted 
equity by issuing bonus shares to their members. Hence, the members will receive additional 
capital to which they have clear property right.  
 
2.1.1 “Lantmännen” 
 
“Lantmännen” is a cooperative owned by 36 000 members (www, Lantmännen, 2011, 1). The 
cooperative’s main business is food, energy and farming. To join the cooperative the 
members have to contribute with a minimum of 10 000 SEK within five years (www, 
Lantmännen, 2011, 2). The members contribute with capital which is deducted from their 
patronage refunds and dividends on contributed capital. Fifty percent of the refund and 
dividend is capitalized within the cooperative as individual equity, but it is possible to 
capitalize more if wanted. In case of a new member all refund and dividend is capitalized until 
the minimum requirement of 10 000 SEK is fulfilled. The member is able to contribute a 
maximum of 450 000 SEK, but the limit can be adjusted to 15 percent of the turnover.  
 
 
Figure 11. How “Lantmännen’s” surplus is distributed to its members. Source own arrangement 
 
Figure 11 reveals that “Lantmännen’s” aim is to distribute 40 percent of the business surplus 
to its members through patronage refund, dividend on the contributed capital and new bonus 
shares (Lantmännen, 2011, 3). Out of the surplus 28 percent is paid out as patronage refund, 
20 percent as dividend and 52 percent as bonus shares. The bonus shares imply that a part of 
the cooperative’s business surplus is transferred to the member’s individual equity. This 
constitutes a contribution of capital to the member’s capital account. 
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Table 2. “Lantmännen’s” dividend (million SEK) to its members. Source www, Lantmännen, 2011, 3 
Dividend 
(MSEK)  
2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 
Patronage 
Refund 
95 1 122 83 64 139 199 154 161 144 
Contributed 
Capital 
68 63 57 50 56 50 49 38 38 23 
Bonus 
shares 
177 100 110 151 99 100 39 - - 171 
Total 340 164 289 284 219 289 287 192 199 338 
* 18 % 13 % 14 % 20 % 13 % 14 % 9 % 4 % 4 % 19 % 
* Dividend and issued bonus shares in percent of the member’s contributed capital. 
 
Table 2 presents how “Lantmännen’s” dividend is distributed to the members from 2001 to 
2010.  
 
2.1.2 “Södra” 
  
“Södra” is a cooperative owned by 51 000 forest owners (www, Södra, 2011, 1). The 
members own 36 000 forest properties which is more than half of the privately owned forest 
in the southern parts of Sweden.  
 
The members in “Södra” do not pay any entrance fee to join the cooperative (Södra, 2011). 
Instead they contribute with capital incremental by deducting funds from the amount paid for 
timber deliveries. The contributed capital is paid back to the members after the membership is 
terminated. The members have to contribute with 600 SEK per productive hectare, with a 
maximum of 200 hectares. The members also have the opportunity to contribute with more 
capital by investing in “Södra”. Many members use this option because their contributed 
capital is the base for calculation of the dividend. The contributed capital can also be 
increased by bonus shares, which occurs when “Södra” transfer non-restricted equity to 
members’ capital account. The members have the opportunity to sell the bonus shares to other 
members (Södra, 2011). The contributed capital belongs to the members, but the cooperative 
uses the money during the membership and pays dividend in return. 
 
 
Figure 12. Schematic figure illustrating how the members in “Södra” acquire contributed capital. Source: own 
arrangement  
 
In 2010 the total contributed capital was 2 354 million SEK of which 894 million SEK was 
contributed by investments in “Södra” (Södra, 2011). The equity in “Södra” amounts to 4 289 
million SEK of which 3 737 million SEK is restricted equity. By issuing bonus shares, 1 460 
million SEK has been transferred to the members’ contributed capital.     
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Figure 13. How “Södra’s” surplus is distributed to its members. Source own arrangement 
 
The members profit from the business surplus (Södra, 2011). The members’ dividend of the 
profit should at least be one-third of the business surplus, measured over an economic cycle. 
This share is distributed to all members based on their contributed capital and their wood 
deliveries. The relationship is fifty-fifty, half of the share is based on the contributed capital 
and the other half is based on patronage refund. 
 
Table 3. Dividend to “Södra’s” members. Source www, Södra, 2011, 2 
Dividend to members 2003 2004 2005-2006 2006-2007 2008 2009 
Contributed capital  15 % 9 % 13,5 % 19,5 % 4 % 3 % 
Patronage refund 9 % 6 % * 12,5 % 5 % 8 % 
Bonus share 10 % - - 40 %** 10 %** 10 %** 
Total (Million SEK) 601 316 1402 1284 331 386 
* Pulpwood 35,22 SEK/m
3
 & timber 70 SEK/m
3
 
** Bonus shares issued only on invested contributed capital  
     
The table 3 presents the dividends from 2003 to 2009. The members receive a dividend based 
on the contributed capital (www, Södra, 2011, 2). The contributed capital consists of capital 
which is actively invested by the members and capital which is deducted from their wood 
deliveries. The members also acquire contributed capital by bonus shares, but the bonus 
shares are only based on their invested part of the contributed capital. If a member does not 
invest any capital he/she is not entitled any bonus shares. With this model the members who 
actively invest in the cooperative are rewarded. 
 
This can be clarified with an example of a member who has 20 000 SEK in contributed 
capital, of which 10 000 SEK is invested in “Södra”. For year 2009 the member would 
receive 600 SEK (three percent of 20 000 SEK) as dividend on contributed capital and 1 000 
SEK (ten percent of 10 000 SEK) as bonus shares. These bonus shares of 1 000 SEK will be 
added to the member’s equity account and the contributed capital will be 21 000 SEK. The 
member will also receive a patronage refund of eight percent.  
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2.1.3 Similar studies 
 
A new member in ”Lantmännen” and “Södra” is not forced to invest capital immediately,  but 
in “Lantmännen” the member’s patronage refunds and dividends are capitalized until the 
minimum requirement of contributed capital is reached. A member in “Södra” has to 
contribute with capital by deducting funds from the amount paid for wood deliveries. 
Landshypotek will not demand an entrance fee for new members. If a member does not invest 
capital he/she will contribute with capital in the same procedure as in “Lantmännen” until 
four percent of the borrowed capital is reached. This implies that Landshypotek’s system of 
acquiring capital from the members is very similar. It is therefore possible that Landshypoteks 
intended change of contributed capital might result in comparable effects as experienced in 
“Lantmännen” and “Södra”.    
 
In the study “Medlemmen som ägare: Effekterna av insatsemissioner I Svenska Lantmännen” 
Nilsson examines how “Lantmännen’s” members experience that their role as members were 
changing when bonus shares were introduced. The question was what consequences this 
introduction of bonus shares would have on the members’ actions towards the cooperative.  
 
According to Nilsson’s study (2002) most of the members in “Lantmännen” consider 
themselves as members and not as owners. The majority of the members have no desire to be 
more active as owners. Members of all ages have this attitude. The members’ primary relation 
to “Lantmännen” is the business transactions with the cooperative. Any changes in this matter 
would quickly affect the members’ behavior because of their strong attitudes towards the 
subject. How the members would change their behavior concerning issues as contributed 
capital and bonus shares is more unclear because the members have rather weak interests in 
these kinds of owner-issues. In Landshypotek the patronage refund depends on the amount of 
interest paid and is therefore an indication of the members’ business transactions with the 
cooperative. In accordance with Nilsson’s study the patronage refund might affect the 
members’ attitudes towards the intended change of contributed capital. The fact that the 
dividends are prioritized at the expense of the patronage refunds in Landshypotek’s new 
financial model therefore might have a large impact on the members’ attitudes. 
 
Nilsson (2002) reveals that if the bonus shares are based on the members’ patronage with the 
cooperative the members are willing to adjust their behavior to meet new conditions. But if 
the bonus shares are based on the contributed capital (i.e. the degree of ownership), the 
members are unsure if they will accommodate their behavior to meet the cooperative’s new 
conditions. Half of the respondents proclaim that they will be more engaged as members if 
more capital is at stake. The members have very clear attitudes that members who contribute 
with capital to the cooperative’s equity are those that should profit from the bonus shares. The 
study also demonstrates that there are members who reflect over their ownership, but the 
majority of the members consider their membership as something mandatory to benefit from 
the overall advantages that comes with the membership. Nilsson (2002) study indicates that 
Landshypotek’s members will be negative towards the intended change because the dividend 
is tied to the contributed capital and not to the patronage refund. 
 
The study “Attityder till kooperative finansiering” investigates attitudes towards different 
financial models in the Swedish dairy cooperative Milko. One of the investigated financial 
models is bonus shares. The study is conducted as a qualitative study and the empirical 
material consists of 21 interviews with “elected representatives” in Milko. The study shows 
that the majority of the “elected representatives” are positive towards bonus shares because it 
strengthens the members’ property rights and redistributes unallocated capital to allocated 
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capital. This can be compared to the intended change of contributed capital that makes it 
possible for the members to invest capital in Landshypotek and thereby receive a larger part 
of the cooperative’s business surplus. In accordance with the “elected representatives” in 
Milko, this implies that Landshypotek’s members will be positive towards the intended 
change of contributed capital.  
 
Another interesting study is Karlsson’s (2010) “Lantmännens emission av förlagsandelar och 
handeln med emissionsinsatser”. The thesis analyzes “Lantmännens” members’ incentives to 
make decisions concerning financial issues within the cooperative. This study would have 
been appropriate to make comparisons with, but this was not possible because Karlsson’s 
thesis is confidential and will not be published until after the completion of this study.  
 
Studies about members’ attitudes towards similar topics in international cooperative banks 
would have been useful as a comparison to this study. Although several attempts has been 
made the authors have been unable to find relevant study’s regarding contributed capital in 
cooperative banks. Even if the authors were unable to find similar studies it is important to 
stress that there might be studies written. 
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2.2 Theoretical perspective 
 
2.2.1 Cooperative 
 
According to the United States Department of Agriculture, “A cooperative is a user-owned, 
user-controlled business that distributes benefits on the basis of use” (Croop & Zeuli, 2004, 
p. 1). 
 
Three cooperative principals are captured within this definition, the users own the 
cooperative, the users control the cooperative and the benefits are distributed proportionally 
(Croop & Zeuli, 2004). The “user-owner” principle implies that users (members) also are 
owners because they help finance the cooperative. Cooperative capital is traditionally 
provided by the members who are required to contribute with capital proportional to their use 
(patronage) of the cooperative. This is also the case for Landshypotek, as shown in figure 5 in 
chapter 1, where part of the patronage refunds is deposited into an equity account (www, 
Landshypotek, 2011, 3). These payments are deposited into the equity account until it reaches 
eight percent of the member’s borrowed capital, and serve as the member’s contributed 
capital. This type of shared financing creates joint ownership (Croop & Zeuli, 2004).  
 
The “user-control” principle implies that a cooperative is governed by the owners (members), 
indirectly through their “elected representatives” on the board of directors and directly 
through voting (Croop & Zeuli, 2004). Cooperatives usually apply “one member one vote” 
which implies that voting is tied to the membership and not to the member’s patronage refund 
or investment in the cooperative. In Landshypotek, every member has one vote that he or she 
can use to select representatives on the regional board of directors (www, Landshypotek, 
2011, 5). The regional board of directors then selects representatives for the main board of 
directors, whose purpose is to represent the members’ interests and to make decisions on 
policy and strategic issues from the cooperative’s vision and mission.
  
 
The proportionally distributed benefits are a key foundation for cooperatives (Croop & Zeuli, 
2004). Costs and risks of doing business as well as benefits should be shared among the 
members proportionally to their patronage. Because of the proportionally distributed benefits 
there are no incentives for non patrons to invest in a cooperative (Lerman & Parliament, 
1993). This lack of incentive leads to a nonexistent secondary market for cooperative shares 
and cooperatives are therefore restricted to its members to raise equity. With the new financial 
model, as shown in figures 8 and 9, Landshypotek is seeking to increase their equity and also 
to strengthen the connection between the members’ contributed capital and their share in the 
cooperative (Landshypotek, 2011). Instead of patronage refund, the member’s will receive 
part of the business surplus directly through dividend proportional to their contributed capital. 
Both Landshypotek’s old and new financial model is based on proportionally distributed 
benefits, which leads to a nonexistent secondary market for Landshypotek’s equity shares. 
 
2.2.2 Property rights 
 
Ill-defined property rights are often seen as a reason for cooperatives financial problems 
(Fahlbeck, 2007). The ill-defined property rights are a result of the individual members 
restricted ownership rights to the cooperatives residual. Property rights are defined as the right 
for an individual to consume, obtain income from or alienate an asset (Barzel, 1989). Tied to 
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the definition are a few assumptions. Property is a benefit or a claim to use an asset that is not 
necessarily limited to physical things, claims to property can only be made by individuals, 
individuals’ claims to property must be enforceable and if the asset’s value changes it will 
lead to a change in property rights (Macpherson, 1991).  
 
As pointed out by Cook et al. (2011) the property rights theory also contributes to an 
understanding of the ownership in a cooperative. In economic analyses of ownership, two 
factors are very important, the residual claim rights and the residual right of control. 
 
The residual right of control is the right to vote and make decisions concerning an asset’s use 
e.g. the equity in Landshypotek (Cook et al, 2011). Landshypotek’s equity consists of 
restricted equity and non-restricted equity. The restricted equity is capital which is contributed 
by the members’ patronage refunds, labeled “contributed capital”. The contributed capital is 
owned by the members and this capital has clear property rights. If a member leaves the 
cooperative the member’s contributed capital is paid out. The non-restricted capital consists 
of unallocated capital and belongs to all members, but no specific member has the property 
rights of the unallocated capital. This implies that there is no clear connection between 
members and the unallocated capital. A member has no right to receive any share of the 
unallocated capital when he/she terminates the membership. This can make the definition of 
ownership i.e. the ownership of the rights become unclear in organizations such as 
Landshypotek. Large cooperative firms could have a large unallocated capital and the 
decision rights for this capital could be unclear. This leads to difficulties in defining who 
owns the cooperative. 
 
The residual claimants are the owners of the firm, who are entitled to receive any net income 
that the cooperative firm generates (Cook et al, 2011).The owners/members in Landshypotek 
are today, see figure 5, entitled to patronage refund and interest on their contributed capital. 
The refund is based on the members’ dealings with Landshypotek and the cooperative’s profit 
(www, Landshypotek, 2011, 7). A member in Landshypotek pays interest on borrowed 
capital, and based on Landshypotek’s profit that year, the Annual General Meeting decides 
the patronage refund rate. This means that the member receive a patronage refund of x percent 
of paid interest as shown below.  
 
Patronage refund = patronage refund rate * interest paid  
 
The interest rate on contributed capital is also decided at the Annual General Meeting and is 
based on Landshypotek’s profit (www, Landshypotek, 2011, 8). The total interest is also 
based on the member’s contributed capital. If a member has contributed capital and the 
interest rate is set to x percent, the member receives interest on the contributed capital as 
shown below.  
 
Interest on contributed capital = Contributed capital * interest rate  
 
“When more than one person is involved in the ownership of an asset, the residual rights of 
control should be proportionately allocated to the residual claimants in order to achieve the 
most efficient possible use of the asset”  (Cook et al, 2011, p. 18). Cook argues that a 
member’s residual return (patronage refunds and dividends) and residual control should be 
aligned. A member who has a large residual return should have a larger influence over an 
asset than a member with a smaller residual return. The magnitude of the residual return 
reflects the member’s size of dealings with the cooperative. This implies that a member in 
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Landshypotek with large contributed capital and large loans should have more votes than a 
member with smaller amount of contributed capital and small loans, in order to obtain the 
most efficient possible use of the asset.  
 
This will create the right incentives from an owner’s view. In Landshypotek’s case this would 
create incentives to invest in the cooperative firm. If a user of an asset does not receive any 
residual returns the user does not have an incentive to maintain the asset. The property theory 
emphasizes that alignment of residual returns and residual control will make the use of 
Landshypotek’s assets more efficient. 
 
2.2.2.1 Portfolio problem   
 
The portfolio problem occurs when members face constraints in diversifying their portfolio 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1979). The constraints are an effect of the non marketability of 
cooperative equity which unable the members to spread their holdings over different firms 
and assets, to adjust for uncertainty and adapt their portfolio to their individual risk aversion.  
This leads to a non-Pareto optimal situation because members are forced to bear risk that 
could be avoided through diversification. This could be a problem for Landshypotek’s 
members because their invested capital in the cooperative is fixed for the whole lending 
period. The same problem occurs when members’ patronage refunds and dividends capitalize 
within the cooperative. The members have no possibility to invest this capital somewhere 
else. 
 
According to Jensen & Meckling (1979) the members therefore experience an additional net 
deadweight welfare loss (deadweight welfare loss is the total loss of surplus that results from 
price controls and inefficient markets Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2001).  The non-Pareto optimal 
situation is also an effect of inefficient distribution of risk that occurs because there is no 
room for individuals to reduce their risk exposure through diversification. This might also be 
a problem for Landshypotek’s members because reduced possibility of diversification 
strategy. Because of these allocation problems, members who seek to invest in a cooperative, 
as an alternative to investor-owned firms, will demand a higher return on their investment. 
Members will also be more reluctant to invest in new cooperative equity than shareholders in 
investor-owned firms (Royer, 1995). 
 
2.2.2.2 Free-rider problem 
 
A cooperative is owned by a number of members and as a consequence the firm’s assets are 
owned collectively (Vitaliano, 1983,). Landshypotek’s equity amounted to barely 3,4 billion 
SEK 2010 (Landshypotek, 2011, 2). The members’ contributed capital constituted just over 1 
billion of the equity and the remaining 2,4 billion was Landshypotek’s unallocated equity. 
The contributed capital is provided by the members and is therefore individually owned but 
unallocated equity is capital that originates from the business surplus and that is not assigned 
or designated to a specific member (Dunn, 1986). Landshypotek’s unallocated equity 
therefore constitutes the members’ collectively owned capital. 
 
The unallocated equity works as a filter and deteriorates the communication between 
members and the cooperative firm (Nilsson, 2001). Since the unallocated equity is owned 
collectively the members do not have to bear the full consequences of their actions and as a 
result certain market mechanisms do not work properly in a cooperative. An example of this 
is that market signals from owners do not reach the management. The lack of market signals 
affects how the agent (management) should run the firm and what investments should be 
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undertaken. These problems contribute to difficulties in obtaining capital and make the 
resource allocation sub-optimal. This inefficient use of capital makes the lenders more 
cautious and result in higher financial costs for the cooperative. As a result the value of the 
cooperative firm is reduced.  
 
New members are seldom required to pay an entrance fee or make an investment in the 
cooperative that equals the value of the received rights (Vitaliano, 1983). As a result, new 
members gain access to the collectively owned capital that older members have accumulated, 
acquire the right to participate in the decision process and the right to the cooperative’s 
residual cash flow against little or no counter performance. These rather small entrance fees 
tend to dilute the cooperative’s equity because the equity remains unchanged while the right 
to the collectively owned capital is dispersed among a larger number of members (Nilsson, 
2001). This leads to low capital growth and difficulties to encourage members to invest 
capital in a cooperative organization. Further, when a member leaves a cooperative he will not 
have any access to the collectively owned capital, even though he has contributed to its 
buildup. This encourages members to be free-riders. Members who become “free-riders” try 
to benefit from the cooperative without contributing too much, the members therefore prefer 
borrowed capital repaid by future members rather than investing in the firm (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1979). 
 
2.2.2.3 Horizon problem 
 
“A horizon problem arises when an owner’s claim on the net cash flow generated by an asset 
is shorter than the productive life of the asset” (Porter & Scully, 1979, p. 495).  
 
Members of a cooperative have different planning horizons (Nilsson, 2001). Some members 
are new and others consider quitting their membership in Landshypotek. Because the fact that 
residual rights cannot be transferred, members leaving the cooperative will lose their share of 
value of the collectively owned capital (Hansmann, 1988). This issue leads to horizon 
problems, which affect the members’ investment decisions. The horizon problem creates 
differences in investment preferences among the members because they can only benefit from 
investments over the time horizons of their expected membership in the cooperative 
(Vitaliano, 1983).  Members leaving Landshypotek in a short period of time have no 
incentives to invest in projects with long payback period (Nilsson, 2001). This tends to make 
it difficult for Landshypotek to make optimal investments and therefore hamper the 
development of the cooperative firm. This may lead to that some profitable long-term 
investments never will be undertaken. This could prohibit the capital growth which further 
reduces the value of the cooperative.   
 
2.2.3 Cost of capital  
 
Economic theorists often “side-step” the cost of capital problem by assuming that assets, like 
bonds, could be considered to have known future net cash flow. This assumption leads to the 
conclusion that cost of capital simply is the risk free rate of interest on bonds. According to 
Lumby & Jones “The discount rate that reduces the sum of a share’s expected future dividend 
flow to a present value equal to its market price is called the cost of equity capital” (Lumby & 
Jones, 2003, p. 382). For Landshypotek this means that it is the minimum required rate of 
return that Landshypotek demands from their members for lending capital i.e. Landshypotek’s 
minimum required rate of return is the members’ cost of capital. The minimum required rate 
of return that Landshypotek can demand from the borrowers is the rate of return that makes 
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the net present value (NPV) of the loan equal to zero (Brealey et al, 2003). Equation (1) 
shows the formula for the net present value of a loan with a time horizon of one year.  
 
         
 
     
 
(1) 
L0 = borrowed capital, r = rate of return, C = net cash flow 
 
By setting NPV = 0 it is possible to calculate the minimum required rate of return that 
Landshypotek can demand by solving r for equation (1). 
  
  
 
  
     
 
If C > L0  r > 0, and if C = L0  r = 0 
(2) 
L0 = borrowed capital, r = rate of return, C = net cash flow 
 
The expression described above shows how to calculate the required rate of return that makes 
the NPV of a short-term loan over one year equal to zero i.e. the members’ cost of capital. 
Unfortunately there are no satisfactory way of defining the members’ cost of capital for a 
long-term loan (Brealey et al, 2003). The best method is to use the internal rate of return 
(IRR). The internal rate of return is defined as the rate of return that makes the net present 
value equal to zero. To find the internal rate of return for a long-term loan that lasts for T 
years, IRR must be solved for the following expression. 
 
       ∑
  
        
  
 
   
 
 (3) 
Ct can be > 0, = 0 or < 0 depending on the specific cash flows per year. 
 
L0 = borrowed capital, IRR = internal rate of return, Ct = net cash flow year t 
 
Internal rate of return is usually found through numerical techniques. Different values for IRR 
are tested until the IRR that makes the NPV equal to zero is found (Brealey et al, 2003). This 
is often done by plotting different combinations of NPV and IRR in a graph and then 
connecting the points with a line and read off the internal rate of return at which NPV= 0. It is 
also possible to use a special program to calculate the internal rate of return. In this study the 
internal rate of return and thereby the members’ cost of capital for borrowing capital in 
Landshypotek is calculated with the function for IRR in Excel.  
 
2.2.3.1 Old model 
 
With the model that Landshypotek uses today, a member that borrows capital has to pay 
interest on the borrowed capital and amortization. As a member in Landshypotek the 
borrower also has the right to patronage refund and interest on contributed capital. In this 
study it is assumed that the members use a straight-line amortization. The member’s cash 
flows per year for a long-term loan are displayed in figure 14. 
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Figure 14. The members’ cash flow per year for a long-term loan of ten years. Source own arrangement 
 
Figure 14 shows a member’s cash flows per year for a long-term loan with a time horizon of 
ten years. The purpose of the figure is to illustrate the cash flows that occur each year and the 
time horizon of ten years is chosen because of the figures limited space. The figure also 
reveals that the contributed capital is repaid first three years after completed membership. The 
member uses a straight-line amortization and as a result the paid interest decreases each year. 
The cash flows per year would be different if the member used an annuity loan, but this is not 
considered in the study. The patronage refunds depend on the amount of interest paid and the 
value of patronage refund that the member receives each year therefore also decreases. The 
figure also illustrate that the amount of interest on contributed capital per year increases. This 
is because earlier years’ patronage refund and interest on contributed capital are capitalized on 
the equity account until it reaches eight percent of the borrowed capital. 
 
In the model that Landshypotek uses today, the member’s net cash flow year t (Ct) consists of 
paid interest year t (it), amortization year t (at), patronage refund year t (Prt), interest on 
contributed capital year t (ict) and interest on the member account year t (imt). If the 
member’s contributed capital is less than eight percent of the borrowed capital, the interest on 
contributed capital and patronage refund are capitalized on the equity account and repaid as 
contributed capital first three years after terminated membership. But if the member has 
reached the input limit, both the interest on contributed capital and patronage refund are paid 
out directly. To calculate the member’s cost of capital for a long-term loan in the model that 
Landshypotek uses today, paid interest, amortization, patronage refund, interest on 
contributed capital and interest on the member account are evaluated by redefining equation 
(3). IRR is then solved for the following expression. 
 
       ∑
                   
        
 
           
          
 
   
   
 (4) 
L0 = borrowed capital, ict = interest on contributed capital year t, Prt = patronage refund year 
t, it = paid interest year t, at = amortization year t, imt = interest on the member account year t, 
CT = contributed capital year T, MT = proceeds on member account year T 
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2.2.3.2 New model 
 
The intended change of contributed capital implies that a member that borrows capital still 
has to pay interest on the borrowed capital and amortization and also has the right to 
patronage refund. But with the intended change, the interest on contributed capital is replaced 
with dividend. The member’s cash flows per year for a long-term loan in the new model are 
shown in figures 15, 16 and 17.  
 
 
Figure 15: The member’s cash flow per year for a long-term loan of ten years without active contribution of 
contributed capital. Source own arrangement 
 
Figure 15 shows the cash flows per year for a long-term loan with a time horizon of ten years 
for a member that has chosen not to actively contribute with capital in Landshypotek. The 
purpose of the figure is to illustrate the cash flows that occur each year. The time horizon of 
ten years is chosen because of the figures limited space. The figure also illustrate that the 
contributed capital is repaid first three years after terminated membership. The member uses a 
straight-line amortization and as a result the paid interest decreases each year. The patronage 
refunds depend on the amount of interest paid and the value of patronage refund that the 
member receives each year therefore also decreases. The figure also shows that the amount of 
dividend on contributed capital per year increases. This is because earlier years’ patronage 
refund and dividend on contributed capital are capitalized in the equity account until it 
reaches four percent of the borrowed capital. If the member’s contributed capital is less than 
four percent of the borrowed capital, the dividend on contributed capital and patronage refund 
are capitalized in the equity account and repaid as contributed capital first three years after 
termination of the membership. However, if the member has reached the input limit, both the 
dividend on contributed capital and patronage refund are paid out directly to the member. 
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Figure 16. The member’s cash flow per year for a long-term loan of ten years with a full active contribution of 
contributed capital of four percent of the borrowed capital. Source own arrangement 
 
Figure 16 shows the cash flows per year for a long-term loan with a time horizon of ten years 
for a member that has chosen to actively contribute with four percent of the borrowed capital, 
thus reaching the input limit. The figure also illustrate that the contributed capital is repaid 
first three years after completed membership. The member uses a straight-line amortization 
and as a result the paid interest decreases each year. The patronage refunds depend on the 
amount of interest paid and the value of patronage refund that the member receives each year 
therefore also decreases. The figure also displays that the amount of dividends on contributed 
capital per year is unchanged. The explanation is that the member has reached the input limit 
through an active contribution of contributed capital. Consequentially, the patronage refunds 
and dividends are therefore not capitalized on the equity account but paid out directly each 
year. 
 
To calculate the member’s cost of capital for a long-term loan after the implementation of the 
intended change of contributed capital, paid interest, amortization, patronage refund and 
dividend on contributed capital are evaluated by applying equation (3). IRR is solved for the 
following expression. 
 
       ∑
              
        
 
    
          
  
 
   
 
 (5) 
L0 = borrowed capital, dt = dividend on contributed capital year t, Prt = patronage refund year 
t, it = paid interest year T, at = amortization year t, CT = contributed capital year T 
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Figure 17. The member’s cash flow per year for a long-term loan of ten years with an full active contribution of 
contributed capital of four percent of the borrowed capital through the use of the ”member loan”. Source own 
arrangement 
 
Figure 17 display the cash flows per year for a long-term loan with a time horizon of ten years 
for a member with a full active contribution of capital through the use of the “member loan”. 
The figure also shows that the contributed capital is repaid first three years after completed 
membership. The member uses a straight-line amortization for both the borrowed capital and 
the ”member loan” and as a result paid interest on both loans decreases each year. The 
patronage refunds depend on the amount of interest paid on the borrowed capital and the 
value of patronage refunds that the member receives each year therefore also decreases. The 
figure also illustrates that the amount of dividend on contributed capital per year is 
unchanged. This is because the member has reached the input limit through an active 
contribution of contributed capital and the patronage refunds and dividends are therefore not 
capitalized on the equity account but paid out directly each year. 
 
To calculate the cost of capital for a member that chooses to actively contribute with capital 
through the use of the “member loan”, the interest and amortization on the “member loan” has 
to be added to equation (5). IRR is then solved for the following expression. 
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(6) 
L0 = borrowed capital, dt = dividend on contributed capital year t, Prt = patronage refund year 
t, it = paid interest year t, at = amortization year t, Rmt = paid interest on the ”member loan” 
year t, Amt = amortization on the ”member loan” year t, CT = contributed capital year T 
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2.3 Hypotheses  
 
 
Figure 18. Schematic model describing the theoretical relationship between Landshypotek and its members. 
Source own arrangement  
 
Figure 18 illustrates the relation between Landshypotek and its members and also the 
problems that can occur in different states of the relationship. In the figure, the system 
constitutes both Landshypotek’s old and new model. 
 
1. Members will be reluctant to increase their equity shares because Landshypotek 
applies “one member one vote” (Cook et al, 2011). The hypothesis is illustrated in 
figure 18 between box 5 and 7. 
 
2. In comparison with investor-owned firms stock, cooperative equity is not marketable 
because the distribution of earnings in a cooperative is based on patronage and not 
investment (Lerman & Parliament, 1993). Because of the non marketability of 
Landshypotek’s cooperative equity their members will be reluctant to increase their 
equity shares. The hypothesis is illustrated in figure 18 between box 2 and 5. 
 
3. Due to the non marketability of Landshypotek’s cooperative equity their members will 
be more interested to invest in investor-owned firms than investing in Landshypotek 
through an active contribution of capital. (Lerman & Parliament, 1993). The 
hypothesis is illustrated in figure 18 between box 5 and 6. 
 
4. The non marketability of Landshypotek’s cooperative equity leads to lack of 
transferability and liquidity which reduces the members’ possibility to adapt their 
portfolio to their individual risk aversion (Jensen & Meckling, 1979). This leads to an 
additional net deadweight welfare loss for Landshypotek’s members who will demand 
a higher rate of return on their contributed capital than they would on an investment in 
an investor-owned firm. The hypothesis is illustrated in figure 18 between box 2 and 
5. 
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5. Rather than earning return on invested capital, members will seek to benefit directly 
through their dealings with the cooperative (Lerman & Parliament, 1993). 
Landshypotek’s members will therefore prefer a lower interest rate on borrowed 
capital instead of a high dividend on contributed capital. The hypothesis is illustrated 
in figure 18 between box 2 and 5. 
 
6. When there are no incentives for members to invest because they only can obtain 
benefits through their dealings with the cooperative, none investing members become 
free-riders because they can harvest benefits that they have not fully contributed to 
(Harris et al, 1996). The intended change of contributed capital will therefore reduce 
the risk of the free-rider problem because the dividend on contributed capital creates 
an incentive for the members to invest capital in Landshypotek. The hypothesis is 
illustrated in figure 18 between boxes 2, 3 and 5. 
 
7. The horizon problem creates differences in investment preferences among the 
members because they can only benefit from investments over the time horizons of 
their expected membership in the cooperative (Vitaliano, 1983). Members with a long 
time remaining in Landshypotek therefore tend to be more positive towards the 
intended change of contributed capital compared to members with a short time left 
and therefore also be more interested in investing capital in Landshypotek. (Nilsson, 
2001). The hypothesis is illustrated in figure 18 between box 4 and 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.  
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3 Method 
 
The chapter contains the method chosen to achieve the studies aim. The chapter begins with a 
motivation of the chosen method. Than follows a description of the qualitative research 
interview. The chapter also contains a narration of the course of action. The chapter ends with 
an exposition of the selected members and structure of the performed interviews.  
 
3.1 Choice of method 
 
The thesis is mostly conducted as a qualitative case study. The case study method is chosen 
because this research is based in real life situations and shall consist of a rich review of 
Landshypotek’s members’ attitudes (Merriam, 2006). The empirical material consists of 
qualitative research interviews with members in Landshypotek and a study of scenarios 
regarding the members’ cost of capital. The purpose of the interviews is to investigate the 
member’s attitudes towards the intended change of contributed capital and thereby examine 
the hypotheses that are listed in chapter 2.3. The case study consists of four scenarios and the 
purpose is to examine how a member’s cost of capital is affected by the intended change of 
contributed capital.  
 
The qualitative research interview approach is chosen because Landshypotek’s change of 
contributed capital is something that has not yet been materialized. It therefore might be 
difficult for the members to for example take part in a survey regarding their attitudes towards 
an issue that they have limited knowledge about. A survey approach was considered as 
method to collect data. A survey has many advantages such as lower cost per respondent in 
comparison with the cost per interviewee in a qualitative research interview (Ejlertsson, 
1996). The survey can be performed within a larger geographical area, include a larger 
amount of respondents and is less time consuming than interviews. In a survey the 
respondents do not feel the same pressure as in an interview situation because they can 
answer the questionnaire at home in peace and quiet. The questions in a questionnaire are 
standardized which generates answers that are easy to interpret and also eliminates the 
“interviewer effect” i.e. the interviewer’s way of asking questions. 
 
A survey has some disadvantages that make the method unfavorable in this study. A survey 
should not engage the respondent for more than 30 minutes and as a result there is room for 
fewer questions compared to an interview that do not have the same time constraint 
(Ejlertsson, 1996). The time constraint makes the survey approach unfavorable because of the 
large amount of information that the member has to review concerning Landshypotek’s 
intended change of contributed capital and the need for a lot of questions to capture the 
members’ attitudes. In a survey there is also a risk of many unanswered questionnaires. If the 
topic is complicated and if the respondent has limited knowledge about the topic, as is the 
case for the members in this study, it increases the risk of a large amount of unanswered 
questionnaires. A questionnaire also excludes the possibilities to obtain further information. 
The open questions in a survey only partly provide the possibility of detailed answers. The 
interview approach provides the possibility to ask more complicated and in depth questions 
and if necessary review and explain certain parts of Landshypotek’s change of contributed 
capital (Kvale, 1997). This is a necessary possibility due to the study’s detailed nature. The 
interview also gives the members the opportunity to ask questions if something is unclear and 
therefore eliminating misunderstandings. This increase the reliability and validity of the 
interview and therefore the quality of the results.  
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The scenario approach for the members’ cost of capital is also chosen because 
Landshypotek’s change of contributed capital is something that has not yet been materialized. 
It is therefore difficult to investigate how the members’ cost of capital has changed as a result 
of the intended change of contributed capital. The study therefore examine the effect that the 
intended change can have on a member’s cost of capital in four hypothetical scenarios. 
 
3.2 Qualitative research interviewing 
 
“The qualitative research interview attempts to understand the world from the subjects’ 
points of view, to unfold the meaning of their experiences, to uncover their lived world prior 
to scientific explanations” (Brinkman & Kvale, 2009, p. 1). 
 
An interview is a professional conversation that goes beyond spontaneous exchange of views 
between partners in everyday life (Brinkman & Kvale, 2009). The interview has a purpose 
and a structure and obtains thoroughly tested knowledge through a questioning and listening 
approach. The purpose of the qualitative research interview is to provide an understanding of 
a versatile and controversial world (Kvale, 1997).The topic of the interview is introduced by 
the researcher who critically follows up the answers provided by the subject through carefully 
chosen questions (Brinkman & Kvale, 2009). The qualitative research interview is an 
exchange of opinions between partners (Kvale, 1997), but the research interviewer defines 
and controls the situation and the research interview is therefore not a conversation between 
equal partners (Brinkman & Kvale, 2009). The qualitative research interview is theoretically a 
semi-structured interview that is neither a completely opened conversation nor a strictly 
structured survey. The interview is carried out according to an interview guide that can 
include questions, but more importantly guides the interview through different themes. The 
interview is normally recorded and together with the printed interview guide it serves as the 
material for further analysis. But for the gathered material to be useful it needs to be 
interpreted through a theoretical perspective (Trost, 1997).  
 
The purpose of the qualitative interview is not to obtain quantitative results, instead it seeks to 
receive qualitative knowledge expressed in a general way (Kvale, 1997). But the qualitative 
research interviewer is not interested in general opinions. The intention is to obtain specific 
answers that contain nuanced descriptions of various aspects. The interview questions can 
produce different answers depending on how the interviewer is perceived amongst the 
interviewees. It is therefore important for the interviewer to use the same approach in every 
interview. This can partly be achieved through the use of an interview guide, but the intention 
is not to present pre-made divisions and schematic claims. Instead the interviewer should be 
open to new ideas and let the interviewee draw their own conclusions and come to new 
insights as the interview progresses. A well conducted interview can be an enriching 
experience for the interviewee who may receive new and useful insights. 
 
3.2.1 Interview quality 
 
The interview represents the material for further analysis (Kvale, 1997).  The quality of the 
results and the final report therefore depends on the quality of the initial interview. As shown 
in figure 19 the theory for qualitative research interviews has listed a few quality criteria. 
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Figure 19. Quality criteria for research interviews. Source own arrangement according to Kvale 1997 
 
Figure 19 shows Kvale’s six quality criteria for qualitative research interviews. The bottom 
three criteria are dependent on the interviewer and his or her ability to perform the interview 
(Kvale, 1997). 
 
The interviewer is the research tool and to receive qualitative results the interviewer needs to 
be competent and possess a craftsmanship. The interviewer is also required to understand why 
and how to perform the interview and what the interview is about. A self-communicating 
interview means that it should be possible to read and understand the interview without 
explanations.  
 
A good interviewer possess great knowledge of the topic in question and are able to 
continuously make decisions about how and which questions to ask and what aspects of the 
answers to follow up and interpret (Kvale, 1997). The quality of the interview depends on the 
interviewer’s ability to interpret and critically test the reliability and validity of the answers. It 
is important to be explicit, ask short and simple questions and avoid academic language. The 
ability to be desirous makes it possible for the interviewer to link answers to what has been 
said earlier in the interview and get the answers developed and verified. An interview with 
little or no follow-up questions will give the interview limited credibility (Trost, 1997). The 
interviewer should be structured and present the interviews aim and procedure (Kvale, 1997). 
The interviewer should also be open to new aspects and let the subject draw their own 
conclusions but still maintain some control so that the purpose of the interview is achieved. 
Allowing the subject to always finish their sentence, being sensitive to their feelings towards 
the topic and to interpret not only what is said but also how it is said increases the quality of 
the interview.  To further increase the quality it is good to, at the end of the interview, present 
some of the results from the interview and also to ask if the interviewee has any questions or 
anything to add.  
 
There are several techniques to learn how to be a god interviewer (Kvale, 1997). Reading 
books about interview techniques, reading actual interviews and observing more experienced 
interviewers are a few of these techniques. But the primary way to learn is through experience 
from actual interviews. To gain self-confidence, interviewers often perform pilot interviews 
before the actual research interviews. The pilot interviews help the interviewer increase their 
ability to create a secure and stimulating interaction with the interviewee and thereby increase 
the quality of the research interview.  
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The issue of leading questions is probably the problem within research interviewing that gets 
the most attention (Kvale, 1997). It is often discussed that leading questions influence the 
subject’s answers and can even make them change a previous statement, thus affecting the 
quality of the results. But it is also a well documented fact that an insignificant reformulation 
of a question can influence the subject’s answers. Even if the formulation of the research 
questions can affect the answers, it is often necessary to use leading questions depending on 
the topic and aim of the study. This is especially useful in a qualitative research interview 
where the interviewer can use leading questions to test the reliability of subject’s answers and 
verify his own interpretations. Leading questions may therefore increase the quality of the 
results and the aim should therefore not be to avoid leading questions but to recognize their 
significance and give the reader the possibility to assess their influence and the reliability of 
the results. 
 
3.2.2 Ethics 
 
Interviewing is a moral undertaking and the interviewee should always be entitled to his or 
her integrity and dignity (Trost, 1997). It is therefore necessary to be able to promise the 
interviewee absolute secrecy and confidentiality. This could constitute a problem in the 
presentation of the results because it is necessary to avoid information that could lead to the 
identification of the interviewee. If it is necessary to use information that reveals the identity, 
the information must be approved by the interviewee (Kvale, 1997). However, presenting 
information that makes it possible for the interviewee to identify himself is not considered 
unethical, but it is important to respect the interviewee’s integrity and not present information 
that could be perceived as intrusive (Trost, 1997).  
 
The presentation of the results should only include information that is necessary for the 
analysis of the material and that contributes to the understanding of the subject without 
leading to identification (Trost, 1997). Information about the subject can easily be made 
confidential by using anonymous data. For example it is not always necessary for the reader 
to know the interviewees exact age, education or hometown. Instead the presentation can 
declare that the interviewee is a middle aged man with higher education from the middle parts 
of Sweden. Another ethical aspect that is important to consider in the presentation of the 
results is the use of quotes. Quotes that can reveal the identity of the interviewee are strictly 
banned and direct quotes that the interviewee can perceive as intrusive should also be 
avoided.  
 
There is a conflict between the ethical aspects of confidentiality and the principles of 
scientific research (Kvale, 1997). Confidentiality minimizes the possibility for other 
researchers to reproduce and verify the validity of the results because the information about 
the participants has been made anonymous. But anonymity can also increase the quality of the 
results because the interviewee’s incentives to answer sincerely increases when they know 
that the information will be confidential. 
 
3.3 Course of action 
 
Before gathering the empirical material, a qualitative literature review is conducted in order to 
obtain background material about Landshypotek, gather literature for the theory chapter and 
method and also to investigate what earlier studies have concluded. The background material 
for Landshypotek is gathered from Landshypotek’s website and through personal contact with 
Landshypotek’s chief financial officer Björn Ordell. The literature for the theory, method and 
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earlier studies conclusions are gathered from databases available at SLU, such as Web of 
science, Scopus, Science direct, Jstor, LUKAS, LIBRIS and Epsilon. Keywords that are used 
to search in the databases are contributed capital, unallocated equity, collectively owned 
capital, bonus shares, cooperative principles, capital acquisition, patronage refund, property 
rights, free-rider problem, horizon problem, portfolio problem, cost of capital and qualitative 
research interview.  
 
After performing the literature review, 7 hypotheses are constructed based on the gathered 
theories. Figure 18 in chapter 2.3 is also created in order to schematically illustrate the 
theoretical relation between Landshypotek’s financial models and the hypotheses. The 
hypotheses constitute the base for the questions that are asked in the interviews with 
Landshypotek’s members and as a result, 46 questions are constructed and organized into an 
interview guide as shown in appendix 2. To gain experience and to test the questions validity, 
three pilot interviews are performed with members in Landshypotek. Through the pilot 
interviews we ensure that the structure of the interview guide leads the interview in the right 
direction and help us achieve the aim. In the end the results from the pilot interviews held 
such high quality that the decision was made to include the pilot interviews in the study’s 
results. The analysis and discussion are based on the results from the performed interviews 
that are structured as described in chapter 3.3.1 below and the calculations of a member’s cost 
of capital. The results are compiled into different categories in relation to the hypotheses. 
According to Merriam (2006) this is an adequate method to use in the analysis of the results. 
The members’ answers are divided into categories to see patterns of similarities and 
differences. These patterns are analyzed in order to confirm or reject the hypotheses.  
 
Landshypotek provides the contact information for a large number of members and the 
interviewees are selected according to the criteria described in chapter 3.3.2. The members 
who are selected for an interview are provided with a factsheet (see appendix 1) before the 
interview. The fact sheet contains a short presentation of us, the study’s aim and 
Landshypotek’s involvement in the study. Furthermore, the factsheet contains a presentation 
of Landshypotek and their need for equity in order to expand the business. The factsheet also 
describes the financial model that Landshypotek uses today and the intended change of 
contributed capital.   
 
After the interviews the results are structured and presented as shown in chapter 4.1. The 
results from each interview are sent to the respective member who are given the opportunity 
verify and comment on the content and if necessary suggest changes.  
 
3.3.1 Interview structure 
 
Before starting the actual interview, a short presentation of ourselves, the study’s aim and 
Landshypotek’s involvement in the study is made. The members are also presented with a 
description of the interview procedure. To increase the incentives to answer sincerely, all 
interviewed members are made anonymous and promised complete confidentiality at the 
beginning of the interview. To further increase the quality of the result each member is 
presented with some of the results and asked if they have any questions or anything to add at 
the end of the interview. All interviews are recorded but notes are also taken during the 
interview to catch the substantial. 
 
The interviews are performed according to an interview guide (see appendix 2) to avoid 
random influences. An interview guide can be structured in different ways (Widerberg, 2002). 
A very structured guide reduces the interaction and a less structured guide can provide more 
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detailed answers. In this study a semi-structured interview guide is chosen because it provides 
the possibility to ask follow-up questions and receive more detailed answers, thus increasing 
the interviews creditability and the quality of the results (Trost, 1997). These kind of 
structured interviews are preferred when the aim is to test hypotheses (Merriam, 2006). The 
interview guide guides the interview through different themes and consists of 46 questions 
that are presented according to the interview guide to secure that they are perceived equal 
amongst all interviewed members.  
 
The interview begins with “Opening questions” that contains some background questions 
about the members, their business and their connection to Landshypotek. These questions are 
easy to answer and are a good way to get the conversation started. The next section 
“Knowledge based questions” consists of questions about Landshypotek, the contributed 
capital and the differences in investing in a cooperative compared to a joint-stock-company. 
These questions are used to investigate if the members’ level of knowledge is enough to 
engage in a meaningful interview about Landshypotek’s intended change of contributed 
capital. If not we review the topic together and describe in detail the change that 
Landshypotek considers.  
 
The section “Investment related questions” contains questions about the members’ interest of 
investing capital in Landshypotek. The members are questioned about their expected rate of 
return, size of the invested contributed capital and the risk aspect. These questions focus on 
Landshypotek in general and not so much on the intended change of contributed capital. The 
purpose of these questions is primarily to receive attitudes that make it possible to analyze 
hypotheses 2, 3 and 4. In the section “Behavior and attitudes” the focus lies on the intended 
change and the members’ attitudes are investigated through questions about behavior and 
feelings towards the intended change of contributed capital. The purpose of this section is to 
attain answers that can be used to analyze hypotheses 5, 6 and 7. The answers from the 
section “Ownership” are primarily used to analyze hypothesis 1. The members are asked 
about their attitudes towards proportional voting rights and its effect on their willingness to 
invest capital. The interview ends with the section “Concluding remarks”. Here the members 
are asked to review the entire change that Landshypotek is considering and provide an overall 
perception of the intended change of contributed capital. 
 
3.3.2 Selection of members 
 
The optimal amount of interviews are usually between 5 and 25 performed interviews (Kvale 
,1997). This study contains interviews with twelve of Landshypotek’s members who have 
been chosen from certain criteria. As shown in table 4 the selection criteria are age, borrowed 
capital, “elected representative” and “non elected representative” in Landshypotek. These 
criteria are chosen to receive views from members with different backgrounds. These factors 
could have diverse impacts of the members’ attitude towards the intended change of 
contributed capital. The age is of interest because of the horizon problem. Older members 
might have a shorter planning horizon than younger members. The property rights are 
affected by the size of the borrowed capital due to the members’ possibilities to invest 
different amounts. To receive further points of view, three “elected representatives” are 
chosen. An “elected representative” is supposed to have a greater knowledge about the subject 
than the common member and might therefore respond in a different way.  
 
The members’ education and their time left as members in Landshypotek were also 
considered as selection criteria. But because of the difficulties to ensure those criteria they 
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were rejected. The problem is that Landshypotek has no information about the members’ 
education and because not all members amortize their loans it is hard for Landshypotek to 
determine their time left as members (pers. com Ordell, 2011). The study includes twelve 
respondents due to time and geographical limits. The amount of respondents is also limited by 
the selection criteria that make it difficult to find appropriate members in a reasonable near 
geographical region. Landshypotek provided a list of members according to the selection 
criteria and as shown in table 4 twelve members are chosen and divided into three groups 
based on their borrowed capital.  
Table 4. Distribution of selected members according to the criteria. Source own arrangement  
Age/Borrowed 
capital 
1 million SEK 5 million SEK >20 million SEK 
20-39 years X X X 
40-59 years X X X 
60+ years X X X 
“Elected 
representative” in 
Landshypotek 
One “elected 
representative” 
One “elected 
representative” 
One “elected 
representative” 
 
The respondents consist of three groups. In the first group all members have a debt of 1 
million SEK. In the next group the members have a 5 million SEK loan. The last group 
consists of members with loans larger or equal to 20 million SEK. Each group consists of one 
member who is between 20-39 years old, one member who is between 40-59 years old and 
one member who is 60 years old or older. There is also one “elected representative” in each 
group. Most of the respondents are located in the Uppsala and Enköping area. Enköping is 
situated 50 kilometers from Uppsala. One respondent is located outside the region around 
“Mälardalen” about 250 kilometers from Uppsala. Another member lives in Flen which is 
around 150 kilometers from Uppsala. Two respondents are located in Stockholm. A 
discussion of how the members’ geographic location affects the reliability and validity of the 
study’s results is presented in chapter 4.3. 
 
3.3.3 Cost of capital 
 
In order to investigate how a member’s cost of capital is affected by Landshypotek’s intended 
change of contributed capital, calculations are made of a member’s cost of capital in four 
different scenarios (appendix 3, 4, 5 and 6). The calculations are based on a new member who 
enters Landshypotek in order to borrow 10 million SEK over 25 years.. In the calculations the 
assumption is made that the member uses straight-line amortization and that the membership 
is terminated at year 25 after the last amortization. The assumption is also made that the 
proceeds on the member account and equity account are repaid three years after the 
terminated membership (year 28). The interest rates, size of patronage refund and dividend on 
contributed capital that are used in the calculations are based on information from 
Landshypotek. These are assessed as relevant for the study because they are the same figures 
that Landshypotek use when they present the intended change of contributed capital to the 
“elected representatives”.  
 
The four scenarios are created to illustrate the differences between the financial model that 
Landshypotek uses today and the possibilities that are associated with the intended change of 
contributed capital. The first scenario constitutes a member that borrows capital in 
Landshypotek’s old financial model. Scenario 2,3 and 4 all contains a member that borrows 
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capital after Landshypotek’s implementation of the change of contributed capital. The reason 
that there only is one scenario for the old model and three scenarios for the new model are 
that a member that borrows capital in the old model does not have any choices to make. 
Whereas a member that borrows capital in the new model can choose to not contribute with 
capital or to actively contribute with capital either through own assets or with a “member 
loan”. The member’s cost of capital in the different scenarios is presented in chapter 4.2. 
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4 The empirical study 
 
This chapter presents the results of the interviews one by one. The members are structured in 
order of their size of borrowed capital, beginning with the members with loans amounting to 1 
million SEK. The chapter also contains a summary of the interviews in tables and figures. The 
results of the four different costs of capital scenarios are also presented. The chapter ends with 
a review of the results reliability and validity. 
 
4.1 Qualitative interviews 
 
4.1.1 Member 1 
 
Description of member 1 
Member 1 is a part-owner of agricultural and forestry land. There is no active farming, but 
there are some forestry operation and rental business. The member is between 20-39 years old 
and has been a member in Landshypotek since 2005. The respondent has no time limit for the 
membership. The borrowed capital is approximately 1 million SEK, which is divided across 
several part-owners. Since the loan is divided over many partners the member’s contributed 
capital is rather small. It is around 0,03 percent of the borrowed capital. The purpose with the 
loan was to acquire land and houses. The loan was taken over in a generational transfer so the 
member has not conducted any analyses of different banks and credit institutions. The 
member has no opinion about Landshypotek as a future commercial business.  
 
Risk attitudes 
Member 1 has long planning horizons in his/her investments which is the reason for the 
member’s risk loving profile. The respondent believes his/her risk profile will change to be 
more neutral in the future. The member does not see any risk in investing capital, which will 
be fixed in Landshypotek during the membership. The respondent has this view because 
Landshypotek is a solid cooperative and is owned by its members and that contributes toward 
limited risk-taking. The member prioritizes the long term development of the cooperative 
instead of receiving as much capital as possible in a short time.    
 
The member believes in Landshypotek’s business idea because there will always be a demand 
for credit in the agricultural and forestry sector. The respondent believes there is less risk in 
investing in Landshypotek compared to the stock market. The stock market is more complex 
and the value of a stock can drop. The member finds it safer to invest in Landshypotek, 
despite the fixed contributed capital. The capital will only be lost if Landshypotek experience 
a bankruptcy, which according to the member is unlikely. The input limit in relation to the 
borrowed capital reduces the risk of losing too much capital. The respondent thinks the 
contributed capital should be paid out immediately after termination of the membership and 
does not see the reason for why it takes three years to receive the contributed capital. 
Nevertheless the member does not think it is a big issue. The member has no insight in 
Landshypotek’s degree of risk in investments in the past but thinks that the risk profile has 
been restrictive because of the structure of a cooperative. The member cannot say if the 
intended change of contributed change will change Landshypotek’s risk profile.    
 
Contributed capital 
The respondent declares that he/she will actively increase the contributed capital to the limit 
of four percent due to the high dividend (ten percent). The investment decision also depends 
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on the economical situation and the planning horizon. The member might also be interested in 
investing more than input limit if that capital is repaid at request. The respondent believes 
members who have reached the limit are those who profit from the intended change of 
contributed capital. The member thinks it is right that members with large contributed capital 
are those who profit the most because they have contributed with much capital. Those 
members have contributed and built up the equity in Landshypotek.  Member 1 does not feel 
compelled to invest to not lose by the change. 
 
Dividend 
The respondent would demand eight percent dividend on the contributed capital. The member 
believes that the fixed capital is a disadvantage and therefore demands a dividend rate which 
is higher than the member’s usual aim. A too low dividend rate would make the investment 
unattractive. According to the member the stock market is more risky, but it does not lead to 
higher dividend rate demands, because the capital in a stock market is always available. 
Member 1 would terminate his/her membership in Landshypotek if the dividend rate would 
be four percent or lower.   
 
Behavior and attitudes 
The member thinks that the incentives to invest in Landshypotek increases because of the 
intended change of contributed capital, but will not follow the cooperative more closely. The 
possibility to reach the input limit immediately is a good motive to invest in Landshypotek. 
The member thinks it is good that the dividend is prioritized at the expense of patronage 
refund. This leads to a more explicit connection between the contributed capital and the 
dividend. 
     
The intended change of contributed capital will not make the respondent interested in 
terminating his/her membership. The member declares that he/she would consider terminating 
the membership if the change implies a general deterioration for the members compared to 
old model. Less favorable conditions would be acceptable for a short period of time, but it 
would be unacceptable if no improvement occurs. The respondent prefers the new model 
because of the possibility to make a direct investment in order to reach the input limit.  
 
Member 1 has no opinion about the impossibility to receive cash payments for dividends and 
patronage refunds until the input limit is reached because it is such small amounts of money. 
The respondent thinks it is more important with a low interest rate than a high dividend on the 
contributed capital. It is the low interest which makes the cooperative attractive and the loan 
conditions is the reason for the membership. According to the respondent the “member loan” 
is a good opportunity to reach the input limit, but member 1 would probably not use it. The 
member finds it problematic that the board of directors is able to adjust the input limit, but if 
the board does explain why they have to change the limit it would be acceptable.    
 
Ownership 
Member 1 believes a cooperative should have one member one vote. The respondent thinks it 
would be wrong if members with large contributed capital have more votes. The member’s 
incentives to invest will not increase with vote rights proportional to the size of contributed 
capital.       
 
Concluding remarks 
The member’s overall perception of the intended change of contributed capital is positive, a 
four on a five-point scale.  
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4.1.2 Member 2 
 
Description of member 2 
The member owns an agricultural and forest property and practice crop farming. The 
respondent is between 40 and 59 years old and has been a member for ten years and will be a 
member until retirement i.e. in approximately 20 years. He/she has chosen Landshypotek 
because of the cooperatives specialization in agricultural business, low interest rates and good 
contact with the employees. The member’s loan is around 1 million SEK and the contributed 
capital amounts to 1,4 percent of the borrowed capital. The loan has been used to finance a 
generational transfer. The respondent believes in Landshypotek as a future commercial 
business. 
 
Risk attitudes 
The respondent is risk-averse and does not believe his/her risk profile will change during the 
expected period as a member. Member 2 finds it less risky to invest capital in Landshypotek, 
even though the capital is fixed in Landshypotek compared to investing in the stock market. 
The member thinks it is a disadvantage, due to inflexibility, that the invested capital in 
Landshypotek is fixed during the membership. He/she finds it problematic that it takes three 
years after terminated membership to receive the contributed capital.  
 
Contributed capital 
The member would invest if the intended change implies disadvantages without investing in 
Landshypotek. The respondent declares that he/she would invest approximately two percent 
of the borrowed capital, but it depends on the economic situation. Member 2 is not interested 
in investing more than the input limit. The respondent believes that members with large 
contributed capital are those members who will benefit the most from the new model, but find 
it reasonable because those who contribute should profit the most. The intended change of 
contributed capital does not make the member feel compelled to invest not to lose due to the 
change.  
 
Dividend 
The respondent believes ten percent is a reasonable dividend rate on the contributed capital. 
He/she would demand a higher dividend rate on contributed capital in Landshypotek 
compared to the stock market because of the fixed capital in Landshypotek. Member 2 
declares that he/she would terminate the membership if the dividend rate falls to two percent. 
 
Behavior and attitudes 
The respondent’s reason to be a member in Landshypotek does not change if the intended 
change is implemented. The member will instead be more active and follow the cooperative 
more closely. The member’s incentive to invest in Landshypotek does not increase with the 
new model, even though the respondent perceives a more clear connection between dividends 
and contributed capital. Member 2 thinks it is unfavorable that the dividend is prioritized at 
the expense of the patronage refund, but the new model does not imply that the member 
would terminate the membership in Landshypotek. It is only the loan conditions that affect 
the choice of credit institution.  
 
The respondent would rather keep the old model, but finds it acceptable that dividends and 
patronage refunds are capitalized until the input limit is reached because it is good to build up 
the own contributed capital. The member rather prefers a low interest rate instead of high 
dividend rate because the member wants to keep the interests cost as low as possible. The 
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member chooses bank after the interest rate. The respondent will not use the ”member loan”, 
but finds it as a good possibility to finance the contributed capital. Member 2 does not like the 
proposal that the board has the opportunity to adjust the input limit because of uncertainty. 
 
Ownership 
Member 2 thinks one member should have one vote. Even if the voting rights were 
proportional to the contributed capital this would not affect the member’s willingness to 
invest capital in Landshypotek.  
 
Concluding remarks 
The member’s overall perception of the intended change of contributed capital is slightly 
negative, a two on a five-point scale. 
 
4.1.3 Member 3 
 
Description of member 3 
The member owns an agricultural and forest property and practice crop and ley production as 
well as beef cattle production and contract work (e.g. snow clearing). The respondent is 
between 40 and 59 years old, has been a member for 30 years and will be a member until 
retirement i.e. approximately 15-20 years. The member is also an “elected representative” in 
Landshypotek. Due to the generational change the respondent became a member in 
Landshypotek, because the first mortgage loan was already available in Landshypotek. The 
borrowed capital amounts to 1 million SEK and the contributed capital amounts to 3,3 percent 
of the borrowed capital. The loan was taken to acquire additional land. The member believes 
that in the future, Landshypotek will only deliver a result in line with market due to some 
uncertainty. The member feels unsecure because Landshypotek lost some market shares a 
couple of years ago. Nevertheless, the cooperative has delivered good results and regained the 
members’ trust of a better future. Member 3 thinks other banks may be a threat if they can 
offer entire solutions and not just low interest’s rates.   
 
Risk attitudes 
The member is risk-averse in the agricultural business, but in private business the member is a 
risk-lover. The agricultural risk profile is not expected to change during the remaining time as 
a member. The member would rather invest in Landshypotek than in the stock market. Firstly, 
the member finds the risk of investing capital in Landshypotek very small compared to 
investing in the stock market and secondly it is a good chance to profit from the investment in 
Landshypotek. An investment in Landshypotek gives access to the whole equity, which 
implies “invest 1 receive 3,5” according to member 3. The respondent believes that risk will 
be reduced with the new model because the board is likely to strive to reach the dividend goal 
of ten percent and that Landshypotek’s profit will be divided over the contributed capital. 
 
Member 3 does not see any problems with the fact that the contributed capital will be fixed 
during the whole membership. The capital will be there, but it is a disadvantage that it takes 
three years to receive the contributed capital after terminated membership. The respondent 
understands the necessities for Landshypotek to have to time adjust, but this makes it harder 
to change credit institution. The member perceives Landshypotek has strong collateral within 
land and forest, which leads to low risk. According to member 3 the cooperative needs more 
equity to reach the expansion goals and more capital implies safety for Landshypotek. This 
makes it easier to meet the market demand and lower the risk slightly. 
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One problem which has to be minimized is the risks of dilution i.e. the members’ individual 
capital (contributed capital) must not be too big in relation to collectively own capital (non-
restricted capital). A distorted relation would lead to lower dividends. The new model might 
be risky if many members reject the new model and chose not to invest because of lack of 
knowledge or have negative approach to the concept “contributed capital”.  
 
Contributed capital 
Member 3 would happily invest to reach the input limit because it is a good investment 
(invest 1 receive 3,5) and there is a substantial probability that the dividend goal of ten 
percent will be reached. The respondent would like to invest more than the input limit if 
possible, in such case he/she would invest ten percent of the borrowed capital. According to 
member 3 new members or members with little contributed capital would profit the most from 
the new model because they are able to invest to reach the input limit immediately. The 
member also adds that members with large contributed capital will benefit more from the 
change than those members with little contributed capital and those who do not invest. The 
respondent states that the dividend should be proportional which implies that members with 
large contributed capital should receive a large dividend. According to the member this new 
model would be a success factor and the free-rider problem would be eliminated. Member 3 
does not feel compelled to invest not to lose due to the change. The investment decision 
depends of the economic situation. There might be other investments which are more urgent 
and of more importance.  
 
Dividend 
Member 3 has no personal dividend goal, but it would be really bad if the contributed capital 
does not yield anything at all. The respondent would demand a higher dividend on invested 
capital in the stock market than in Landshypotek due to a higher risk. If the dividend would 
fall to four percent in combination with bad loan conditions the member would change to 
another credit institution. According to member 3 a dividend of six percent and good loan 
conditions are good enough.    
 
Behavior and attitudes 
The respondent’s reason to be a member in Landshypotek does not change because of the new 
model and the member is already very active as a member. According to the member, his/her 
incentives to invest in Landshypotek will increase and there will be a more clear connection 
between dividend and contributed capital, given that most of the members invest. One 
problem could be that many members reject the new model and do not invest. This leads to a 
few members contributing which is not the purpose with the new model. In such a case of few 
investing members it might be an idea to find another model, but that might lead to that a 
model which makes it possible for external investors to profit the most from the cooperative. 
Member 3 does not find any problems with the dividend being prioritized at the expense of 
the patronage refund. This will not be an issue if many members choose to invest, they will in 
that case receive dividend instead of patronage refund. The new model could imply problems 
for the members who do not realize the advantage to invest in the cooperative.  
 
The respondent would not terminate his/her membership in Landshypotek because of the 
intended change of contributed capital. The only reasons to terminate the membership are if 
the member sells the farm or if the member no longer is an “elected representative” and 
another bank offers better loan conditions. The member would also terminate the membership 
if the dividend would become too low and if Landshypotek performs really poor which leads 
to higher interest’s rates.   
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Member 3 finds the old model reasonable, but it does not generate enough equity. The new 
model would be better for Landshypotek if most of the members invest. The capital structure 
would be improved if the contributed capital is divided over many members and most of the 
members will be satisfied. It will be an advantage for Landshypotek if many members are 
satisfied. The member really likes the fact that patronage refunds and dividends are 
capitalized until the input limit is reached. All companies need equity and a cooperative has 
no possibility to issue shares. The member is not satisfied with the fact that the cooperative 
keeps parts of the business surplus as collective capital. It is preferred if the capital remains in 
the cooperative as individual capital. The member understands that the capital base has to 
grow and if the change is good for Landshypotek it is good for the members.      
 
The respondent thinks it is best if Landshypotek determines the interest rate based on the 
market conditions, which leads to higher dividend. The dividend is a better measure because it 
indicates how good Landshypotek performs. Member 3 believes that the ”member loan” is a 
good opportunity and would use it if needed. Furthermore, the member thinks that the 
”member loan” is a necessary condition for as many of the members as possible to be 
interested in investing. The member regards it as necessary that the board has the possibility 
to adjust the input limit to adjust the model after rules and demand of capital.   
 
Ownership 
The respondent does not think members with a large contributed capital should have 
additional voting rights than members with little contributed capital. It would be necessary 
with proportional voting rights if many members become active and vote for their own best 
instead of the cooperative’s best. It may lead to wrong decisions if the members vote for their 
own best. The “elected representatives” should receive voting rights, at national level, based 
on a combination of the region’s members and their share of the borrowed capital. The 
respondent’s incentives to invest would not increase with proportional voting rights.  
 
Concluding remarks 
The member’s overall perception of the intended change of contributed capital is positive, a 
four on a five-point scale. The member is very positive, but believes it will be hard to 
implement the model to the members because it is difficult to promise a certain dividend on 
contributed capital. Member 3 perceives some risk of rejecting members because they might 
not see the advantages with the new model or their aversion to additional loans. It might be a 
risk that other banks speak negatively about the intended change. Therefore it is very 
important that Landshypotek achieves the goals.   
 
4.1.4 Member 4 
 
Description of member 4 
The member owns an agricultural and forest property and practice crop farming and operate a 
herd of beef cows. The respondent is in the group 60 years or older and has been a member 
for 30 years and will be a member for an additional five years. The member did not actively 
choose Landshypotek as a credit institution because the loan was already taken in 
Landshypotek when member 4 bought the farm from his/her parents. The loan is 
approximately 1 million SEK and has been used to finance the farm, buy additional land and 
for machinery investments. The member’s contributed capital amounts to 1,3 percent of the 
borrowed capital. The member has a very good confidence in Landshypotek as a future 
commercial business.    
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Risk attitudes 
The member is risk-averse and does not believe the risk profile will change during the 
remaining time period as a member. The member perceives the risk of investing capital in 
Landshypotek as very small compared to investments in the stock market because 
Landshypotek is a solid company with little costumer and credit losses. The agricultural 
sector feels very secure. If the value of the agricultural properties would fall everything else 
would also fall. Member 4 finds it acceptable that the capital is fixed in Landshypotek during 
the entire membership because it is the way a cooperative works and there is not a problem 
due to the small amount of capital. The capital is something extra for the retirement. The 
respondent desires a faster payback time than three years, but finds it agreeable because those 
are the rules. The member believes Landshypotek is a cooperative that historically has taken 
small risks. The fact that the cooperative has survived 175 years is proof of stability and the 
intended change of contributed capital does not change Landshypotek’s risk profile.   
 
Contributed capital 
Member 4 would invest to reach the input limit if the new model is introduced. The new 
model increases the member’s incentives to invest because of the high dividend. The member 
will probably not invest above the input limit. This decision depends on the liquidity situation. 
The respondent would invest 50 000 SEK over input limit if there is a high dividend. Member 
4 perceives that no member profit more than any other member in the new model because the 
calculations are based on percent. The respondent perceives no problem if members with 
large contributed capital profit more because they contribute with more capital. The member 
does not feel compelled to invest not to lose due to the change.   
 
Dividend 
The member believes ten percent as dividend is a good ambition. The respondent would 
demand a higher dividend from investments in the stock market due to the greater risk. If 
Landshypotek’s dividend would be zero percent two years in a row combined with poor 
results for Landshypotek, the member would terminate his/her membership.     
 
Behavior and attitudes 
The respondent’s reason to be a member is not affected by the intended change, but his/her 
incentives to invest increases. The member will not be more active because he/she is already 
quite active and follows the cooperative closely. Member 4 believes it will be a more distinct 
connection between invested capital and dividend. The member would not end his/her 
membership because of the intended change of contributed capital, but if Landshypotek 
would perform poorly the member would terminate the membership. The member prefers the 
new model before the old model, but he/she would rather prefer a low interest rate instead of 
high dividend because the interest rate affects the total paid interest. The respondent is 
positive towards the fact that all dividends and patronage refunds are capitalized until the 
input limit is reached. The respondent would maybe use the ”member loan” to reach the input 
limit. Member 4 does not see any problems that the board is able to adjust the input limit, 
after the demand of capital, as long as the board makes advance warning of a future change of 
the input limit.      
 
Ownership 
The respondent believes that members with large contributed capital should not have more 
votes than members with little contributed capital, but the member would invest more if the 
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voting right was proportional to the size of the contributed capital. Member 4 would in that 
case invest a moderate amount of capital.     
 
Concluding remarks 
The member’s overall perception of the intended change of contributed capital is positive 
(four on a five-point scale).   
 
4.1.5 Member 5 
 
Description of member 5 
Member 5 owns agricultural and forestry land and the main focus is crop production, but there 
are also some forestry operation and rental business. The member is between 20-39 years old 
and has been a member in Landshypotek for eight years. Member 5 declares that his/her 
intention is to remain as a member in Landshypotek until retirement. The member has chosen 
Landshypotek because of the loan terms and Landshypotek’s focus on farmland as security 
for mortgage loans. Member one’s loan is around 5 million SEK and the purpose of the loan 
was to acquire the farm and to purchase nearby land. The member believes that in the future, 
Landshypotek will deliver a result in accordance to the market. 
 
Risk attitudes 
The member has a neutral risk profile and does not think that it will change during his/her 
time left as a member in Landshypotek. The respondent believes that the risk of investing in 
Landshypotek is lower than investing in the stock market because he/she feels more 
comfortable with a cooperative like Landshypotek and because there is a very small risk of 
actually losing capital invested in Landshypotek. The member believes that Landshypotek is a 
cooperative that historically has taken small risks and also that the intended change of 
contributed capital is not going to affect the company’s risk profile. The member adds that 
there is greater risk of losing capital on the stock market but that the stock market also can 
provide higher return on invested capital. The respondent sees no problem with the invested 
capital being fixed throughout the whole term of the membership, but feels that three years 
after terminated membership is an unnecessary long time to wait for the contributed capital to 
be paid out. The member would like to receive the contributed capital as soon as possible 
after terminated membership. 
 
Contributed capital 
The Member’s contributed capital is today around two percent of the borrowed capital. 
He/she declares that if the change of contributed capital is implemented he/she will not 
actively invest the intermediate capital needed to reach the input limit of four percent of the 
borrowed capital. The reason is that the member feels that the capital is needed elsewhere for 
example to purchase machinery and cover maintenance. According to the member the only 
reason to actively invest capital in Landshypotek would be an incredibly high dividend on 
contributed capital. The respondent believes that members with large contributed capital will 
gain the most from the intended change but also adds that this has no relevance to the 
respondent who also does not feel compelled to invest to not lose by the change.  
 
Dividend 
Member 5 believes that Landshypotek might have a problem in maintaining a ten percent 
dividend on contributed capital and adds that a dividend around seven to eight percent is more 
reasonable. When the respondent compares the contributed capital in Landshypotek to capital 
invested in the stock market he/she declares that he/she would demand a higher return on 
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capital invested on the stock market because there is a higher risk of losing capital. The 
respondent feels that the service, discussion and availability that Landshypotek can offer are 
more important than high dividend on contributed capital. The member therefore feels that if 
Landshypotek would fail to deliver ten percent dividend on contributed capital and only for 
example deliver two percent, it would not matter as long as it only happens once. But if the 
dividend was two percent for several years consecution the respondent would consider the 
decision to terminate his/her business relationship with Landshypotek. 
 
Behavior and attitudes 
The respondent does not feel that the intended change of contributed capital will affect his/her 
reason for being a member in Landshypotek. According to the member the main reason for 
the membership is still the whole package that Landshypotek can offer. The member will not 
follow developments in Landshypotek more accurate and adds that the incentive to invest in 
Landshypotek does not change as a result of the intended change of contributed capital. 
However, the member believes that the intended change will lead to a clearer link between the 
contributed capital and dividend compared too previously and sees no problem with the fact 
that the dividend is prioritized at the expense of the patronage refund. Member 5 will not 
terminate his/her membership in Landshypotek because of the intended change of contributed 
capital, but if the interest rate were to rise to a much higher level than other credit institutions 
and banks the member would consider a redemption of the loans in Landshypotek.  
 
Member 5 believes that the intended change of contributed capital constitutes a better model 
than before. The main reason is that the input limit is reduced from eight to four percent 
which makes it easier to reach the input limit and get the patronage refund and dividend paid 
out. The member sees no problem with the fact that the patronage refunds and dividends are 
capitalized on the equity account until the contributed capital reaches the input limit, as long 
as the input limit is four percent of the borrowed capital. When the member is asked to 
compare the importance of a low interest rate and a high dividend the member answers that a 
low interest on borrowed capital is much more important than high dividend on contributed 
capital. The reason is that the member perceives the low interest rates as one of the main 
reasons for choosing Landshypotek as credit institution.  
 
The respondent will not use the ”member loan” to reach the input limit and he/she is positive 
towards the possibility for the board of directors to change the input limit as long as it leads to 
a lower input limit. Otherwise he/she would like the input limit to be fixed at four percent.   
 
Ownership 
The respondent believes that members with large contributed capital should have more votes 
than members with little contributed capital. However, a voting right proportional to the size 
of the contributed capital would not affect the member’s will to invest capital in 
Landshypotek.  
 
Concluding remarks 
The member’s overall perception of the intended change of contributed capital is positive, a 
four on a five-point scale. 
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4.1.6 Member 6 
 
Description of member 6 
Member 6 owns agricultural and forestry land and the main focus is crop production, but there 
are also some rental business. The respondent became a member in Landshypotek three years 
ago when he/she took two loans. The duration of the two loans are three and four years and 
the member states that he/she will continue to be a member for two more years and then 
review all possible options. Member 6 is 40-59 years old and has a loan in Landshypotek 
which amounts to nearly 5 million, the member’s contributed capital amounts to 0,12 percent 
of the borrowed capital. The purpose of the loan was to acquire the farm property that he/she 
owns today. The respondent is a member in Landshypotek because it was the institution that 
gave the best loan terms at the time of the loan and states that it primarily was the low interest 
rate that determined the choice of credit institution. Member 6 considers Landshypotek to be a 
well managed company that has followed the development on the market and the respondent 
continues to have a good faith in Landshypotek as a profit-making enterprise. The member 
thinks that Landshypotek wants to implement the change of contributed capital because of 
changes in capital adequacy rules and to make themselves more attractive on the market. 
 
Risk attitudes 
Member 6 considers himself/herself to have a very high risk profile. The member believes 
that the willingness to take risks in general decreases with age, and therefore believes that 
his/her own propensity to take risks will decrease in the future. In comparison with investing 
capital on the stock market, the respondent sees it as a very small risk of tying up capital in 
Landshypotek. The reason is that the member thinks that Landshypotek is a company that 
historically has taken small risks. The member also believes that the intended change of the 
contributed capital will not change Landshypotek’s risk profile. Furthermore, member 6 
argues that there are more parameters that affect investments on the stock market and 
indicates the general economy as well as the individual company as stress factors. By this, the 
member implies that there are additional parameters in the stock market that may affect the 
return on capital negatively than there are in Landshypotek. However the potential yield is 
greater in the stock market. The member is negative towards the fact that the contributed 
capital is fixed throughout the term of membership because it limits the possibility to use the 
capital for alternative investments. The member is also negative towards the fact that the 
contributed capital is repaid first three years after termination of the membership, but adds 
that he/she understands that Landshypotek must have certain rigidity in the contributed capital 
to maintain control over the equity.  
 
Contributed capital 
Member 6 believes that the intended change of contributed capital clearly is an attractive 
model if the goal of ten percent dividend is achieved. The member considers himself/herself 
not to have enough liquid assets at the time to actively contribute with capital in 
Landshypotek. The member will therefore most likely not contribute actively with capital in 
Landshypotek if the intended change is implemented, but adds that if his own situation 
changes, he/she is willing to actively contribute with capital up to and including the input 
limit. The member also adds that in that situation he/she would also be willing to contribute 
with more than the input limit and says that he/she would be willing to actively contribute 
with ten percent of the borrowed capital granted that he/she received ten percent dividend on 
the contributed capital. Member 6 believes that members with large contributed capital will 
benefit most from the change and also states that he/she thinks this is right because he/she 
believes that members who contribute with a large amount of capital also should be rewarded. 
  46 
 
 
Furthermore, the member adds that he/she does not feel compelled to contribute with more 
capital in order not to lose by change and states that it is not the dividend that determines the 
choice of investment but his/her own liquidity and access to alternative investments. 
 
Dividend 
Member 6 states that he/she would demand at least seven percent dividend on contributed 
capital if the intended change was implemented. The demand is based on the member’s 
required rate of return in investment situations. The respondent requires a lower dividend on 
contributed capital in Landshypotek compared to invested capital in the stock market because 
he/she feels that there is a greater risk of investing in the stock market. The member states that 
the dividend on contributed capital does not affect the decision to be a member in 
Landshypotek or not and adds that the interest rate is the most important factor in the decision 
of credit institution. 
 
Behavior and attitudes 
The member declares that the intended change of contributed capital might change his/her 
reason for being a member in Landshypotek depending on the member’s situation after the 
implementation. The respondent also believes the intended change will make him/her follow 
Landshypotek more thoroughly. The member’s motives for investing in Landshypotek will 
increase if the intended change is implemented but the member adds that his/her motives for 
investing is highly connected to the goal of ten percent dividend. The member therefore 
believes that it is very important for Landshypotek to achieve their goal and that they might 
lose a lot of members if they fail. The respondent also feels that the intended change will lead 
to a clearer link between the dividend and the contributed capital. Member 6 believes that 
his/her own future situation plays a major role in determining whether it is good or bad that 
the dividend on contributed capital is prioritized at the expense of the patronage refund. 
 
The intended change of contributed capital will not make the respondent conclude its business 
with Landshypotek and the member declares that it still is the loan terms that determine the 
choice of credit institution. Furthermore, the member declares that a low interest rate on 
borrowed capital is more important than high dividend on contributed capital and states that 
the low interest rate was his/her main reason for choosing Landshypotek. The member is also 
indifferent to the fact that both patronage refunds and dividends are capitalized until the input 
limit is reached. The respondent views the ”member loan” as an attractive possibility and 
states that he/she might use this possibility depending on his/her own financial situation at the 
time. The member is negative towards the fact that the board of directors will have the 
possibility to change the input limit and declares that he/she sees this need as a sign that the 
board of directors has not done their job in the first place.  
 
Ownership 
Member 6 thinks that members with large contributed capital ought to have greater voting 
rights because they contribute more, but also argues that a proportional voting share will not 
make him/her contribute with more capital in Landshypotek.  
 
Concluding remarks 
Member's overall perception of the intended change of contributed capital is cautiously 
positive, a four on a five-point scale. 
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4.1.7 Member 7 
 
Description of member 7 
Member 7 owns agricultural and forestry land and the main focus is crop production and calf 
breeding. The respondent is in the age group 60 years or older and has been a member in 
Landshypotek for 30 years. The member has the intention to be a member for an additional 
ten years. The respondent did choose Landshypotek as his/her credit institution because of 
Landshypotek’s loan conditions with low and predictable interests. The borrowed capital is 
around 5 million SEK and has been used for financing investments and working capital. The 
member’s contributed capital amount to 4,7 percent of the total borrowed capital. The 
respondent believes in Landshypotek as a future commercial business. 
 
Risk attitudes 
Member 7 perceives himself/herself as risk neutral and does not believe that the risk profile is 
likely change during the remaining time of the membership in Landshypotek. The member 
believes it constitutes a greater risk of investing in the stock market than investing in 
Landshypotek because the cooperative’s solid financial situation and no risk of losing the 
contributed capital. Member 7 thinks it is okay that the contributed capital is fixed during the 
membership, because that is how the operation works. However it would be a problem if the 
dividend rate would be too low. The respondent also accepts that the contributed capital is 
paid out three years after termination of the membership because he/she understands that 
Landshypotek needs stability. The member finds it problematic that not all equity is 
redistributed to the members. According to the respondent, Landshypotek has taken small 
risks in the past except a few large “crashes”. Member 7 believes the new model would lower 
Landshypotek’s risk profile because more capital is fixed in the cooperative.      
 
Contributed capital 
The member would increase his/her contributed capital as much as possible if the dividend 
rate is ten percent. If the dividend rate on the amount of capital that exceeds the input limit 
would be five percent or less the respondent would not invest more than the input limit. 
Member 7 believes that members with a large contributed capital are those who will benefit 
the most of the intended change and does also believe all members will invest to reach the 
input limit. The respondent finds it better if all equity is paid out to the members and that 
Landshypotek should practice cost-effectiveness so their interest rate becomes as low as 
possible. The ownership should be connected to the whole company and that is why it is good 
with fixed contributed capital so the members cannot get their capital paid out until they 
terminate the membership.     
 
Dividend 
The respondent does not think that the dividend is the most important issue and which model 
Landshypotek uses is of less interest. It is better if as much as possible is paid back to the 
members. The member would compare his/her dividend goal with treasury bonds i.e. 4,5 
percent because of the safety in investments in Landshypotek. Member 7 would require a 
higher dividend from Landshypotek compared to the stock market because an investment in 
the stock market gives the opportunity to profit from a stock’s increase in value. The dividend 
rate on the contributed capital does not affect the decision of being a member in 
Landshypotek. If the dividend rate is to become too low for many years the member would 
consider other banks. One year with low dividend rate is not a problem. 
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Behavior and attitudes 
The respondent’s reason to be a member in Landshypotek does not change because of the new 
model and he/she will not be more active as a member or get bigger incentives to invest in 
Landshypotek. Member 7 does not think that there will be a stronger connection between 
contributed capital and dividend, it is only another way of receiving a refund. The member 
has no problem with the fact that the dividend will be prioritized before the patronage refund. 
The respondent will not terminate his/her membership because of the intended change, the 
only reason to change is if another bank offers better loan conditions. Member 7 thinks the 
new model is good if it implies an improvement for the cooperative.  
 
Another positive aspect with the new model is that the input limit is lowered and that all 
patronage refunds and dividends are capitalized until the input limit is reached. The 
respondent points out that all equity, including unallocated equity, should be divided among 
the members as contributed capital. Member 7 makes his/her choice of credit institution 
mostly based on the interest rate, but the total result is also of importance. If the member 
invests capital in Landshypotek he/she demands a dividend.         
 
According to member 7 the “member loan” is a good idea if the financial supervisory 
authority accepts the concept and the respondent would use the ”member loan” if he/she 
needs to. The member believes that the board needs to have the power to adjust the input 
limit, but he/she demands a warning in advance. The member would like a higher input limit 
so there is room to issue bonus shares from the contributed capital.    
 
Ownership 
Member 7 believes that members with a large amount of contributed capital should not have 
more votes than members with little contributed capital. A voting right, proportional to the 
contributed capital would not affect the member to invest more capital in Landshypotek.  
 
Concluding remarks 
The member has not enough knowledge to judge if the intended change is positive or 
negative, but he/she would like to see something in between the old and the new model. The 
respondent is slightly positive, but ten percent is too high and contributed capital could 
therefore be regarded as risk capital. Member 7 believes that a too high dividend rate will 
“dope the capital”. 
 
The member thinks Landshypotek should maintain their strategy towards cost-effectiveness 
and be a cooperative offering the best loan conditions. All equity should be paid out to the 
members and not keep the capital and act as a foundation. A new member today gets access to 
the cooperative’s equity which has been contributed by old members. 
 
4.1.8 Member 8 
 
Description of member 8 
Member 8 is an “elected representative” in Landshypotek and owns agricultural and forest 
land. The agriculture land produces ley but the farms main focus is forestry and milk 
production. The respondent is in the age group 40-59 years old and has been a member in 
Landshypotek for 33 years. The respondent declares that he/she intends to remain a member 
in Landshypotek for five more years before performing a generational transfer. The member’s 
loan amounts to around 5 million SEK and the contributed capital is 3,6 percent of the 
borrowed capital. The purpose of the loan was to acquire the agriculture and forestry land in 
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an earlier generational change but also to build a livestock barn. The reason that the 
respondent is a member in Landshypotek is because he/she feels that they have favorable 
interest rates and good loan terms in general. The member also states that he/she believes that 
as a member in Landshypotek you receive the correct interest rate right away and not an 
initial low interest rate that is increased later on with the purpose to allure clients to become 
borrowers. Member 8 has a very high confidence in Landshypotek as a future profit-making 
enterprise. 
 
Risk attitudes 
The member considers himself/herself to be quite willing to take risks but adds that the 
willingness to take risks decreases with age. Member 8 thinks it is associated with little risk to 
invest capital in Landshypotek compared to investing capital on the stock market because 
agricultural and forest land provide strong securities. The member also believes there are 
major changes in the stock market and that it actually happens that companies go bankrupt 
Member 8 view the risk that this would happen to Landshypotek as in principle non-existent. 
The respondent is positive towards the fact that the contributed capital is fixed throughout the 
term of membership and states that this is a price you have to be willing to pay to take part of 
the benefits that Landshypotek offers. Further, the member believes that this type of capital 
structure is necessary for Landshypotek and that what is good for Landshypotek is also good 
for him/her as a member in the end.  
 
On the contrary, member 8 believes that it is unnecessary that the contributed capital is repaid 
first three years after termination of the membership and that it should be possible to obtain 
repayments no later than one year after completion of the membership. The member adds that 
this is purely a matter of principle. The member believes that Landshypotek is a company that 
historically has taken small risks and he/she does not believe that the intended change of 
contributed capital is going to affect Landshypotek’s risk profile. 
 
Contributed capital 
Member 8 believes that the intended change of the contributed capital is a good solution given 
that the patronage refund and dividend goals are achieved and that Landshypotek really is in 
need of capital to expand its business. However, the member also adds that he/she will not 
actively contribute with capital if the intended change is implemented. The argument is that 
he/she only has the scheduled time of five years left as a member in Landshypotek and 
therefore finds it unnecessary to invest capital that will be redeemed in a near future. The 
member also feels that he/she needs to distribute the risk and is therefore not willing to invest 
too much capital in a single operation. However, the member indicates that a guaranteed 
higher dividend and patronage refund would make him/her invest more than what he/she is 
willing to do in the current situation. Furthermore, the respondent does not believe that 
Landshypotek’s need of capital will grow that much due to the increased business activity will 
be restricted by new rules on capital adequacy and amortization. The difficulties in taking 
market shares from other competing credit institutions is another obstacle. He/she therefore 
believes that the ability to actively invest four percent of the borrowed capital is a pure 
hypothetical question that will not be of significance for the members.  
 
Member 8 believes that new members with a small contributed capital abuse the system that 
Landshypotek has today. He/she also believes that the intended change of contributed capital 
will bring balance to the system because new members’ need to actively contribute with 
capital in order to enjoy the benefits. The member therefore also believes that members with 
large contributed capital should get more in return and adds that if that is not the case, he/she 
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believes that members will invest their capital elsewhere. Member 8 also adds that if he/she 
did not have so little time left as a member he/she would feel compelled to actively contribute 
with capital, up to and including input limit, in order not to lose by the change. However, the 
member once again points out that he/she believes that what is good for Landshypotek also is 
good for him/her as a member in the end, and that he/she therefore does not view this as a 
problem. 
 
Dividend 
Member 8 believes that the dividend on contributed capital should be at least five percent and 
states that he/she would not demand a higher return on contributed capital in comparison to 
capital invested in the stock market. The reason is that the respondent believes that the more 
favorable loan terms cause lower yields in Landshypotek compared to the stock market. The 
member also believes that compared to a low interest rate the magnitude of dividends and 
patronage refunds are insignificant and therefore do not affect the decision to be or not be a 
member in Landshypotek. 
 
Behavior and attitudes 
The intended change of contributed capital does not imply that the member's reason for being 
a member in Landshypotek changes because the member feels that the change does not affect 
him/her in a significant way. However the respondent adds he/she understands 
Landshypotek’s need for the intended change. The member does not think that the intended 
change will make him/her follow more closely what happens in Landshypotek because he/she 
has a confidence in the management and believe they will manage the business for the 
members' best. The respondent does not think that his/her own motives to invest in 
Landshypotek are likely to increase with the intended change of contributed capital because 
he/she has such a short time left as a member. 
 
Member 8 believes that the intended change of contributed capital will lead to a stronger and 
more direct link between contributed capital and dividend because the dividend is linked to 
the contributed capital and not to the borrowed capital. He/she also believes that this link puts 
more pressure on Landshypotek that forces clearly defined objectives to achieve. The 
respondent also believes that after the intended change it will be easier for members to predict 
how much they will receive in the form of patronage refunds and above all dividends on 
contributed capital. Due to these reasons, member 8 believes that it is good that the dividend 
is prioritized at the expense of the patronage refund. 
 
The intended change of contributed capital does not cause member 8 to terminate his/her 
membership in Landshypotek. However, the member indicates that serious errors involving 
large credit losses for Landshypotek could constitute grounds to terminate the membership. 
Member 8 states that it does not matter to him/her if Landshypotek implement the intended 
change or not because he/she does not believe that neither the patronage refund nor dividend 
will have much effect on his/her financial situation since there is such a short time left as a 
member. The member indicates however that he/she prefers the new model if the intended 
change represent an improvement for Landshypotek.  
 
Member 8 is positive towards the fact that it is not possible to have either the patronage 
refunds or dividends paid out until the input limit is reached because he/she regards it as a 
necessity for Landshypotek to be able to build equity. The member believes that a low interest 
on borrowed capital is more important than high dividend on contributed capital because 
he/she believes that the dividend will only produce a marginal effect on the interest costs 
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compared to interest rate. The respondent is positive towards the possibility for the members 
to borrow capital to use as contributed capital in Landshypotek but adds that for his/her own 
part, the choice of using a “member loan” depends on how highly leveraged he/she is at the 
time. The member is also positive towards the fact that the board will have an option to 
change the input limit, because he/she believes that this is a necessity for Landshypotek to be 
able to adapt to the variations on the lending market.  
 
Ownership 
Member 8 indicates that there are reasons to consider making voting rights proportional in 
relation to contributed capital but he/she also believes that it would be difficult to implement 
this kind of change. Furthermore the member states that proportional voting would not make 
him/her contribute with more capital in Landshypotek because it would require a considerable 
investment on his part to get a significant voting right in the association. 
 
Concluding remarks 
Member 8 is generally very supportive of the intended change (five on a five-point scale) 
because he/she believes that the change will solve Landshypotek’s need of capital. The 
member finally adds that he/she does not believe that the intended change will to any greater 
extent affect him personally. 
 
4.1.9 Member 9 
 
Description of member 9 
Member 9 owns several properties, its tenement houses and factories but the main property is 
agricultural and forestry land. The main focus is forestry and grain production. Member 9 is 
in the age group 60 years or older and has been a member in Landshypotek for 17 years. The 
respondent declares that his/her intention is to remain as a member in Landshypotek for the 
remaining part of his/her life. The reason that the respondent chose Landshypotek is that they 
offer good loan terms and because he/she is investing in agricultural activities and 
Landshypotek is an institution that specializes in agricultural and forest land. The respondent 
adds that the good contact he/she has with Landshypotek and the staff who works there also 
affects his/her choice of credit institution. The purpose of the member’s loan is to purchase 
large agricultural properties. The loan is in the group 20 million or more and the contributed 
capital is today 0,06 percent of the borrowed capital. The member has a very good confidence 
in Landshypotek as a future commercial business. 
 
Risk attitudes 
Member 9 believes that it takes courage to do business and therefore has a fairly high risk 
profile. The member believes that the risk profile changes over time and considers 
himself/herself to have a lower risk profile today than in the past. The reason for today’s 
lower risk profile is that he/she prioritizes security and stability before large gains. The 
member adds that today’s risk profile will not be further changed in the future. The now 
somewhat lower risk profile is one of the reasons why the member is investing in agriculture 
as he/she considers it to be very low risk of investing in agriculture and forestry properties 
and because he/she sees a good development potential in the agricultural sector. This is also 
the reason why the member believes that it is a very low risk of investing capital in 
Landshypotek because they lend money with strong security to a large and stable customer 
base with relatively good repayment capacity. Member 9 also believes that Landshypotek is a 
cooperative that historically has taken small risks and that the intended change of contributed 
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capital gives Landshypotek a lower risk profile because it makes it possible to increase 
Landshypotek’s equity. 
 
In comparison with investing capital in the stock market the member believes that the risk is 
practically 100 percent larger than to commit the same capital in Landshypotek. The value of 
agricultural land does not fall to the same extent as capital on the stock market can do. 
However there are also opportunities to obtain higher returns in the stock market. According 
to the member this means that he/she is much more willing to take risks on the stock market 
than he/she ever would be willing to do in Landshypotek. The fact that the contributed capital 
in Landshypotek is fixed throughout the term of the membership also affects the willingness 
to take risks compared to the stock market where capital can be made available almost 
immediately, but the member adds that since it in this case is so small amounts it does not 
matter. The respondent also has no problem with the fact that the contributed capital is repaid 
first three years after the membership is completed.  
 
Contributed capital 
Member 9 will not actively increase his/her contributed capital if the intended change is 
implemented. The reason is that the respondent does not believe that there are any assurances 
that the dividend on contributed capital will be ten percent. Moreover, as the member adds, 
there are no guarantees on the stock market but, unlike the contributed capital in 
Landshypotek the capital on the stock market is not fixed in the same way and it is therefore 
possible to transfer capital if you are not satisfied with the returns. This possibility does not 
exist in Landshypotek and it is one of the reasons why the member is not going to increase 
his/her contributed capital if the intended change of contributed capital is implemented. 
Furthermore the member adds that if he/she was to invest capital in Landshypotek he/she 
would invest enough capital to reach the input limit, otherwise he/she sees no point with the 
investment. The member also sees it as a very positive contribution that the input limit is 
lowered from eight percent to four percent as it makes it easier to reach the input limit which 
means that you receive direct payment of patronage refund as well as dividend. The member 
also believes that the reduced input limit increases the incentive to contribute with more than 
the input limit because that capital is not fixed and can be repaid at request. Member 9 would 
also be willing to invest more than the input limit if Landshypotek is operated as a different 
form of company which offered greater influence for the owners. The member also believes 
that the change which allows members to actively invest capital in Landshypotek is a good 
model. 
 
The respondent believes that those who benefit most from the change are members who have 
been members for a long time and thus built up a large contributed capital. This is something 
that the member is negative towards because he/she believes that Landshypotek should 
reward members who are actively contributing to the business by taking new loans, not 
passive members who are at the end of their membership and for the most part only 
contributes with contributed capital. However, this is something that member 9 does not want 
to put too much emphasis on because the contributed capital according to him/her is an 
insignificant amount of money. 
 
Dividend 
Member 9 feels that the goal of ten percent dividend is excessive and believe that this is only 
an explicit goal from Landshypotek to try to sell the intended change of contributed capital to 
their members. The respondent thinks that six percent dividend is very high, but believes that 
it is more reasonable. Member 9 also thinks that the dividend should be linked to an index so 
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that it follows the interest rates and the market in general. As an example the member 
mentions “Stibor” and expresses that a dividend equal to two times “Stibor” would be 
reasonable for Landshypotek. Furthermore, the member expresses that he/she does not like 
that the dividend is stated as a percentage as this is a relative measure. The respondent 
believes that dividend expressed in real terms would give a fairer picture of the distribution 
capability and be easier to understand for all members. The member does not feel that the 
dividend is what matters most and declares that he/she puts more emphasis on a calm and 
sensible development of the interest rates. The respondent is very negative towards the fact 
that the dividend is prioritized at the expense of the patronage refund because he/she believes 
that Landshypotek primarily should prioritize members with large loans. However, member 9 
indicates that the dividend will not affect his willingness to be involved in Landshypotek, no 
matter how large or small it is. 
 
Behavior and attitudes 
Member 9 does not believe that his/her reason for being a member in Landshypotek will 
change due to the intended change of the contributed capital. The member declares that 
patronage refund and dividend on contributed capital is not the most important aspect and 
states that he/she appreciates the staff at Landshypotek and their willingness to help build up 
agricultural entities. The intended change of contributed capital does not mean that member 9 
terminates his/her membership in Landshypotek, but the member feels that it is pity that the 
change is more inclined to promote passive owners with large contributed capital, rather than 
active owners with large loans and interest expenses. The intended change will neither cause 
the member to more closely follow what happens in Landshypotek. 
 
Member 9 prefers the change that Landshypotek is considering relative to the model that is 
used today. However the respondent thinks that the patronage refund should be higher and the 
dividend on contributed capital should be lower. The member states that he/she would have 
accepted a patronage refund of at least two percent and a six percent dividend on contributed 
capital. Member 9 finds that a low interest rate on the borrowed capital is the most important 
factor and the member is therefore negative towards the fact that the patronage refunds and 
dividends are capitalized on the equity account until the input limit is reached. Member 9 
thinks that the ability to take a “member loan” is a good solution for those who want to reach 
the input limit but indicates that he/she will not use the option himself/herself because he/she 
does not intend to actively contribute with capital. The member is positive towards the change 
of the statutes under which the board has the ability to change the input limit because he/she 
believes that the board must have this possibility in order to achieve an optimal capital base.  
 
Ownership 
In general member 9 thinks that members who have large amount of contributed capital shall 
have greater voting rights than members with a small capital contribution. But the member 
realizes that this would defeat his/her will to reward active members with large loans that do 
not necessarily have a large contributed capital rather than passive members with only a large 
capital contribution. Finally the member adds that the right to vote should be proportionate 
with regard to the contributed capital but that this will not increase his/her own willingness to 
invest because the number of members is too large. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The member's overall perception of the intended change of contributed capital is very 
negative (one on a five-point scale) because he/she believes that the distribution of patronage 
refund and dividend are all wrong. Member 9 believes that it is better for indebted borrowers 
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to have more than one percent refund on paid interest and that the patronage refund therefore 
should be increased at expense of the dividend. The member adds that he/she believes that ten 
percent dividend is unnecessary and all wrong and that the high dividend only is an 
allurement in order for Landshypotek to be able to implement the intended change of 
contributed capital.  
 
4.1.10 Member 10 
 
Description of member 10 
Member 10 is currently acquiring an agricultural and forestry land through an 
intergenerational transfer. The farms focus is crop, pig and forestry production and also some 
rental business. The member is in the age group 40-59 years old and the loans taken over by 
him/her through the generational change is signed for 10 to 15 years ago. The loan amounts to 
20 million or more and the purpose of the loan is to finance agricultural activities and the 
main property.  
 
The reason that the loan was signed in Landshypotek is that they were the credit institution 
that provided the lowest interest rate and best loan terms in general at the time of the loan. In 
connection with the generational transfer the member will examine Landshypotek’s loan 
terms and hence, it may become necessary to terminate the membership if better terms can be 
achieved elsewhere. The reason that member 10 is a member in Landshypotek is that he/she 
assumed the loans through the generational transfer, but also because the member believes in 
Landshypotek in the future because they have knowledgeable staff and “elected 
representatives” who are well versed in agriculture and forestry. 
 
Risk attitudes 
Member 10 strongly disapproves risk-taking in the case of investment in property and farm 
business. The member also states that his/her willingness to take risks will not increase during 
the term of membership in Landshypotek or in the future. Member 10 considers it less risky to 
contribute with capital to Landshypotek compared to investing the capital in the stock market. 
The reason is, according to the member, that clients who borrow money from Landshypotek 
also are the owners and that the activities are restricted to lending to agriculture and forestry 
properties which the member regards as very safe assets. Member 10 perceives no risk of 
locking in the contributed capital during the entire term of the loan because the time horizon 
is short. He/she expects to implement a new generational transfer within 25 years. He/she also 
does not see it as a problem that the contributed capital is repaid only three years after 
completion of the membership because he/she is not in need of the capital urgently. The 
member believes that Landshypotek is a company that historically has taken small risks 
because they use agricultural and forestry property as collateral. Member 10 does not believe 
that the intended change of contributed capital will change Landshypotek’s risk profile. 
 
Contributed capital 
Member 10 does not know if he/she will actively increase the contributed capital if the 
intended change is implemented. This is because the member is not able to predict his/her 
financial situation following after generational change and expresses that the possibility of 
investing capital in Landshypotek does not lie at the top of the priority list. However, the 
respondent indicates, that he/she thinks that the intended change is an attractive alternative 
given that the goal of ten percent dividend on contributed capital is achieved. Member 10 
believes that the members which have a large amount of contributed capital will benefit the 
most from the intended change and indicates that he/she thinks it is acceptable because those 
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who contribute with a lot of capital should also be rewarded. But the member does not feel 
compelled to contribute with capital in Landshypotek in order not to lose due to the change. 
 
Dividend 
Member 10 considers ten percent dividend on contributed capital to very good but also states 
that he/she would be satisfied with five percent. The member would not seek a higher return 
on invested capital in Landshypotek compared to capital invested in the stock market and 
states that "money is money". The dividend does not affect the member's desire to be a 
member in Landshypotek and the member adds that he/she values other things such as a good 
relationship with the staff on Landshypotek. 
 
Behavior and attitudes 
The respondent’s reason for being a member in Landshypotek is not likely to change as a 
result of the intended change of contributed capital. A low interest rate is still the most 
important factor. The member declares that he/she definitely will follow more closely what 
happens in Landshypotek after the implementation of the intended change. The member 
believes his/her motives to invest in Landshypotek increases if it is a good deal, which the 
member thinks it is if the dividend is ten percent. The member also believes that there will be 
a stronger and clearer link between members' contributed capital and dividends after the 
intended change of contributed capital. The respondent does not view it as a problem that the 
dividend is prioritized at the expense of the patronage refund because he/she believes that the 
change will benefit “Landshypotek AB”. What is good for Landshypotek will also benefit 
him/her in the end.  
 
The intended change of contributed capital does not imply that the member will terminate its 
membership, but he/she states that, if better loan terms are received elsewhere, he/she will 
terminate the membership. The respondent believes that it is good that it is not possible to 
obtain dividend or patronage refund until the input limit is reached because he/she believes 
that the purpose of a cooperative is that everyone should contribute. Member 10 thinks it is 
very important with a low interest rate on borrowed capital in comparison with high dividend 
on contributed capital since interest expenses are a significant cost in his/her own business. 
The member also believes that the ”member loan” is a good model and states that he/she will 
use it himself/herself in the event of an active contribution of capital in Landshypotek. The 
member also accepts that the board has the ability to adjust input limit so that they can 
optimize their operations and thereby they might be able to further lower interest rates. 
 
Ownership 
The member argues that voting rights should be proportional to the volume of the contributed 
capital. The member also declares that he/she would not be willing to actively contribute with 
more capital if that was the case. 
 
Concluding remarks 
Member 10 indicates that he/she is generally quite positive towards the intended change of 
contributed capital, (four on a five-point scale).  
 
4.1.11 Member 11 
 
Description of member 11 
The member is a part-owner in an agricultural and forest property with crop, egg and beef 
production and contract work (e.g. snow removal). The respondent has been a member for 
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eight years and an “elected representative” for five years. Member 11 is between 40 and 59 
years old and will probably be a member for 15 more years. The choice of Landshypotek is 
partly based on the already established contact with the cooperative and partly the fact that 
Landshypotek did the valuation of the property when the member bought the farm. The loan 
is in the group 20 million or more and the contributed capital is today 0,8 percent of the 
borrowed capital. The loan has been used to finance the purchase of property and for 
investments in egg production, workshop, barn etc. The member has a strong confidence in 
Landshypotek as a partner in future commercial business.    
 
Risk attitudes 
Member 11 is a risk-lover, but believes his/her risk profile will decrease over the years 
because it will be risky to jeopardize capital which is needed for the retirement. The 
respondent perceives that there is less risk of investing in Landshypotek compared to 
investing in the stock market because Landshypotek has focused its lending to one kind of 
security, Landshypotek has small credit losses and generates a good dividend. The member 
thinks the problem of fixed capital in Landshypotek is reduced because contributed capital in 
the cooperative leads to better possibilities to get good loan conditions “We help to finance 
ourselves”. Member 11 does not see any risks of fixed contributed capital during the 
membership. The capital is used as a “deposit” to be a member. The contributed capital does 
not feel very fixed because it is possible to receive the capital if the loans are repaid. The 
member declares that three years might be too long time to wait to receive the contributed 
capital after ending membership. However, he/she understands that Landshypotek needs the 
capital to maintain the equity balance for the lending. The member believes Landshypotek is a 
cooperative that historically has taken small risks, only a few wrong investments. 
Furthermore, Landshypotek has a low risk profile due to good collateral in agricultural and 
forest properties. The intended change might be perceived as greater risk for the members due 
to large amounts of capital which could frighten some members.      
 
Contributed capital 
The member is interested in increasing the contributed capital and would invest around 1 
million SEK to profit from the new model. The respondent has done calculations of how 
much is needed to invest not to lose due to the change. Member 11 points out the importance 
of the possibility of using the ”member loan” even if 75 percent leverage is reached. If the 
member loan’s interest is good enough the member would use the loan to reach the input 
limit. But the respondent is not sure if he/she would invest more than the input limit. In that 
case the interest and the dividend are the most important issues. The same dividend would be 
positive.  
 
The member believes that good dividend and ”member loan” conditions would motivate  
further investments in Landshypotek. The respondent perceives that members with large 
contributed capital benefit the most due to the change because they receive larger dividends as 
well as older members who already have reached the input limit. It is acceptable that they 
benefit the most according to member 11 because they contribute with the most capital and 
take risks. The new model would lead to an improvement for all members because 
Landshypotek improves the capital base and structure which implies better loan conditions for 
the members. To offer good loan conditions contributed capital is needed. But it is not 
advisable to allow invested capital in excess of the input limit for speculation. Member 11 
does not feel compelled to invest not to lose due to the change.  
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Dividend 
The member has no specific dividend goal but states that ten percent is okay. The investments 
on the farm might not generate ten percent, but the investments lead to an increase in the 
market value of the farm. The respondent would require the same dividend on invested capital 
in the stock market as in Landshypotek. A low dividend for only one year would not be a 
problem, but low dividend for many years without an improvement would be very negative. If 
the dividend would fall below six-eight percent the member would consider changing credit 
institution and to compare loan conditions. The average dividend is the most important. 
According to the member the dividend is level very important because he/she will use the 
”member loan”. 
 
Behavior and attitudes 
The respondent’s reason to be a member is not affected by the intended change of contributed 
capital, but the incentives to invest in Landshypotek increases. The member’s rationale to be a 
member is the loan opportunities for financing the current operation and expansion. The 
member is already very active in the cooperation and will continue to follow Landshypotek 
closely. Member 11 declares that the connection between dividend and contributed capital 
will become clearer. In the old model the interest rate was the main issue. The respondent 
believes the new model might frighten some members because of the large amount of capital 
required and members have to understand additional questions and take more decisions. On 
the other hand more decisions could lead to more involved members. The respondent finds it 
reasonable that the dividend is prioritized at the expense of the patronage refund. It is fair that 
members who contribute a lot should profit the most. The member desires that Landshypotek 
is able to set the “right interest rate” which leads to a good dividend and a very low or no 
patronage refund at all.  
 
The intended change does not cause the respondent to terminate his/her membership. The 
factors that would affect such decision would be bad loan conditions or if the member sells 
the farm. Member 11 believes the new model is necessary to reach the needed capital base for 
the cooperative’s expansion. The new model implies that members contribute in relation to 
their borrowed capital. It might be a risk if many members do not invest because the relation 
between non-restricted and restricted capital would be distorted. On the other hand it could be 
a risk if too many choose to invest. This problem could be solved by adjusting the input limit. 
The respondent agrees with the approach where all dividends and patronage refunds are 
capitalized until the input limit is reached. The capital remains within the cooperative does 
not affect the member’s liquidity too much. Member 11 thinks a low interest rate is much 
more important than a high dividend.  
 
The ”member loan” is necessary for the members to invest in the cooperative. It is important 
that the members are able to use the ”member loan” even if the first mortgage loan is fully 
used. The member regards it as a good idea that the board is able to adjust the input limit to 
maintain the right balance between non-restricted and restricted capital. That relation affects 
the cooperative’s rating. This opportunity gives the board the possibility to influence the 
result and the dividend.        
 
Ownership 
Member 11 does not think that members who have large contributed capital ought to be given 
additional votes than members with a small capital contribution because it is a cooperative. 
One member one vote is important and the democracy is fundamental. The respondent would 
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not invest to gain more voting rights. Member 11 does not feel any need to gain more votes 
because it is a cooperative.  
 
Concluding remarks 
The member is very positive to the intended change (five on a five-point scale), but believes it 
is very important to make the model easy to understand and show how the change affects the 
members. According to the respondent is it also very important that the dividend goals are 
reached the first years as a proof of Landshypotek’s credibility. If the member loan’s interest 
rate increases the dividend level has to increase. These two parameters have to harmonize.   
 
4.1.12 Member 12 
 
Description of member 12 
Member 12 owns an agricultural and forest farm where the main focus is grain production. 
The member is in the age group 20-39 years old and has a loan that amounts to 20 million 
SEK or more. The member’s contributed capital amounts to 0,19 percent of the borrowed 
capital. The purpose of the loan was to acquire the property through a generational change, 
but there have also been some investments in the property. The respondent has been a 
member in Landshypotek for 7 years and intends to continue to be a member as long as 
Landshypotek offers favorable loan terms. The reason that member 12 is a member in 
Landshypotek is that previous generations have had their loans there and because he/she 
believes that they are competitive with their advantageous client offerings. The member also 
states he/she has a very high confidence in Landshypotek as a future profit-making enterprise.  
 
Risk attitudes 
Member 12 considers himself/herself to be quite risk willing in general but states that when it 
comes to the farm he/she is very reluctant to take risks. Further on the member declares that 
the willingness to take risk is linked to his/her own financial situation and the specific 
investment or situation and adds that if he/she was not so highly leveraged, he/she would be 
more inclined to take risks. But the member is not reluctant to borrow capital as long as the 
proceeds that the loan generates are larger than the cost of the borrowed capital. The 
respondent also believes that his/her willingness to take risks might increase in the future.  
 
Member 12 considers it to be a low risk of investing capital in Landshypotek compared to the 
stock market but views it to very negative that the contributed capital in Landshypotek is 
fixed throughout the term of membership. This is because he/she believes that it constitutes a 
risk when you do not have free access to the capital. The member is also negative towards the 
fact that the contributed capital is repaid three years after completion of the membership and 
states that it should be possible to receive the contributed capital upon termination of the 
membership or one year later at the most. He/she believes that the completion of membership 
should imply a mutual termination of the business and not enable Landshypotek to withhold 
the member’s assets.  
 
The member believes that Landshypotek is a cooperative that historically has taken small 
risks. Member 12 believes that the intended change of contributed capital will increase 
Landshypotek’s risk profile because they now have to achieve a goal of ten percent dividend. 
He sees it as a risk that Landshypotek might attract lot of "bad will" if they fail to achieve the 
dividend goal and further believes that it might cause many members to seek out some 
alternative credit institution. 
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Contributed capital 
Member 12 is in favor of contributing actively with contributed capital, provided that 
Landshypotek can guarantee a dividend of ten percent. In that case the member would be 
willing to provide capital corresponding to the input limit of 4 percent of the borrowed 
capital. Member 12 thinks it is interesting to invest 4 percent because then both dividends and 
patronage refund are paid out directly. The respondent is however in the current situation not 
interested in investing more than 4 percent of the borrowed capital but adds that it also 
depends on how the outcome of the dividend. If the dividend was to be very high, he/she 
would be willing to invest more than the input limit.  
 
The member is negative towards the intended change of contributed capital if Landshypotek 
cannot guarantee a ten percent dividend. This is because he/she considers it a big enough risk 
that the capital is fixed during the entire term of membership and therefore believes that 
he/she should be well paid for such an undertaking. Member 12 compares with Brummer 
equity funds that have had an average yield of 8-10 percent over the past ten years and argues 
that these investments can be made available in principle immediately without having to 
cancel a membership or wait another year before he/she can get access to the capital.  
 
Member 12 believes that the intended change of contributed capital implies equal benefits to 
all members regardless of their former contributed capital, but adds that he/she thinks it is a 
compelling system because he/she believes that members who do not choose to actively fill 
up their contributed capital to the input limit may be worse off than before. The member 
states that he/she feels obligated to actively contribute with capital in order not to lose by the 
intended change. Further, the respondent argues that members with large loans have the 
possibility to invest more and thereby get access to more of the surplus. However, the 
member adds that these members also are more stressed in terms of interest costs and thereby 
contribute to Landshypotek’s operation to a larger extent than members with small loans. 
 
Dividend 
Member 12 believes that a return on invested capital equal to the net between Landshypotek’s 
deposit rate and lending rate is a reasonable dividend on contributed capital. The respondent 
believes such this arrangement gives a more clear and easy to understand picture of how the 
dividend is determined and that this would lead to more members becoming interested in the 
intended change of contributed capital.   
 
Member 12 believes that there is a greater risk of investing capital in the stock market 
compared to contributing with capital in Landshypotek and he/she would therefore seek a 
higher return on capital invested in the stock market. The respondent also states that the fact 
that the capital is fixed during the entire term of membership leads to that he/she demands a 
higher return on the invested capital than he/she would if he/she had free access to the capital. 
 
The member might consider terminating the business relationship if Landshypotek fails to 
achieve the goal of ten percent dividend on contributed capital. The reason is that he/she 
believes that if you promise ten percent dividend then you should also keep it. Member 12 
emphasizes that it is very important that Landshypotek is able to achieve the dividend goal, 
otherwise it will create huge "bad will" among the members and lead to a permanent damage 
to Landshypotek’s reputation. The respondent therefore believes that it is better to promise a 
lower dividend such as nine percent and then deliver above expectations 
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Behavior and attitudes 
Member 12 does not believe that the intended change of contributed capital will change his 
motives for being a member in Landshypotek. The loan terms still determine the choice of 
credit institute. The member has a long term perspective and is only interested in what the 
total cost of the capital is in the end. He/she will therefore calculate what the difference will 
be for him/her in comparison with the current situation and then make a decision to remain as 
member or not based on what other lending institutions offer. 
 
Member 12 indicates that if he/she continues the membership, he/she will control that he/she 
receives the dividend that Landshypotek promise but otherwise the member will not follow 
what happens in Landshypotek more closely. The member also believes that his/her motive to 
invest in Landshypotek increases because the respondent feels obligated to actively provide 
contributed capital in order not to lose in comparison with the old model. The member 
believes, however, that the intended change implies a clearer link between the contributed 
capital and what you get in dividend and sees no problem with the fact that the dividend is 
prioritized at the expense of the patronage refund. 
 
Member 12 is not negative towards the intended change in general but finds it difficult to 
assess which model is advantageous because it crucially depends on if Landshypotek is able 
to achieve their dividend goal. The member does also not consider a low interest rate on 
borrowed capital to be more important than a high dividend on contributed capital. The 
respondent indicates that the most important aspect is that the cumulative effect of the interest 
expenses and dividends are as favorable as possible. 
 
Member 12 believes that the “member loan” is a good solution as long as it does not affect the 
member’s ability to take first mortgages loans in Landshypotek. The member also states that 
there is a possibility that he/she would be willing to use the “member loan” in order to reach 
the input limit on the equity account. The respondent is however very negative towards the 
fact that the board will have the possibility to change the input limit if necessary. He/she feels 
that the criteria / rules for an investment should be equal throughout the investment period, 
otherwise the investment is not that attractive.  
 
Ownership 
Member 12 believes that members with large contributed capital should have more votes than 
members with little contributed capital. The reason for this is that the respondent believes that 
members with large contributed capital are more interested in what happens to the contributed 
capital and therefore have more knowledge than members with little contributed capital. If the 
voting rights were proportional in relation to the contributed capital, this would act as an 
incentive for member 12 to actively contribute with more contributed capital 
 
Concluding remarks 
Member 12 believes that there are both positive and negative aspects of the intended change 
of contributed capital (three on a five point scale). Positive is that it increases the pressure on 
Landshypotek and the board to produce good results in order to achieve the dividend goal. 
The downside is that he/she sees it as a compulsion to actively contribute with capital in order 
not to lose in comparison with the old model. 
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4.1.13 Summary of interviews 
 
In this chapter the results from the interviews are summarized in relation to the hypotheses as 
shown in table 5 and 6. The members’ attitudes towards Landshypotek’s future, the risk of 
investing capital, capitalization of patronage refunds and dividends, level of interest and 
dividend, minimum required dividend and overall perception of the intended change are also 
presented in form of pie charts. The member’s attitudes are measured on a scale from one to 
five. 
 
 
Figure 20. Members’ confidence in Landshypotek 
as a future profit making enterprise, on a scale 
from one to five where 1 = very bad, 5 = very good. 
Source own arrangement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21. Members’ attitudes towards the risk of 
investing capital in Landshypotek compared to the 
stock market, on a scale from one to five where 1 = 
low risk, 5 = high risk. Source own arrangement 
 
 
As revealed in figure 20 the majority of the members have a high confidence in the business 
and Landshypotek’s ability to be profit making in the future. Almost 70 percent of the 
interviewed members have a high or very high confidence in Landshypotek and 25 percent 
believe that Landshypotek will perform around average. Eight percent of the interviewed 
members did not have an opinion regarding Landshypotek’s future profit potential. Figure 21 
shows that more than 90 percent of the interviewed members believe that the risk of investing 
capital in Landshypotek is lower compared to investing capital in the stock market. Notably 
only 8 percent of the members are indifferent between Landshypotek and the stock market.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22.The dividend rate at which the members 
will consider to terminate their membership. Source 
own arrangement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23. Members’ attitudes towards the 
importance of a low interest rate on borrowed 
capital compared to high dividend on contributed 
capital, on a scale from one to five where 1 = 
prefers high dividend, 5 = prefers low interest. 
Source own arrangement 
 
Figure 22 illustrates different dividend rates at which the members will consider to terminate 
their membership in Landshypotek. 42 percent of the interviewed members state that even if 
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Landshypotek fails to deliver the goal of ten percent dividend on contributed capital, this will 
not affect the members’ decision to be a member in Landshypotek or not. If Landshypotek 
only achieves four percent dividend, 17 percent of the interviewed members will consider 
terminating the membership. The same thing happens if a two percent dividend on contributed 
capital is reached. For each dividend rates eight, six and zero percent, eight percent of the 
members will also consider terminating their dealings with Landshypotek. According to 84 
percent of the interviewed members, a low interest rate on borrowed capital is much more 
important than a high dividend on contributed capital as shown in figure 23. Only eight 
percent prefer a high dividend to a low interest rate and eight percent of the members are 
indifferent between low interest rate and high dividend. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24. The members’ attitudes towards the fact 
that it is not possible to receive neither patronage 
refund or dividend until the proceeds on the equity 
account has reached the input limit, on a scale from 
one to five where 1 = very negative, 5 = very 
positive. Source own arrangement 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25. Members’ overall perception of 
Landshypotek’s intended change of contributed 
capital, on a scale from one to five where 1 = very 
negative, 5 = very positive. Source own 
arrangement
Figure 24 shows that half of the interviewed members are very positive or positive towards 
the fact that it is not possible to receive direct cash payments of neither patronage refunds nor 
dividends until the contributed capital has reached the input limit. Only 16 percent are very 
negative or negative towards this limitation and 17 percent are indifferent towards receiving 
direct payouts of patronage refunds and dividends or waiting until the input limit is reached. 
Eight percent of the members do not have an opinion. Figure 25 illustrates the interviewed 
members overall attitudes towards Landshypotek’s intended change of contributed capital. As 
shown in the figure 25. The majority of the interviewed members are overall positive, only 
nine percent expresses strong negative attitudes towards the intended change and eight 
percent are slightly negative. Eight percent are indifferent towards the intended change of 
contributed capital and an additional eight percent states that they do not have sufficient 
information to form an opinion in this matter.  
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Hypothesis/ 
Member 
1. Property rights 2. Portfolio 3. Portfolio 4. Portfolio 5. Free-rider 6. Free-rider 7. Horizon 
1. 
Age: 20-39 
Loan: 1 MSEK 
Would not like 
proportional voting 
rights. Would not 
invest more to gain 
more votes.    
Fixed capital is not 
a problem due to 
the financial 
strength of 
Landshypotek. 
Would invest in 
Landshypotek. 
Would not demand 
higher dividend on 
the stock market 
because of the 
availability.  
A low interest rate 
is more important 
than high 
dividends. 
Thinks that the 
incentives increase 
and will invest. 
Likes the new 
model because of 
the possibility to 
invest 4 %. 
2. 
Age: 40-59 
Loan: 1 MSEK 
Prefer one member 
one vote. Would 
not invest to 
receive more 
influence. 
Does not like the 
fact that the capital 
is fixed during the 
membership. 
Thinks the non 
marketability is a 
problem, but will 
invest not to lose 
by the change. 
 
Would demand a 
higher dividend in 
Landshypotek due 
to the non 
marketability. 
Low interest rates 
are more important 
to be able keep the 
interest cost at a 
low level.  
The incentives to 
invest does not 
increase, would 
invest not to lose 
by the change. 
Is negative towards 
the new model and 
would rather keep 
the old. 
3. 
Age: 40-59 
Loan: 1 MSEK 
“Elected 
representative” 
Would not invest 
to gain more votes 
and prefers one 
member one vote. 
According to the 
member there is no 
problem with fixed 
capital in 
Landshypotek. 
Would rather 
invest in 
Landshypotek due 
to smaller risk and 
a good profit 
opportunity. 
 
Due to higher risk 
would the member 
require higher 
dividend at the 
stock market. 
It is better if 
Landshypotek sets 
the “right interest 
rate” and therefore 
maximize the 
dividend. 
The member’s 
incentive to invest 
in Landshypotek 
increases with the 
new model and 
will invest. 
The member  is 
positive towards 
the new model. 
4. 
Age: 60+ 
Loan: 1 MSEK 
 
One member 
should have one 
vote, but the 
incentives to invest 
would increase 
with proportional 
voting rights. 
 
Finds it acceptable 
that the capital is 
fixed during the 
membership. 
Prefers investment 
in Landshypotek 
due to low risk and 
does not perceive 
the fixed capital as 
a problem. 
Due to higher risk 
in the stock market 
the member 
demands a higher 
return on stocks. 
Would rather 
prefer a low 
interest rate to a 
high dividend. 
 
 
 
  
The motives to 
invest increase and 
will also invest. 
Prefers and is 
positive towards 
the new model. 
5. 
Age: 20-39 
Loan: 5 MSEK  
Would like 
proportional voting 
rights, but it does 
not affect the 
investments.  
Does not see any 
problems of the 
non marketability. 
Feels more 
comfortable in 
investing in 
Landshypotek. 
Demands a higher 
dividend on the 
stock market due 
to higher risk.  
Prefers low 
interest rate 
instead of high 
dividend. 
The incentives to 
invest do not 
increase and will 
not invest.   
Prefers the new 
model. 
6. 
Age: 40-59 
Loan: 5 MSEK 
The voting rights 
should be 
proportional, but it 
does not lead to 
further 
investments. 
Is negative to the 
fact that the capital 
is fixed during the 
membership. 
The member will 
not invest and does 
not like the non 
marketability and 
the member has a 
short time horizon. 
Requires a lower 
dividend from 
Landshypotek due 
to lower risk. 
Declares that low 
interest is more 
important than 
high dividend.  
The incentives 
increase if the 
dividend goal of 
10 % is reached, 
but will not invest. 
The member is 
cautiously positive. 
Table 5. Summary of the first six members’ answers and attitudes divided under the hypotheses. Source own arrangement     
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Hypothesis/ 
Member 
1. Property rights 2. Portfolio 3. Portfolio 4. Portfolio 5. Free-rider 6. Free-rider 7. Horizon 
7. 
Age: 60+ 
Loan: 5 MSEK 
Voting rights 
should not be 
proportional. 
Would not invest 
to the gain more 
power. 
The non 
marketability is 
not a problem. 
Would invest as 
much as possible if 
the dividend is 10 
% due to the low 
risk. 
Requires higher 
dividend in 
Landshypotek due 
to the fact that a 
stock can increase 
in value. 
It is the total 
calculation that 
matters. The 
choice of bank is 
based on the level 
of interest rates.  
The incentives to 
invest do not 
increase, but the 
member would 
invest. 
Prefers the new 
model if it implies 
an improvement 
for Landshypotek. 
8. 
Age: 40-59 
Loan: 5 MSEK 
“Elected 
representative” 
Might prefer 
proportional voting 
rights, but that 
would not 
motivate 
investments. 
Has a positive 
attitude towards 
the fact of the 
capital is fixed. 
Too short time 
horizon to make 
any investments. 
Accepts a lower 
dividend in 
Landshypotek than 
the stock market 
due to other 
benefits. 
Is indifferent 
because of short 
time horizon but 
accept the change 
if it is better for 
Landshypotek. 
The motive to 
invest does not 
increase due to the 
short time horizon. 
The member is 
very positive and 
prefers the new 
model. 
9. 
Age: 60+ 
Loan: 20+ MSEK 
It should be 
proportional voting 
rights, but this will 
not increase the 
motive to invest. 
Finds no problem 
with fixed capital 
in Landshypotek 
because it is a 
small amount of 
capital. 
Would not invest 
in Landshypotek 
because they 
cannot assure the 
10 % dividend. 
The risk on the 
stock market is 
much higher which 
leads to higher 
dividend demands.   
Would prefer low 
interest rates and 
high patronage 
refunds instead of 
high dividends. 
The member has 
no plans of 
investments in 
Landshypotek. 
Is very negative 
towards the new 
model. 
10. 
Age: 40-59 
Loan: 20+ MSEK 
Would not invest 
to gain votes but 
thinks that the 
voting rights 
should be 
proportional.  
Due to short time 
horizon does not 
the case of fixed 
capital imply any 
problem. 
Due to short time 
horizon is the 
member reluctant 
to invest in 
Landshypotek. 
Does not require a 
higher dividend in 
Landshypotek than 
in the stock 
market. 
Prefers low 
interest rates 
because paid 
interest expenses  
is a large expense 
in the business. 
The motive to 
invest increases 
but unsure if 
he/she will invest. 
The member is 
positive towards 
the new model. 
11. 
Age: 40-59 
Loan: 20+ MSEK 
“Elected 
representative” 
Does not think the 
voting rights 
should be 
proportional and 
would not invest to 
gain more power. 
Does not see any 
problems of fixed 
capital. It leads to 
better loan terms. 
Due to a 
decreasing risk-
taking the member 
would prefer 
investments in 
Landshypotek. 
Would demand the 
same dividend in 
Landshypotek as 
in the stock 
market. 
Low interest rate is 
much more 
important than 
high dividend. 
The incentives to 
invest in 
Landshypotek 
increase with the 
new model and 
will invest. 
The member is 
very positive 
towards the new 
model. 
12. 
Age: 20-39 
Loan: 20+ MSEK 
 
The voting rights 
should be 
proportional which 
would motivate to 
more investments. 
Finds it very 
negative that the 
capital is fixed 
during the 
membership. 
Leads to higher 
risk. 
Prefers stock 
investments which 
are not fixed. But 
will invest not to 
lose by the change. 
Requires a higher 
dividend at the 
stock market due 
to higher risk. 
None is the most 
important it is 
more important 
that the new model 
leads to an 
improvement. 
The incentives 
increase because 
the member feels 
obligated to invest 
not to lose.  
The member is 
both negative and 
positive towards 
the new model. 
Table 6. Summary of the last six members’ answers and attitudes divided under the hypotheses. Source own arrangement     
65 
The above tables 5 and 6 present a summary of the interviewed members’ answers and 
attitudes. These tables contribute to an overview of the members most relevant opinions. The 
answers and attitudes are categorized under suitable hypothesis to easier depict the overall  
opinions and to facilitate the analysis  
 
Table 7. Overview of the interviewed members. Source own arrangement 
Member Age group Time left as a member Borrowed capital Contributed capital 
Member 1 20-39 15-20 years Around 1 million 0,03% 
Member 2 40-59 15-20 years Around 1 million 1,40% 
Member 3 40-59 15-20 years Around 1 million 3,30% 
Member 4 60+ 0-5 years Around 1 million 1,30% 
Member 5 20-39 15-20 years Around 5 millions 2% 
Member 6 40-59 0-5 years Around 5 millions 0,12% 
Member 7 60+ 10 years Around 5 millions 4,70% 
Member 8 40-59 0-5 years Around 5 millions 3,60% 
Member 9 60+ 15-20 years 20 million + 0,06% 
Member 10 40-59 0-5 years 20 million + - 
Member 11 40-59 15-20 years 20 million + 0,80% 
Member 12 20-39 15-20 years 20 million + 0,19% 
 
Table 7 shows a list of the interviewed members. The table also presents the borrowed capital, 
what age group, their contributed capital and how long the members have left in 
Landshypotek. 
 
4.2 Cost of capital  
 
The cost of capital for a new member in Landshypotek has been calculated in four different 
scenarios. As shown in table 8 the scenarios are the old model, the new model with no active 
contribution, the new model with active contribution through the use of own assets and the 
new model with active contribution through the use of a “member loan”. Equal for all 
scenarios is that the loan amounts to 10 million SEK, the time horizon for the loan is 25 years, 
interest on borrowed capital is a fixed interest rate of 4,3 percent and that the member uses 
straight-line amortization.   
 
4.2.1 Scenario 1 
 
Scenario 1 constitutes Landshypotek’s old model where the business surplus is distributed 
amongst the members according to figure 5 in chapter 1.1.1. The member has not reached the 
input limit on the equity account. Patronage refund and interest on contributed capital are 
therefore capitalized on the equity account and paid out as contributed capital three years after 
terminated membership. The interest on the member account is also capitalized in this 
scenario and the proceeds on the member account are repaid three years after terminated 
membership. The member’s cost of capital is calculated according to equation (4) in chapter 
2.3. The calculations are shown in appendix 3 and the member’s cost of capital in scenario 1 
is 4,161 percent as show in table 8.  
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4.2.2 Scenario 2 
 
In scenario 2 Landshypotek has implemented the intended change of contributed capital and 
the business surplus is distributed according to figure 8 in chapter 1.1.3. In this scenario the 
member has chosen not to actively contribute with capital either through the use of own assets 
or the “member loan”. The member has therefore not reached the input limit on the equity 
account. Patronage refund and dividend on contributed capital are therefore capitalized in the 
equity account and repaid three years after termination of the membership. The member’s cost 
of capital is calculated according to equation (5) in chapter 2.3. The calculations are shown in 
appendix 4 and the member’s cost of capital in scenario 2 is 4,177 percent as show in table 8. 
 
4.2.3 Scenario 3 
 
In this scenario the intended change of contributed capital has been implemented and the 
member has seized the opportunity to actively contribute with four percent of the borrowed 
capital through the use of own assets. The member has therefore reached the input limit on the 
equity account. Patronage refund and dividend on contributed capital are therefore not 
capitalized on the equity account but paid out directly each year. Landshypotek’s business 
surplus is distributed according to figure 9 in chapter 1.1.3 and the member’s cost of capital is 
calculated according to equation (5) in chapter 2.3. The calculations are shown in appendix 5 
and the member’s cost of capital in scenario 3 is 3,383 percent as show in table 8. 
 
4.2.4 Scenario 4 
 
Scenario 4 constitutes Landshypotek’s new model where the member chooses to actively fill 
up the contributed capital up until the input limit through the use of the “member loan”. 
Patronage refunds and dividends on contributed capital are therefore not capitalized on the 
equity account but paid out directly each year. The distribution of Landshypotek’s business 
surplus is as shown in figure 9 in chapter 1.1.3 and the member’s cost of capital is calculated 
according to equation (6) in chapter 2.3. The calculations are shown in appendix 6 and the 
member’s cost of capital in scenario 4 is 3,816 percent as show in table 8. 
 
Table 8. Member’s cost of capital in four different scenarios. Source own arrangement 
Scenario Cost of capital/ IRR 
1. Old model 4,161 % 
2. New model (no active contribution) 4,177 % 
3. New model (active contribution with own assets) 3,383 % 
4. New model (active contribution with member loan) 3,816 % 
 
Table 8 displays the member’s cost of capital for borrowing 10 million SEK in Landshypotek 
in four different scenarios. The table shows that the member’s cost of capital increases with 
0,016 percent in the new model (scenario 2) compared to the old model (scenario 1) if the 
member chooses to not actively contribute with capital. The lowest cost of capital is achieved 
with the new model (scenario 3) when a member chooses to actively contribute with capital 
through the use of own assets. Table 8 also shows that the new model (scenario 4) with an 
active contribution through the use of a “member loan” is a favorable alternative compared to 
the old model (scenario 1) where the member’s cost of capital is higher. 
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As shown in table 8 the new model leads to a higher cost of capital for the member if the 
member does not choose to actively contribute with capital either through own assets or the 
“member loan”. But the member is not compelled to actively contribute with the full amount 
of four percent of the borrowed capital right away, as is the case in scenario 3 and 4. In 
contrast to the old model where the member is unable to actively contribute with capital, the 
member can choose to contribute with capital between zero and four percent of the borrowed 
capital. It is therefore interesting to know how much capital the member needs to contribute in 
order to attain a lower cost of capital with the new model. As shown in table 8 the member’s 
cost of capital for borrowing 10 million SEK in Landshypotek’s old model is 4,161 percent. 
For the new model to be more favorable than the old model, the member has to actively 
contribute with 3 500 SEK because the member’s cost of capital for borrowing 10 million 
SEK then is 4,160 percent as shown in figure 26. 
 
 
 
Figure 26. Member’s cost of capital at different amounts of contributed capital in the new model. Source own 
arrangement 
 
Figure 26 shows that the member’s cost of capital in the new model decreases with higher 
active contribution of capital. The figure also shows that the member’s cost of capital is 4,160 
percent when the member uses own assets to actively contribute with 3 500 SEK. The purpose 
of this figure is to demonstrate how much a member has to invest in Landshypotek in order to 
profit from the intended change of contributed capital. The breakpoint is approximately 3 500 
SEK, which means that a new member with a 10 million SEK loan has to use own assets to 
invest a minimum of 3 500 SEK in order to benefit from the new model, otherwise the new 
model would imply a loss for the member. The member has to invest 3 500 SEK immediately 
when he/she joins Landshypotek. However, this is total amount of capital a new member 
actively has to provide during the entire membership. 
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4.3 Reliability and validity 
 
4.3.1 Interviews  
 
Reliability traditionally means that the research is free from random influences, the interview 
should be performed in the same way and therefore create an equal situation for all subjects 
(Trost, 1997). The interviews in this study follow a premade interview guide which guides the 
interview through different themes. The interview guide contains questions that are read by 
the interviewer and therefore asked in exactly the same way during all performed interviews. 
This minimizes the risk of the interviewer being perceived differently amongst the 
interviewed members and therefore receiving answers that depend on the interview situation 
and not the topic at hand. According to Trost (1997) the minimization of the “interviewer 
effect” reduces random influences and therefore increases the reliability of the results. The 
random influences impact on the results are further reduced by the fact that each interviewed 
member in Landshypotek is presented with some of the results at the end of the interview and 
given the opportunity to ask questions and to add or deny information. The interviewed 
members are also provided with the final results, after the material from the interviews are 
consolidated, and given one week to review the content and provide comments. 
  
Reliability also concerns the degree in which a study’s results can be reproduced by another 
researcher (Merriam, 2006). In this study, all interviewed members are made anonymous in 
order to achieve complete confidentiality. This minimizes the possibility for another 
researcher to reproduce and verify the study’s results and therefore reduces the reliability of 
the study’s results. But according to Kvale (1997) the anonymity also increases the incentives 
for the interviewed members to answer sincerely, which leads to more valid results. Apart 
from the members’ identity, it is possible to reproduce the results to some extent by using the 
selection criteria described in chapter 3.3.2 and the interview guide in appendix 2. 
 
Validity concerns the degree in which the interview questions are a good instrument to 
measure what is supposed to be measured and to achieve the study’s aim (Trost, 1997). The 
questions in the interviews are based on the hypotheses in chapter 2.3 who in turn are 
constructed according to the theories in chapter 2. To ensure that the structure of the interview 
guide led the interview in the right direction and therefore produced results that were relevant 
for the study, three pilot interviews were performed with members in Landshypotek. This 
helped us gain experience as interviewers and to test the questions validity. 
 
The validity of the results might be affected by the fact that eleven of the interviewed 
members are situated in the region around “Mälardalen”. Compared to members who are 
situated in the southern parts of Sweden, where a large part of the agribusiness are dominated 
by livestock production that implies a large amount of fixed capital. The members in the 
region around “Mälardalen” are more flexible because they do not possess the same amount 
of capital invested in livestock barns (pers. com Andersson, 2011). This implies rather low 
transaction costs for the members in the region around “Mälardalen” if they decide to 
terminate livestock production. They might therefore be more positive towards the possibility 
of actively contributing with capital in Landshypotek.  
 
The members in the region around “Mälardalen” also belong to the same regional association 
and therefore go to the same regional meetings. The members therefore might have similar 
attitudes where some of them already have discussed the topic at regional meetings. 
Landshypotek’s intended change of contributed capital is however new to the members and 
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has only been presented before the “elected representatives”. The risk of the member’s 
attitudes being affected by previous discussions is therefore limited to the “elected 
representatives” which reduces the impact on the results in this study.  
 
4.3.2 Cost of capital 
 
The member’s cost of capital in the different scenarios are straightforward to reproduce for 
another researcher because the entire calculations are presented in appendix 3, 4, 5 and 6. The 
results are therefore easy to verify which increases the reliability. The figures that are used in 
the calculations are based on information from Landshypotek. These are assessed as relevant 
for the study because they are the same figures that Landshypotek uses when they present the 
intended change of contributed capital to the “elected representatives”. This increases the 
validity of the results. However, the results are limited to one specific type of member who 
borrows 10 million SEK in Landshypotek and uses straight-line amortization with a time 
horizon of 25 years. The results can therefore not be applied on existing members which 
reduces the possibility to draw general conclusions about Landshypotek’s members. This 
limitation reduces the results validity because the study aims to investigate the current 
member’s attitudes towards Landshypotek’s intended change of contributed capital.  
 
The four scenarios are created to illustrate the differences between the financial model that 
Landshypotek uses today and the possibilities that emerge as a result of the intended change 
of contributed capital. The validity of the results is increased by the fact that the cost of 
capital is calculated for the different choices that a member can make compared to 
Landshypotek’s old financial model. However the validity is reduced by the fact that the 
scenarios do not fully account for the member’s opportunity cost of capital. This is of 
particular significance in scenario 3 when the member actively contributes with capital 
through the use of own assets.  
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5 Analysis  
 
This chapter analyzes the results from chapter 4 (the empirical study). The analysis is based 
on the theories presented in chapter 2 (theoretical perspective and literature review). The 
analysis intends to confirm or reject the hypothesis.  
 
5.1 Property rights 
 
Hypothesis 1 declares that the members will be reluctant to increase their equity shares 
because Landshypotek applies “one member one vote”.  
 
The residual right of control is the right to vote and make decisions concerning an assets use 
(Cook et al, 2011). Cook argues that a member’s residual return (Landshypotek’s patronage 
refund and dividend) and residual control should be aligned. This will create incentives to 
invest capital in the cooperative firm. The theory implies that Landshypotek’s members will 
prefer a proportional voting right in order to invest capital in the cooperative. The results 
show that fifty percent of the members would prefer a proportional voting system in relation 
to their magnitude of contributed capital. But only 33 percent of these members think that a 
proportional voting right increases their incentives to invest. The remaining fifty percent 
prefer today’s system that implies “one member one vote” which indicates that their decision 
to invest capital in Landshypotek is not based on the residual right of control. Even if half of 
the members would like proportional voting right, they also state that it does not affect their 
investment decision.  
 
Hypothesis 1 is rejected because the interviewed members’ decision to invest capital in 
Landshypotek is not based on the residual right of control. The theory is only supported by 
two of the twelve members whose motives to invest increase with proportional voting rights. 
Cook’s theory is ruled out by the other ten members, whose incentives to invest do not 
increase as a result of a system with proportional voting rights. The theory is also dismissed 
because six of the “investing members” prefer the fact that one member equals one vote. The 
interviewed members are not interested in increasing their contributed capital in order to gain 
more votes. This can be compared to the conclusion drawn in Nilsson’s study (2002) which 
declares that members in “Lantmännen” consider themselves as members and not as owners. 
The majority of the members in “Lantmännen” therefore have no desire to be more active as 
owners. 
 
5.2 Portfolio problem 
 
Hypothesis 2 claims that because of the non marketability of Landshypotek’s cooperative 
equity their members will be reluctant to increase their equity shares. 
 
The portfolio problem occurs when members are constrained to diversify their portfolio 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1979). The constraints are an effect of the non marketability of 
cooperative equity. This could be a problem for Landshypotek’s members because their 
invested capital is fixed and the patronage refunds and dividends are capitalized within the 
cooperative.  
 
The second hypothesis is rejected since nine of twelve members do not see any problem with 
the non marketability of their equity shares. According to the theory the members should 
dislike the non marketability of their contributed capital, but the members accept that their 
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cooperative equity is fixed because that is how a cooperative works and they believe it is 
better for Landshypotek which leads to improvements for the members. The hypothesis is also 
rejected because the majority of the members are willing to invest capital and believe their 
incentives to invest increase despite the fixed contributed capital.     
 
Hypothesis 3 declares that due to the non marketability of Landshypotek’s cooperative equity 
their members will be more interested in investing in investor-owned firms than investing in 
Landshypotek through an active contribution of capital. 
 
According to the theory the members should be less interested in investing in the cooperative 
than an investor-owned firm due to the non marketability of the cooperative equity (Lerman 
& Parliament, 1993). Nine of the members do not perceive the non marketability as a 
problem. Five of these members will rather invest capital in Landshypotek because they find 
the new model profitable, less risky and because the non marketability does not affect their 
investment decision. The other four choose not to invest capital due to other reasons than non 
marketability. They are reluctant to invest because of a short time horizon. They need the 
capital to more urgent investments and since Landshypotek cannot assure the dividend to be 
ten percent. The members’ opinions about the non marketability problem disaffirm the 
hypothesis. 
 
On the other hand there are three members who believe that the fixed capital is problematic. 
Two members would only invest not to lose by the intended change of contributed capital. 
This implies that they do not see the non marketability as too big of a problem, which also 
leads to a rejection of the hypothesis. The last of these three members would not invest at all 
in Landshypotek. He/she finds that the fixed capital is a very big problem and is therefore the 
only member whose attitude supports the hypothesis. The members’ collected attitudes 
towards the non marketability of cooperative equity lead to a rejection of the third hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 4 states that because of the non marketability of the members’ cooperative equity 
the members will demand a higher rate of return on their contributed capital than they would 
on an investment in an investor-owned firm.  
 
Jensen & Meckling (1979) argue that members who invest in a cooperative should demand a 
higher rate of return compared to an investment in an investor-owned firm because of the non 
marketability of cooperative equity. This theory is dismissed because eight of twelve (one is 
indifferent) require a lower rate of return on their contributed capital in Landshypotek than 
they would require on invested capital in investor-owned firms as shown in table 5 and 6. The 
members demand a lower dividend due to lower risk in Landshypotek. The theory is only 
supported by one member who demands a higher rate of return in Landshypotek because of 
the fixed contributed capital. One member demands higher dividend in Landshypotek due to 
another reason. He/she demands a higher dividend in Landshypotek because contributed 
capital does not give the possibility to benefit from the increase in value as much as an 
investment in stocks could do. The fourth hypothesis is therefore rejected because the 
majority of the members would not require a higher dividend on their contributed capital than 
they would on an investment in an investor-owned firm. 
 
5.3 Free-rider problem 
 
The free-rider problem occurs when a member joins Landshypotek without contributing with 
any or little capital (Vitaliano, 1983). The new member gets access to the collectively owned 
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capital in the cooperative which older members have accumulated. New members also acquire 
the right to vote and the right to the cooperative’s residual cash flow against little counter 
performance.  
 
According to Lerman & Parliament (1993) members will rather seek to benefit directly 
through their business relation with the cooperative than earning return on invested capital. 
Hypothesis 5 states that Landshypotek’s members will prefer a lower interest rate on 
borrowed capital instead of a high dividend on contributed capital. According to figure 23, 
84 percent of the interviewed members believe that a low interest rate on borrowed capital is 
more important than a high dividend on contributed capital. Of the two members (member 3 
and 12) that constitute the remaining 16 percent one states that the interest rate should be 
determined so that the dividend on contributed capital is maximized. The second of the two 
members declares that he/she is indifferent between low interest rate and high dividend as 
long as the total result is as favorable as possible. This implies that only one of the 
interviewed members prefers a high dividend on contributed capital to a low interest on 
borrowed capital. Hypothesis 5 is therefore confirmed. According to the theory this indicates 
that the members are more interested in benefitting directly through their commercial 
relationship with Landshypotek than earning a return on invested capital. 
  
In the financial model that Landshypotek uses today the interest on contributed capital is 
small compared to the patronage refund. This implies that the members in Landshypotek 
mostly profit through their dealings with the cooperative. Because of this and the fact that the 
members are unable to actively contribute with capital, the incentives to invest capital in 
Landshypotek’s old financial model is practically nonexistent. According to Harris et al, 
(1996), Landshypotek therefore experiences problems with free-riders because new members 
gain access to equity, contributed by the older members. The new members are therefore able 
to harvest benefits that they have not fully contributed to. Further as described above, the 
interviewed members prefer a low interest rate compared to a high dividend which indicates 
that they are more interested in benefitting directly through their business relation with 
Landshypotek than earning a return on invested capital. This implies that the interviewed 
members have a tendency to become free-riders also in the new model if there are no 
incentives to invest capital.  
 
According to the property rights theory, the risk of free-riders decreases if the incentives for 
the members to invest in the cooperative increases. Hypothesis 6 states that the intended 
change of contributed capital will reduce the risk of the free-rider problem because the 
dividend on contributed capital creates an incentive for members to invest capital in 
Landshypotek. The hypothesis is supported by seven of the interviewed members who state 
that their incentives to invest capital in Landshypotek increases with the intended change of 
contributed capital. Two of the five members (member 7 and 2) who state that their incentives 
to invest capital in Landshypotek do not increase as a result of the intended change of 
contributed capital, also state that they would actively contribute with capital in Landshypotek 
if the intended change is implemented. Member 7 believes that members with large 
contributed capital will benefit the most from the intended change and member 2 states that 
he/she will invest in order not to lose by the intended change. This contradicts member 7 and 
2 statements that their incentives to invest in Landshypotek do not increase. This can be 
interpreted as their incentives to invest in Landshypotek increases subconsciously.  
 
In Landshypotek’s new financial model it is necessary to contribute with capital in order to 
profit to the same extent as before. According to figure 26, a new member that borrows 10 
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million over 25 years needs to actively contribute with approximately 3 500 SEK in order to 
attain the same cost of capital as in the old model. This amount of 3 500 SEK is not much 
money and a new member should be able to invest that capital. Table 8 also shows that it is 
possible for the member to further reduce the cost of capital by making a full capital 
contribution of four percent of the borrowed capital, either through the use of the “member 
loan” or by own assets. The results from the calculations of a member’s cost of capital in 
chapter 4.2 reveals that Landshypotek’s new financial model is a reward system which 
thereby creates incentives for members to invest capital in Landshypotek.  
 
According to the majority of the interviewed members, their incentives to invest capital in 
Landshypotek increase with the intended change of contributed capital. The results from 
chapter 4.2 also show that the new financial model rewards investing members with lower 
cost of capital. According to the property rights theory, these increased incentives to invest 
capital in the new financial model imply that Landshypotek’s intended change of contributed 
capital will lead to a reduced risk of free-riders. Hypothesis 6 is therefore confirmed. 
 
5.4 Horizon problem 
 
Hypothesis 7 declares that members with long time left in Landshypotek will be more positive 
towards the intended change of contributed capital than members with a short time left and 
therefore also be more interested in investing capital in Landshypotek.  
 
According to figure 25 almost 70 percent of the interviewed members are overall positive 
towards Landshypotek’s intended change of contributed capital. According to hypothesis 7, 
members with long time left in Landshypotek will be more positive towards the intended 
change of contributed capital than members with a short time left. Half of the members who 
are overall positive towards the intended change have a time horizon of 15-20 years and the 
remaining half have a time horizon of 0-5 years as shown in table 9. It is therefore not 
possible to draw any straightforward conclusion from the interviewed members who are 
positive. However, figure 25 also shows that 17 percent of the interviewed members are very 
negative or negative towards the intended change. According to the theory, these members 
should have a shorter time horizon than those who are positive. Among the 17 percent who 
are negative, all interviewed members have a time horizon of 15-20 years which therefore 
contradicts the theory. Finally one member (eight percent) with a time horizon of 15-20 years 
is indifferent towards the intended change and the member with a time horizon of ten years 
has no opinion. The first part of hypothesis 7 is therefore rejected because the results do not 
show that members with a longer time horizon have a tendency to be more positive towards 
the intended change of contributed capital. 
 
According to Nilsson (2001) the members with shorter time left in the cooperative should be 
less interested in investing in the cooperative than members with longer time left. This leads 
to the conclusion that members who are willing to invest capital in Landshypotek should have 
a long expected time horizon. Seven of the interviewed members state that they will invest 
capital in Landshypotek if the intended change of contributed capital is implemented. Table 9 
illustrates that five of these members have a time horizon of 15-20 years, which therefore is in 
accordance with the theory. One member has a time horizon of ten years, which in this case 
can be considered as both a long and short time horizon. The last of the members who are 
willing to invest capital has a time horizon of 0-5 years, which contradicts the theory. The 
theory also indicates that the members who are reluctant to invest capital in Landshypotek 
should have a short expected time horizon. Five of the interviewed members state that they 
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will not invest capital in Landshypotek if the intended change is implemented. Among the 
five non investing members there are three members who have a time horizon of 0-5 years 
who therefore are in accordance with the indication. The indication is however contradicted 
by two of the non investing members who have a time horizon of 15-20 years. This implies 
that five members with a time horizon of 15-20 years are willing to invest and three members 
with a time horizon of 0-5 years are reluctant to invest. This leads to the conclusion that eight 
of the interviewed members support the theory. The second part of hypothesis 7 that states 
that members with long time left in Landshypotek will be more interested in investing capital 
is therefore confirmed. 
 
Hypothesis 7 is therefore partly rejected and partly confirmed because the results are 
ambiguous show little or no connection between the members’ expected time horizon and 
their overall attitudes towards Landshypotek’s intended change of contributed capital. 
However, the results show that members with a long time left as members are more interested 
in investing capital in Landshypotek. 
 
Table 9. The members’ attitudes towards the new model and their ambition to invest. Source own arrangement 
 
Table 9 displays the members’ overall perception of the intended change of contributed 
capital. The members are divided in groups based on their expected time left as members in 
Landshypotek. Table 9 also reveals how many of the members that intend to invest capital in 
Landshypotek.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 Overall perception Investing 
Time horizon Positive Negative Indifferent No opinion Yes No 
0-5 years (4 members) 4    1 3 
10 years (1 member)    1 1  
15-20 years (7 members) 4 2 1  5 2 
Total   8 2 1 1 7 5 
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6 Conclusions 
 
The purpose with this chapter is to draw conclusions from the analysis and the results and 
therefore be able to answer the questions stated in the aim. 
 
The aim of the study is to answer the following questions: 
 
 Will Landshypotek’s members be negative towards increasing their illiquid stake?  
 Will the intended change of contributed capital reduce the risk of free-rider problem?  
 Will members with a long time left in Landshypotek be more positive towards the 
intended change of contributed capital than those with a short time left?  
 Will members terminate their business relationship with Landshypotek due to the 
intended change of contributed capital? 
 How will the intended change of contributed capital affect a member’s cost of capital? 
 
 
6.1 Will Landshypotek’s members be negative towards increasing their illiquid stake?  
 
The analysis shows that the member’s decision to invest capital in Landshypotek is not based 
on the residual right of control and they will therefore not be reluctant to increase their equity 
shares because Landshypotek applies “one member one vote”. The majority of the 
interviewed members also perceive no problem with the non marketability of Landshypotek’s 
cooperative equity. It is demonstrated that the incentives to invest increase despite the fixed 
contributed capital and according to the analysis, the non marketability of Landshypotek’s 
cooperative equity will therefore not lead to that the members will be reluctant to increase 
their equity shares. 
 
As discussed above the majority of the interviewed members see no problem with the fact that 
Landshypotek’s cooperative equity is non marketable. The non marketability of 
Landshypotek’s cooperative equity therefore does not imply that the interviewed members are 
more interested in investing in investor-owned firms than investing in Landshypotek through 
an active contribution of capital. The decision to invest capital in Landshypotek is governed 
by other factors such as lower risk compared to the stock market and the fact that they find the 
new financial model profitable. The analysis also shows that the interviewed members’ 
attitudes towards the non marketability of the cooperative equity and their perception that the 
risk of investing capital in Landshypotek is lower compared to the stock market. This implies 
that fact the members will not demand a higher rate of return on their contributed capital than 
they would on an investment in an investor-owned firm. 
 
Hypotheses one, two, three and four are all rejected and the conclusion therefore is that 
Landshypotek’s members will not be negative towards increasing their illiquid stake. 
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6.2 Will the intended change of contributed capital reduce the risk of free-rider 
problem? 
 
According to the analysis, Landshypotek experiences problems with free-riders in the old 
financial model. It is also shown that there are tendencies among the members to become 
free-riders in the new financial model.  
 
However, the analysis reveals that the intended change of contributed capital is a system that 
creates incentives to invest capital because investing members are rewarded with lower cost 
of capital. It is shown that a member’s cost of capital decreases if the members increase their 
contributed capital. In comparison with the old financial model, a member borrowing 10 
million SEK over 25 years only has to use own assets to invest amounting to approximately 
3 500 SEK in order achieve the same cost of capital after the intended change of contributed 
capital is implemented as shown in figure 26. The analysis also shows that the majority of the 
interviewed members’ incentives to invest capital in Landshypotek increase consciously or 
subconsciously as a result of the intended change of contributed capital. According to the 
analysis, these increased incentives to invest capital will lead to a reduced risk of free-riders. 
The overall conclusion is therefore that the intended change of contributed capital will reduce 
the risk of free-rider problem. 
 
6.3 Will members with a long time left in Landshypotek be more positive towards the 
intended change of contributed capital than those with a short time left? 
 
The results show that the majority of the interviewed members are overall positive towards 
Landshypotek’s intended change of contributed capital. However, the analysis shows that 
there is little or no connection between the members’ expected time horizon and their overall 
attitudes towards Landshypotek’s intended change of contributed capital. It is therefore not 
possible to draw a conclusion based on merely the interviewed members overall attitudes 
towards the intended change of contributed capital. But the analysis also shows that the 
assertion that members with a long time left in Landshypotek will be more interested in 
investing capital is supported by the majority of the interviewed members. The possibility for 
the members to actively contribute with capital in Landshypotek is the main feature in 
Landshypotek’s intended change of contributed capital. The relationship between the 
members’ expected time horizon and their willingness to invest capital in Landshypotek is 
therefore considered to be an important aspect when trying to answer the question above. The 
conclusion is that the members, regardless of their expected time horizon, are positive 
towards the intended change of contributed capital and that members with long time left in 
Landshypotek are even more positive towards the possibility to actively contribute with 
capital. 
 
6.4 Will members end their business relationship with Landshypotek due to the 
intended change of contributed capital? 
 
The results show that almost none of the interviewed members will terminate their 
membership in Landshypotek if the intended change of contributed capital is implemented. 
One member intends to calculate the difference in comparison with the old financial model 
and then make a decision whether to remain as member or not based on what other credit 
institutions offer. The results also show that 42 percent of the interviewed members’ decision 
to remain as a member in Landshypotek is not affected by the dividend on contributed capital. 
The remaining 58 percent express that the dividend rate is of importance when the 
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membership is considered as shown in figure 22. The conclusion is that the members are not 
likely to terminate their business relationship with Landshypotek due to the intended change 
of contributed capital as long as Landshypotek achieves the goal of ten percent dividend on 
contributed capital. 
 
6.5 How will the intended change of contributed capital affect a member’s cost of 
capital? 
 
The results show that the intended change of contributed capital has a small effect on a 
member’s cost of capital as long as the member chooses not to invest capital in Landshypotek. 
It is shown that a member’s cost of capital for borrowing 10 million SEK over 25 years 
increases with 0,016 percent in the new financial model compared to the old model if the 
member chooses not to invest any capital. The cost of capital decreases with higher 
contributed capital and in order to achieve a lower cost of capital in the new financial model, 
the member needs to invest approximately 3 500 SEK through the use of own assets. The 
lowest cost of capital is achieved when the member chooses to actively contribute with four 
percent of the borrowed capital. It is possible for a member to reduce the cost of capital for 
borrowing 10 million SEK over 25 years with 0,78 percent or 0,35 percent with an full active 
contribution of capital, through the use of own assets or the “member loan” respectively. The 
conclusion is that the intended change of contributed capital tends to increase the cost of 
capital for non investing members and decrease it for investing members. 
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7 Discussion 
 
This chapter aims to discuss the empirics and results from the analysis and the conclusions.  
 
According to the analysis the members do not find the non marketability of Landshypotek’s 
cooperative equity as a big problem. However, eight of the interviewed members are negative 
towards the fact that the contributed capital is paid out three years after the membership is 
terminated. This indicates that the members do not like the non marketability of their equity 
shares. But the members accept it as long as they are members because that is how the 
cooperative works and it improves the conditions for Landshypotek to attract loan capital.      
 
One of the conclusions is that the intended change of contributed capital reduces the free-rider 
problem, partly because the dividend is prioritized at the expense of the patronage refund. 
This implies that the new model creates incentives to invest capital because investing 
members are rewarded. According to the results most of the interviewed members find it 
acceptable that members with large contributed capital will benefit the most from the new 
model. The members think this is fair because these members have contributed more and 
helped build up the cooperative. This is also the conclusion in the Nilsson (2002) study where 
the members in “Lantmännen” believe that the members who contribute with capital should 
be rewarded. This indicates that the intended change of contributed capital will further reduce 
the risk of free-riders in Landshypotek because the members do not only understand that 
investing members are rewarded but also believe that members who do not invest capital 
should profit less.  
 
In the selection of the respondents there was at first a criterion with the purpose to divide the 
members in groups according to their expected time left as a member. The aim with this 
criterion was to make it easier to analyze the horizon problem. But according to 
Landshypotek’s chief financial officer, Björn Ordell, it would be impossible to achieve this 
selection criterion because Landshypotek has no knowledge of the members’ expected time 
horizon. This made it very hard to choose respondents based in their expected time left in 
Landshypotek. The selection was then partly based on the members’ age instead. This did not 
result in a perfect distribution and among the interviewed members there are a majority of 
members with a longer time horizon. The results would have been easier to analyze with a 
more even distribution of members with different time horizons. It might have been possible 
to avoid this problem by using another method to select the respondents. One method could 
have been to first do a minor telephone interview to receive necessary information about the 
members and then choose members according to the selection criteria. 
 
The conclusions never really answer the question if members with longer time horizon are 
more positive towards the intended change. But the conclusions state that members with 
longer time left in Landshypotek are more positive towards investing capital in Landshypotek. 
This might indicate that members with longer time horizon also are more positive towards the 
intended change because the possibility to invest capital constitutes an essential part of the 
intended change. It is therefore not unreasonable to assume that members with a long time left 
in Landshypotek also are more positive towards the intended change of contributed capital 
than members with a short time left. 
 
The results indicate that the members will not terminate their membership because of the 
intended change of contributed capital. The general opinion is that the interest rate is the most 
important aspect and the majority of the interviewed members state that they will only change 
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credit institute if they attain better lending conditions elsewhere. The analysis also concludes 
that the members prefer low interest rate rather than a high dividend. One of the reasons for 
this is that the members believe that it is easier to compare Landshypotek with other credit 
institutions on the basis on the interest rate. This is something that Landshypotek should be 
aware of when they present the intended change of contributed capital to their members. The 
results support the importance of presenting the intended change of contributed capital in 
terms of lower interest rates rather than lower interest payments that are expressed in real 
terms. This will probably lead to an enhanced interest towards the intended change of 
contributed capital because the members are very focused on the interest rate.  
 
According to the conclusions it is important for Landshypotek to achieve the goal of ten 
percent dividend on contributed capital in order not to lose any members. However, the 
members might not terminate their membership if the dividend goal is not reached during a 
single year. But many of the interviewed members, state that they will consider other credit 
institutions if Landshypotek fails to deliver the dividend goal for two-three years consecution. 
The members also express that if Landshypotek promise something they should also be able 
to keep it. The results show that there is an acceptance of a lower dividend rate as shown in 
figure 22. It is also shown that several of the interviewed members believe that ten percent 
dividend sounds “too good”. This implies that it is possible for Landshypotek to lower the 
dividend goal without making the members negatively inclined towards the intended change 
of contributed capital. This is something that Landshypotek should consider, at least in the 
first years after the implementation of the change. A failure to deliver dividend in accordance 
with the goal might cause substantial “bad will” among the members.  
 
7.1 Future research 
 
This study is very qualitative and only investigates twelve members’ attitudes. After the 
implementation there is no need to explain the change of contributed capital to the members, 
which supports the possibility to conduct a quantitative study. A proposal for further studies 
therefore is to perform a survey regarding the members’ attitudes towards the new financial 
model, after the intended change of contributed capital is implemented. This kind of study 
would, to a larger extent, capture the members’ collective attitudes and also help 
Landshypotek to further develop their financial model. 
 
The study contains a review of “Lantmännens” and “Södras” models for transferring non-
restricted equity to restricted equity by issuing bonus shares. The study also includes a short 
presentation of the conclusions from the study “Medlemmen som ägare: Effekterna av 
insatsemissioner I Svenska Lantmännen” and “Attityder till kooperative finansiering”. 
“Lantmännen”, “Södra and “Milko” are all Swedish cooperatives whose main businesses are 
not within cooperative banking. Although several attempts has been made the authors have 
been unable to find relevant study’s regarding contributed capital in cooperative banks. A 
proposal for future studies therefore is to conduct a literature review regarding financial 
models and the members’ attitudes towards contributed capital in international cooperative 
banks, in order to examine what Landshypotek can learn from similar cooperatives.   
 
Finally it would be interesting to use other theoretical perspectives in order to investigate the 
members’ attitudes towards Landshypotek’s intended change of contributed capital. By using 
option theory it is possible to calculate the value of a member’s invested capital in a future 
sale of Landshypotek. The return on a member’s invested capital would probably be extensive 
if Landshypotek were to be sold. Is this something that affects the members’ willingness to 
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invest capital in Landshypotek and thereby their attitudes towards the intended change? It 
would also be interesting to use risk theories in order to calculate the risk of changing 
inflation rates, interest rates and dividend rates. How are the members’ attitudes towards the 
intended change of contributed capital affected by these risks?     
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Personal messages  
 
Björn Ordell 
Chief Financial Officer, Landshypotek 
Personal meeting, 2011-03-04 
 
Hans Andersson 
Professor at the department of economics, SLU 
Personal meeting, 2011-05-12 
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Appendix 1: Factsheet 
 
 
 
Dear member in Landshypotek! 
 
Our names are Fredrik Grönvall and Hannes Rydmark and we are studying to become agronomists at 
the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences in Uppsala. 
 
We are in the final stage of our education and have started our master thesis that intends to investigate 
Landshypotek’s members' attitudes towards an intended change of the contributed capital. The idea 
has emerged through discussions with Landshypotek’s chief financial officer Björn Ordell and we 
have designed the thesis together with our supervisor Hans Andersson at the Department of 
Economics, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Ultuna. The theories that are used in the 
thesis are the property rights theory, investment theory and financial theory. 
 
The study is conducted as a qualitative study of empirical material obtained through in-depth 
interviews with twelve members in Landshypotek. In order to capture Landshypotek members' 
collective opinions it is important to interview members with different backgrounds. We are therefore 
contacting you because you meet the criteria for one of these backgrounds. Your contact information 
has been administered to us by Mats Du Rietz, District Manager at Landshypotek. 
 
Your participation in this study is of course optional, but we want to stress that your responses are 
important for our investigation. The interview will take approximately one hour to complete and we 
would appreciate if we could visit you. 
 
Your responses will of course be treated confidentially and after the compilation, it will not be 
possible to discern an individual's responses. 
 
Facts about Landshypotek 
Landshypotek is today owned by an economic association consisting of around 50 000 members. The 
fact that the members own Landshypotek also means that they are helping to finance the business. 
With the financial model that Landshypotek uses today, the members have collectively built up an 
equity that amounts to around 3,5 billion.  
To meet the market's growing need for capital Landshypotek is required to expand the business and is 
therefore in need of increased funding. Landshypotek is therefore considering to introduce a change in 
the funding model that is used today at the end year 2011/ beginning of year 2012.  
 
Today 
 
Landshypotek’s profits are today distributed to borrowers (members) through patronage refund on 
interest that the borrowers paid during the year. How large the patronage refund will be is determined 
each year on Landshypotek’s annual meeting. In 2009 the patronage refund was 4,5 %, which meant 
that  the members received a refund that amounted to 4,5 % of their individual paid interests. Of the 
received patronage refund, 70 % is deposited into an equity account until it reaches 8 % (input limit) 
of the borrowed capital. The remaining 30 % and any excess of the input limit are deposited into a 
member account. The proceeds on the equity account serve as the members’ contributed capital and 
are paid out first three years after the members exit from Landshypotek. The contributed capital is 
fixed for the whole lending period but the proceeds on the member account offers three choices. Keep 
the money in the member account and receive interest, receive deduction of interest payments or 
request cash payout (minimum withdrawal is 5000 crones). Both the equity account and member 
account are interest bearing and for the last ten years the interest rate has averaged around 5%. 
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Tomorrow 
 
The change in the financial model that Landshypotek is considering implies that the member account 
is removed and that the input limit on the equity account is reduced from 8% of the borrowed capital 
to 4%. Instead of interest on contributed capital the members will be entitled dividend that is 
proportional to the size of their contributed capital. Patronage refund and dividend on contributed 
capital are capitalized on the equity account until it reaches 4 % of the borrowed capital. The change 
in the financial model also allows the members to deposit the full amount of contributed capital right 
away, either through a “member loan” or the use of own assets. By doing so, the member will receive 
direct payout of both patronage refund and dividend. The change will also give the board of directors 
the opportunity to each year change the input limit if needed. 
Following the change in the financial model, Landshypotek’s profits will be distributed amongst the 
members through dividend on contributed capital and patronage refund on paid interests. Because 
dividends and patronage refund are based on the business surplus, it is impossible to say in advance 
how large they will be, but the goal is to give 10 % dividend on contributed capital, and 1 % patronage 
refund on paid interests. With this change Landshypotek hopes to attain the funds needed to expand 
the business and to reward the members who contribute with capital. 
 
We now want to investigate the members' attitudes towards this intended change of contributed 
capital. Since the members (borrowers) also owns and finances the business, it is important for 
Landshypotek to investigate their attitudes towards the change. We believe that this study that also 
highlights the possibilities with the change may be of interest to you as an owner of Landshypotek. We 
would appreciate it if you wanted to participate in this interview, which will be of great help to us in 
this thesis. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fredrik Grönvall   Hannes Rydmark 
0702- 461512    0709- 966033 
a06frgr1@stud.slu.se   a06hary1@stud.slu.se 
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Appendix 2: Interview guide  
 
We are studying to become agronomists and are currently performing a master thesis with the 
intention to examine Landshypotek members' attitudes an intended change of the contributed 
capital. The idea has emerged through discussions with Landshypotek’s chief financial officer 
Björn Ordell. Landshypotek has also provided us with contact information for suitable 
members, but otherwise the thesis is completely independent of Landshypotek. 
 
We would like to record the interview and hope that this is okay. There is no right or wrong 
answers, we are only interested in your attitudes towards the intended change. Your responses 
will of course be treated confidentially and after the compilation, it will not be possible to 
discern an individual's responses. 
 
 
 
Opening questions 
 
1. What type of property do you own? 
 
 
 
2. What is the property’s main focus? 
 
 
 
3. For how long have you been a member in Landshypotek? 
 
 
 
4. What is your expected time horizon of your remaining membership? 
 
 
 
5. How old are you?  
 
 
 
6. What is your reason for being a member in Landshypotek? 
 
 
 
a) What are the criteria that made you chose Landshypotek? 
 
 
 
b) Why did you not chose another credit institute? 
 
 
 
7. How large is your total loan sum?  
  88 
 
 
8. What is the purpose of the loan?  
 
 
 
9. What is your opinion about Landshypotek’s future/ development as a profit making 
enterprise, on a five-point scale where 1 is very bad and 5 is very good? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
              Very bad                       Very good 
 
 
Knowledge based questions 
 
10. How is Landshypotek financed today? 
 
 
a) How is the equity financed? 
 
 
b) How is the remaining capital financed? 
 
 
11. What does contributed capital mean according to you? 
 
 
 
 
12. What differences do you see in investing in a cooperative compared to investing in the 
stock market?  
 
 
 
a) What is your perception of possibilities to trade/ sell your cooperative share compared 
to a share in a company on the stock market?  
 
 
  
b) What is your attitude towards the fact that it is only possible for the members to 
acquire cooperative shares?  
 
 
 
13. What is your perception of the term patronage refund and how is the patronage refund rate 
determined?  
 
 
 
14. Can you describe what the concept of the member account and equity account includes?  
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a) What are the possibilities to request pay out of the capital on the member account?  
 
 
 
b) What are the possibilities to request pay out of the capital on the equity account? 
 
 
 
15. Why do you think Landshypotek wants to introduce a new financial model?  
 
 
 
16. Do you find it easy or difficult to understand the change that Landshypotek is 
considering? 
 
 
 
Investment related questions 
 
RISK ATTITUDES 
 
17. What is your attitude towards taking risks? On a five-point scale where 1 is strongly 
dislikes and 5 is strongly likes.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
  Strongly dislikes                   Strongly likes 
 
18. What is the probability that your risk profile changes during your time left as a member in 
Landshypotek? On a five-point scale where 1 is very small and 5 is very large. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
    Very small                      Very large 
 
19. How do you perceive the risk of tying up capital in Landshypotek compared to investing 
capital in the stock market? On a five-point scale where 1 is very small and 5 is very 
large. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
    Very small                      Very large 
 
 
a) Why do you asses Landshypotek to have this type of risk profile? 
 
 
 
b) What are the risks of contributing with capital in Landshypotek compared to investing 
the capital on the stock market?  
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20. What is attitude towards contributing with capital in Landshypotek when the capital is 
fixed during the entire term of the membership?  
 
 
 
21. What is your attitude towards the fact that the contributed capital is repaid first three years 
after the membership is terminated 
 
 
 
22. Do you consider Landshypotek to be a cooperative that historically has taken small risks 
 
 
 
a) If yes, do you believe that the intended change of contributed capital will change 
Landshypotek’s risk profile?  
 
 
CONTRIBUTED CAPITAL 
 
23. How large is your contributed capital today?  
 
 
 
24. If the intended change of contributed capital is implemented, what is your attitude towards 
actively increasing your contributed capital in Landshypotek? 
 
 
 
a) Why do you want to/ not want to increase your contributed capital? 
 
 
 
b) How much of your borrowed capital would you be willing to actively contribute with?  
 
0 % 2 % 4 %  
 
c) What is your reason for choosing this amount?  
 
 
 
25. Would you be willing to contribute with more than the input limit of 4 % of the borrowed 
capital?  
 
 
a) If yes, how much would you be willing to contribute with?  
 
 
 
26. What would make you interested in contributing with more capital?  
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27. Who do you believe will profit the most from the intended change, members with a large 
or small amount of contributed capital?  
 
 
a) If members with a large amount of contributed capital where to profit more, what 
is your attitude towards this?  
 
 
 
b) Do you feel compelled to contribute with capital in order not to lose by the 
intended change?  
 
 
 
DIVIDEND 
 
28. What dividend rate would you require on your contributed capital?  
 
 
a) What is your reason for choosing that dividend rate?  
 
 
29. Would you require a higher dividend rate on your contributed capital compared to what 
you would require on capital invested on the stock market?  
 
 
a) Why do you demand a higher/ lower dividend on your contributed capital 
compared to capital invested on the stock market?  
 
 
30. Which of the following dividend rates would make you terminate your membership in 
Landshypotek?  
 
0 % 2 %  4 % 6 %  8%  the dividend does not affect the decision 
 
a) If the dividend does not affect the decision, what is the reason for this? 
 
 
 
Behavior and attitudes 
 
 
31. Does your reason for being a member change and in that case how, if the intended change 
of contributed capital is implemented?  
 
 
 
32. Will you more closely follow what happens in Landshypotek if the intended change is 
implemented?  
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33. Does your motives to invest capital in Landshypotek increase as a result of the intended 
change of contributed capital?  
 
 
 
34. Do you believe that the intended change will lead to a stronger an clearer connection 
between the contributed capital and the dividend?  
 
 
 
35. What is your attitude towards the fact that the dividend is prioritized at the expense of the 
patronage refund?  
 
 
 
36. Does the intended change of contributed capital mean that you will terminate your 
membership by changing to another credit institute?  
 
 
b) What would make you terminate your membership?  
 
 
 
37. Do you prefer Landshypotek’s old financial model before the intended change of 
contributed capital?  
 
 
a) What is your reason for this? 
 
 
 
38. What is your attitude towards the fact that it is not possible to receive neither patronage 
refund nor dividend on contributed capital until the proceeds on the equity account has 
reached 4 % of the borrowed capital? On a five-point scale where 1 is strongly dislikes 
and 5 is strongly likes. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
    Strongly dislikes                                Strongly dislikes 
 
 
a) What is your reason for this? 
 
 
 
39. Is it more important with a low interest on borrowed capital compared to a high dividend 
on contributed capital? On a five-point scale where 1 is very unimportant and 5 is very 
important. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
    Very unimportant                     Very important 
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a) What is your reason for this?  
 
 
 
40. Landshypotek will offer the possibility to borrow capital (”member loan”) to make an 
active contribution of capital, is this something that you will consider in order to finance 
your contributed capital?   
 
 
 
41. What is your attitude towards the fact that the board will have the possibility to change the 
size of the input limit if Landshypotek’s need of equity changes?  
 
 
 
 
Ownership 
 
42. Do you believe that members with a large amount of contributed capital should have a 
larger voting right compared to members with a small amount of contributed capital?  
 
 
 
43. Would you be willing to contribute with a larger amount of contributed capital if the 
voting right were proportional to the member’s size of contributed capital?  
 
 
a) If yes, how much would you be willing to contribute with? On a five-point scale 
where 1 is very little and 5 is very much. 
 
  
1 2 3 4 5 
    Very little                                                Very much 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
44. What is your overall perception of Landshypotek’s intended change of contributed 
capital? On a five-point scale where 1 is very negative and 5 is very positive. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
    Very negative                     Very positive 
 
 
45. Do you have any comments, questions or anything to add? 
 
 
 
46. Can we come back with further questions if we lack information?  
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Interest on borrowed capital 4,3%
Intereset on contributed capital 2,5%
Patronage refund in percent of paid interest 4,5%
Interest on member account 3,05%
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Member account (M) 5805 11378 16895 22351 27742 33068 38326 43514 48631 53673 58639 63527 68334 73058
Contributed capital (C) 13545 26548 39348 51932 64293 76427 88329 99992 111411 122579 133492 144141 154522 164627
Borrowed capital (L0) 10000000 9600000 9200000 8800000 8400000 8000000 7600000 7200000 6800000 6400000 6000000 5600000 5200000 4800000 4400000
Interest on borrowed capital (i) -430000 -412800 -395600 -378400 -361200 -344000 -326800 -309600 -292400 -275200 -258000 -240800 -223600 -206400
Straight-line amortization (a) -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000
Patronage refund (Pr) 19350 18576 17802 17028 16254 15480 14706 13932 13158 12384 11610 10836 10062 9288
Interest on contributed capital (ic) 0 339 664 984 1298 1607 1911 2208 2500 2785 3064 3337 3604 3863
Interest on member account (im) 0 177 347 515 682 846 1009 1169 1327 1483 1637 1788 1938 2084
Net cash flow per year 10000000 -830000 -812800 -795600 -778400 -761200 -744000 -726800 -709600 -692400 -675200 -658000 -640800 -623600 -606400
Cost of capital/ IRR 4,161%
Appendix 3: Old model  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
77696 82247 86706 91072 95342 99513 103582 107546 111402 115147 118777 122288 125911 129641
174450 183984 193221 202155 210778 219083 227061 234706 242008 248959 255551 261775 268164 274708
4000000 3600000 3200000 2800000 2400000 2000000 1600000 1200000 800000 400000 0 0 0 0
-189200 -172000 -154800 -137600 -120400 -103200 -86000 -68800 -51600 -34400 -17200 0 0 0
-400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 0 0 0
8514 7740 6966 6192 5418 4644 3870 3096 2322 1548 774 0 0 0
4116 4361 4600 4831 5054 5269 5477 5677 5868 6050 6224 6389 6544 0
2228 2370 2509 2645 2778 2908 3035 3159 3280 3398 3512 3623 3730 0
-589200 -572000 -554800 -537600 -520400 -503200 -486000 -468800 -451600 -434400 -417200 0 0 404349
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Interest on borrowed capital 4,3%
Dividend on contributed capital 10%
Patronage refund in percent of paid interest 1%
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Contributed capital 0 4300 8858 13700 18854 24351 30226 36517 43265 50515 58319 66730 75811 85629
Borrowed capital (L0) 10000000 9600000 9200000 8800000 8400000 8000000 7600000 7200000 6800000 6400000 6000000 5600000 5200000 4800000 4400000
Straight-line amortization (a) -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000
Interest on borrowed capital (i) -430000 -412800 -395600 -378400 -361200 -344000 -326800 -309600 -292400 -275200 -258000 -240800 -223600 -206400
Patronage refund (Pr) 4300 4128 3956 3784 3612 3440 3268 3096 2924 2752 2580 2408 2236 2064
Dividend on contributed capital (d) 0 430 886 1370 1885 2435 3023 3652 4326 5052 5832 6673 7581 8563
Net cash flow per year 10000000 -830000 -812800 -795600 -778400 -761200 -744000 -726800 -709600 -692400 -675200 -658000 -640800 -623600 -606400
Cost of capital/ IRR 4,177%
Appendix 4: New model, no active contribution  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
96255 107773 120270 133845 148606 164670 182169 201246 222059 244781 269603 296735 326409 359050
4000000 3600000 3200000 2800000 2400000 2000000 1600000 1200000 800000 400000 0 0 0 0
-400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 0 0 0
-189200 -172000 -154800 -137600 -120400 -103200 -86000 -68800 -51600 -34400 -17200 0 0 0
1892 1720 1548 1376 1204 1032 860 688 516 344 172 0 0 0
9626 10777 12027 13385 14861 16467 18217 20125 22206 24478 26960 29674 32641 0
-589200 -572000 -554800 -537600 -520400 -503200 -486000 -468800 -451600 -434400 -417200 0 0 359050
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15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
400000
4000000 3600000 3200000 2800000 2400000 2000000 1600000 1200000 800000 400000 0 0 0 0
-400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 0 0 0
-189200 -172000 -154800 -137600 -120400 -103200 -86000 -68800 -51600 -34400 -17200 0 0 0
1892 1720 1548 1376 1204 1032 860 688 516 344 172 0 0 0
40000 40000 40000 40000 40000 40000 40000 40000 40000 40000 40000 40000 40000 0
-547308 -530280 -513252 -496224 -479196 -462168 -445140 -428112 -411084 -394056 -377028 40000 40000 400000
Interest on borrowed capital 4,3%
Dividend on contributed capital 10%
Patronage refund in percent of paid interest 1%
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Own assets -400000
Contributed capital (C) 400000
Borrowed capital (L0) 10000000 9600000 9200000 8800000 8400000 8000000 7600000 7200000 6800000 6400000 6000000 5600000 5200000 4800000 4400000
Straight-line amortization (a) -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000
Interest on borrowed capital (i) -430000 -412800 -395600 -378400 -361200 -344000 -326800 -309600 -292400 -275200 -258000 -240800 -223600 -206400
Patronage refund (Pr) 4300 4128 3956 3784 3612 3440 3268 3096 2924 2752 2580 2408 2236 2064
Dividend on contributed capital (d) 40000 40000 40000 40000 40000 40000 40000 40000 40000 40000 40000 40000 40000 40000
Net cash flow per year 10000000 -785700 -768672 -751644 -734616 -717588 -700560 -683532 -666504 -649476 -632448 -615420 -598392 -581364 -564336
Cost of capital/ IRR 3,383%
Appendix 5: New model, active contribution with own assets  
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15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
400000
4000000 3600000 3200000 2800000 2400000 2000000 1600000 1200000 800000 400000 0 0 0 0
-400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 0 0 0
-189200 -172000 -154800 -137600 -120400 -103200 -86000 -68800 -51600 -34400 -17200 0 0 0
1892 1720 1548 1376 1204 1032 860 688 516 344 172 0 0 0
40000 40000 40000 40000 40000 40000 40000 40000 40000 40000 40000 40000 40000 0
160000 144000 128000 112000 96000 80000 64000 48000 32000 16000 0 0 0 0
-16000 -16000 -16000 -16000 -16000 -16000 -16000 -16000 -16000 -16000 -16000 0 0 0
-6160 -5600 -5040 -4480 -3920 -3360 -2800 -2240 -1680 -1120 -560 0 0 0
-569468 -551880 -534292 -516704 -499116 -481528 -463940 -446352 -428764 -411176 -393588 40000 40000 400000
Interest on borrowed capital 4,3%
Dividend on contributed capital 10%
Patronage refund in percent of paid interest 1%
Interest on member loan 3,5%
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Contributed capital (C) 
Borrowed capital (L0) 10000000 9600000 9200000 8800000 8400000 8000000 7600000 7200000 6800000 6400000 6000000 5600000 5200000 4800000 4400000
Straight-line amortization (a) -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000 -400000
Interest on borrowed capital (i) -430000 -412800 -395600 -378400 -361200 -344000 -326800 -309600 -292400 -275200 -258000 -240800 -223600 -206400
Patronage refund (Pr) 4300 4128 3956 3784 3612 3440 3268 3096 2924 2752 2580 2408 2236 2064
Dividend on contributed capital (d) 40000 40000 40000 40000 40000 40000 40000 40000 40000 40000 40000 40000 40000 40000
Member loan 400000 384000 368000 352000 336000 320000 304000 288000 272000 256000 240000 224000 208000 192000 176000
Straight-line amortization member loan (Am) -16000 -16000 -16000 -16000 -16000 -16000 -16000 -16000 -16000 -16000 -16000 -16000 -16000 -16000
Interest on member loan (Rm) -14000 -13440 -12880 -12320 -11760 -11200 -10640 -10080 -9520 -8960 -8400 -7840 -7280 -6720
Net cash flow per year 10000000 -815700 -798112 -780524 -762936 -745348 -727760 -710172 -692584 -674996 -657408 -639820 -622232 -604644 -587056
Cost of capital/ IRR 3,816%
Appendix 6: New model, active contribution with “member loan 
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Appendix 7: Distribution of contributed capital in Landshypotek 
 
 
Contributed capital/ debt Members Contributed capital (SEK) Debt (SEK) 
0,0 % - 0,5 % 7769 25980478 14127239145 
0,5 % - 1,0 % 3034 54841129 7417976156 
1,0 % - 1,5 % 2904 70150268 5688555683 
1,5 % - 2,0 % 2882 72951829 4211621225 
2,0 % - 2,5 % 2529 66159689 2958615234 
2,5 % - 3,0 % 2429 64294622 2350107667 
3,0 % - 3,5 % 2308 56027748 1733425781 
3,5 % - 4,0 % 1914 47625231 1276313634 
4,0 % - 4,5 % 1833 42212573 994203747 
4,5 % - 5,0 % 1812 41351571 870905349 
5,0 % - 5,5 % 1643 37234989 711704600 
5,5 % - 6,0 % 1532 35279090 614301539 
6,0 % - 6,5 % 1322 29792504 476141826 
6,5 % - 7,0 % 1371 29515039 437471078 
7,0 % - 7,5 % 1356 29024773 400183680 
7,5 % - 8,0 % 1594 26298014 338884886 
Over 8 % 23492 297563429 1482384348 
Total 61724 1026302976 46090035578 
 
